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When 8is sufficiently small, the first term is the smaller of the two, and it is well approximated by the expression 4 page | Borgers, Tilman, and Rajiv Sarin. 1995. "Naive Reinforcement Learning with Endogenous Aspirations." Discussion Paper, University College, London.
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