d. Àt whàt prîduñtiîn låvål is àvåràgå ñîst à minimum? (Uså thå språàdshååt råsults.)
å. Àssuming îthår firms hàvå this ñîst struñturå, whàt shîuld this sîftwàrå firm åxpåñt tî bå ñhàrging fîr its sîftwàrå in thå lîng run åquilibrium fîr this màrkåt? Åxplàin.
The nature of international law and the international system
In the following chapters, much will be said about the substance of international law, the method of its creation and the legal persons or 'subjects' who may be governed by it. The purpose of this first chapter is, however, to examine the very nature and quality of this subject called 'international law'. Historically, international law has been derided or disregarded by many of the world's foremost jurists and legal commentators. They have questioned, first, the existence of any set of rules governing inter-state relations; second, its entitlement to be called 'law'; and, third, its effectiveness in controlling states and other international actors in 'real life' situations. In the early years of the twenty-first century, this theoretical rejection of the prescriptive quality of international law seemed to be borne out in practice as a number of states, groups and individuals became engaged in internationally 'unlawful' action without even the remote possibility that their conduct could be checked by the international legal system. Whatever the legal merits of the US-led invasion of Iraq or the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, or the detention of terrorist suspects without trial, or the unhindered resort to terrorism by groups based in existing states (with or without the support of another state's government), or the rejection by some of international minimum standards for the protection of the environment, the perception has been that international law is failing in one of its primary purposes - the maintenance of an ordered community where the weak are protected from arbitrary action by the strong. Some commentators have even suggested that we are witnessing the demise of this subject as a legal discipline and should now recognise it as having political and moral force, but not necessarily legal content.
There is, of course, some truth in these criticisms, but let us not pretend that we are arguing that international law is a perfect legal system. It is not, but neither is the national legal system of any state. Historically, there have been successes and failures for the international legal system. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 may have produced a significant response from the international community, both legally and militarily, but the United Nations failed in Bosnia, Somalia and Sudan and was impotent as Israel invaded Lebanon in July 2006. Likewise, the denial of procedural and substantive rights to those being held in detention by the USA at Guantanamo Bay may well constitute a violation of the international law of human rights worthy of much criticism, but it pales beside the activities of Pol Pot in Cambodia in the late 1970s or the Rwandan genocide of the 1990s. On the other hand, these episodes can be contrasted with the successful UN-led efforts to bring self-determination and then independence to East Timor in 2002, the groundbreaking establishment and operation of the International Criminal Court responsible for
The nature of international law and the international system
prosecuting individuals for violation of fundamental international human rights and the continuing impact of the International Court of Justice in regulating states' use of the world's oceans and their natural resources. In other words, the story of international law and the international legal system, like so many other legal systems, is one with successes and failures. So, in much the same way that we would not suggest that the law of the UK is somehow 'not law' because it is currently proving impossible to control internet crime, it does not necessarily follow that international law should be dismissed as a system of law because there are international actors that seem determined to ignore it.
The way in which the international system deals with these practical issues and the many others that occur on a daily basis whenever the members of the international community interact, goes to the heart of the debate about whether 'international law' exists as a system of law. However, to some extent, this debate about the nature of international law is unproductive and even irrelevant. The most obvious and most frequently used test for judging the 'existence' or 'success' of international law is to compare it with national legal systems such as that operating in the UK or Japan or anywhere at all. National law and its institutions -courts, legislative assemblies and enforcement agencies - are held up as the definitive model of what 'the law' and 'a legal system' should be like. Then, because international law sometimes falls short of these 'standards', it is argued that it cannot be regarded as 'true' law. Yet, it is not at all clear why any form of national law should be regarded as the appropriate standard for judging international law, especially since the rationale of the former is fundamentally different from that of the latter. National law is concerned primarily with the legal rights and duties of legal persons (individuals) within a body politic - the state or similar entity. This Taw' commonly is derived from a legal superior, recognised as competent by the society to whom the law is addressed (e.g. in a constitution), and having both the authority and practical competence to make and enforce that law. International law, at least as originally conceived, is different. It is concerned with the rights and duties of the states themselves. In their relations with each other it is neither likely nor desirable that a relationship of legal superiority exists. States are legal equals and the legal system which regulates their actionsQnterjg must reflect this. Such a legal system must facilitate the interaction of these legal equals rather than control or compel them in imitation of the control and compulsion that national law exerts over its subjects. Of course, as international law develops and matures it may come to encompass the legal relations of non-state entities, such as 'peoples', territories, individuals or multi-national companies, and it must then develop institutions and procedures which imitate in part the functions of the institutions of national legal systems. Indeed, the re-casting of international law as a system based less on state sovereignty and more on individual liberty is an aim of many contemporary international lawyers and there is no doubt that very great strides have been made in this direction in recent years. The establishment of the International Criminal Court is perhaps the most powerful evidence of this trend. However, whatever we might hope for in the future for international law (see section 1.7 below), it is crucial to remember that at the very heart of the system lies a set of rules designed to regulate states' conduct with each other, and it is this central fact that makes precise analogies with national law at present misleading and inappropriate.
The nature of international law and the international system