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Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority

t Stevens1991. This case illustrated the Presentment Clause (giving President opportunity to veto any bill) and the bicameral requirement (whereby both Houses must pass a bill before it can become law). SCt held that if a review board (or other oversight board) staffed by Members of Congress is carrying out what are properly viewed as legislative functions, the board’s own actions must be approved by both Houses and presented to the President for his veto.

t Facts. Congress passed a statute saying that Dulles and National Airports would be transferred from the federal government to the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, provided that the Authority set up a Board of Review composed of nine Members of Congress. The Board of Review would have veto power over any decisions made by the Authority. Challengers to the Act argued that if the Board of Review were set up with that composition, Members of Congress would in effect be administering the airports, a function entrusted to the Executive Branch.

t Board struck down. SCt agreed that the creation of the Board staffed by Members of Congress would violate separation of powersprinciples. SCt did not decide which of two constitutional violations would occur, but did decide that one or the other would definitely occur:

n Improper lawmaking. If the Board’s actions were viewed as legislative in nature, the Congress was violating the presentment and bicameralism requirements, since the congressionally-staffed Board would be making individual decisions that would that would not be approved by each House or presented to the President for his possible veto. The Board action in that instance would be similar to the legislative veto invalidated in Chadha.

n Improper execution of laws. Alternatively, the Board might be viewed as giving the Board the power to execute or administer the laws. In that event, the Board would be in effect an arm of Congress performing Executive functions. This would violate the separation of powersprinciple that only the Executive Branch, not Congress, may carry out the laws. (Bowhser established this rule.)

t Dissent - White. Board is a creature of state law, and separation of powersdoes not apply to state laws. More generally, the SCt shouldn’t worry so much about legislative encroachment. These days, the executive is the more dangerous branch of government.

t Critiqueof Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority

n Assuming that Board of Review was exercising executive authority, what did Court ignore relatively clear requirements of appointments and ineligibility clauses in favor of more amorphous, arguably nontextual Bowsher principle (unconstitutional because Board of Review was an “agent of Congress”)? This contrasts with Burger’s textualism in Chadha.

n Assuming Board of Review was exercising legislative authority, then why was it constitutional for Federal Aviation Administration to run the airport prior to the transfer?


Date: 2015-01-02; view: 749


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