Commitment and the budget

t Gramm-Rudman Actinvalidated in Bowsher is one of a number of structural or “quasi-constitutional” statutes enacted by Congress in recent years designed to control federal spending. These statutes raise fundamental questions concerning the constitutional authority of the political branches to restructure the political process so as to favor certain outcomes.

t One commentator suggested that the Gramm-Rudman act does not and cannot reduce legislative power to spend. Specifically, under the Act, if Congress and the President prefer to evade the consequences of automatic budget cuts, they may readily do so.

t Why didn’t Congress simply enact an ordinary law accomplishing the result it favored instead of proceeding indirectly through the Gramm-Rudman Act.

Appointments power - Congressional control over administrative officials

Chadhaand Bowsher

t While these two cases both invalidated innovative schemes designed to preserve congressional control of delegated authority, the two decisions utilize different approaches.

t Chadha. Invalidated statute (legislative veto) because it failed to comply with presentment and bicameral requirements for enactment of statutes. Problem with this approach is that in absence of legislative veto, Chadha’s deportation status would be determined by INS, yet the INS’s decision also fails to comply with bicameralism requirement.

t Bowsher. Avoids this difficulty by reversing the analysis; SCt treated Comptroller General’s budget-cutting authority not as legislative, but rather as executive power. SCt. Held that Congress unconstitutionally trenched on executive authority by vesting this authority in an officer under legislative control.

Date: 2015-01-02; view: 609