Notes on Reciprocity and Kinship Rank

B.0.0 These materials deal with kinship-rank reciprocities both in simple form and in the context of chiefly redistribution.

B. 1.0 Hunting-Gathering Peoples

B.l.l Bushmen — "No Bushman wants prominence, but Toma [a band headman] went further than most in avoiding prominence; he had almost no possessions and gave away ev­erything that came into his hands. He was diplomatic, for in exchange for his self-imposed poverty he won the respect and following of all the people there" (Thomas, 1959, p. 183). "We did hear people say . . . that a headman may feel that he should lean well to the generous side in his giving, for his position as headman sets him out from the others a little and he wants whatever attention this attracts not to be envious. Someone remarked that this could keep a headman poor" (Marshall, 1961, p. 244).

B.1.2 Andamans— "Generosity is esteemed by the Andaman Is­landers as one of the highest of virtues and is unremittingly practiced by the majority of them," Radcliffe-Brown writes (1948, p. 43), He notes that the person who does not work and must needs be given food sinks in esteem, while Man remarked that the generous person rises in esteem (Man, n.d, p. 41). There is a definite generation-status influence on reci­procity. Although at least sometimes appearing as givers of food—on occasions of collective sharing of game—elders are privileged in regard to juniors: "It is considered a breach of good manners ever to refuse the request of another. Thus if a man be asked by another to give him anything that he may possess, he will immediately do so. If the two men are equals a return of about the same value will have to be made. As between an older married man and a bachelor or a young married man, however, the younger would not make any request of such a nature, and if the older asked the younger for anything, the latter would give it without always expect­ing a return" (Radcliffe-Brown, 1948, pp. 42—43).

B. 1.3 Eskimo — Influence and prestige accrued t o the North Alas­kan Eskimo whale boat leader or caribou hunting leader at least in part by virtue of the stuff he doled out in ostensibly generous fashion (Spencer, 1959, pp. 144, 152 f, 210 f_s 335-336, 351). Great men noted for their great generosity (pp. 154-155, 157). Stinginess as usual deplorable (p. 164).

B. 1.4 Carrier — A big-man, slighted by a fur trader, boasts that he is just as good a chief as the trader: " 'When it is the proper season to hunt the beaver, I kill them; and of their flesh I make feasts for my relations. I, often, feast all the Indians of my village; and, sometimes, invite people from afar off, to come and partake of the fruits of my hunts . . . ' " (Harmon, 1957, pp. 143-144; cf. 253-254).

B.2.0 Melanesia— I have elsewhere presented a general study of the economics of big-man leadership in western Melanesian societies (Sahlins, 1963). Generalized reciprocity is here the decisive "starting mechanism" of ranking. A following is developed through private assistance to individuals, a tribal name (renown) through large-scale giveaways, often of pigs and vegetable foods. The wherewithal for his generosity comes initially from the aspiring big-man's own household from his nearest relatives: he capitalizes in the beginning on kinship dues and by finessing the generalized reciprocity ap­propriate among close kin. He often enlarges his household at an early phase, perhaps by taking additional wives. A leader's career is well under way when he is able to link other men and their families to his faction, to harness their prod­uction to his ambition by helping them in some big way. He cannot, however, extend these people too far: some material benefits must accrue to followers on pain of encouraging their discontent and his downfall.

Most examples that follow are of big-man systems. The concluding cases are different: chiefdoms or protochiefdoms in which generalized reciprocity between ranks is apparent in a redistributive context.

B.2.1 Siuai— The most thorough exposition of Melanesian big-man economics is Oliver's (1955) study. The development of influence and prestige through generalized transactions is richly described. There are several peripheral features like­wise of interest in the present context. Notable is the influ­ence of rank on customary rates of balance in shell money dealings: "One great advantage of being a leader lies in one's ability to buy things more cheaply ('When a mumi [big-man] sends out thirty spans of mauai to purchase a pig for a feast, the pig owner would be ashamed to send along a pig worth less than forty'). On the other hand, this commercial advan­tage of the leader is usually counterbalanced by the tradition­al exercise of noblesse oblige" (p. 342). So, "the most praiseworthy thing a man can do is to exceed the transaction­al requirements of ordinary trade and kin relationships by paying generously (in goods) for all goods and services he receives, by giving goods to persons to whom he is not direct­ly obligated, and by doing these things after the manner of great leaders of the past" (p. 456; cf. pp. 378, 407, 429^30). Thurnwald writes of another Buin Plain people that ma-moko, the reward given by a big-man to his followers, "is considered an act of liberality, for which there is no obliga­tion. Any gift of friendship is described by the same name. A surplus payment over the price agreed is also called mamo-ko. Totokai is the excess payment of a kitere [follower] to his mumira [leader] for ensuring his good will and his willing­ness to credit him with abuta [shell money] on another occa­sion. Dakai designates a payment for reconciliation or reparation between men of equal position" (Thurnwald, 1934-35, p. 135). The variation of reciprocity by rank differ­ence is clear.

B.2.2 'Gawa (Busama) — Clubhouse leaders and, especially, out­standing village leaders are typical western Melanesian big-men. Hogbin writes: "The man who is generous over a long period thus has many persons in his debt. No problem arises when these are of the same status as himself—the poor give one another insignificant presents, and the rich exchange sumptuous offerings. But if his resources are greater than theirs they may find repayment impossible and have to de­fault. Acutely conscious of their position, they express their humility in terms of deference and respect. . . . The relation of debtors and creditors forms the basis of the system of leadership" (Hogbin, 1951, p. 122). The leaders were "men who ate bones and chewed lime—they presented the best meat to others, leaving only scraps for themselves, and were so free with areca nuts and pepper that they had no betel mixture left. Folk-tales about legendary headmen of the past relate that, although these men had 'more pigs than anyone could count and bigger gardens than are made now,' they gave everything away" (p. 123; cf. pp. 118 f). The main run of clubhouse leaders were reluctantly placed in that position. The work was hard— "His hands are never free from earth, and his forehead continually drips with sweat" (p. 131)—and the material rewards nil. The principal big-man of the village, however, was ambitious. "It is frequently insisted that the headmen were so jealous of their reputation that they went to the trouble of inventing excuses for giving food away" (p. 139). Low rank was the reward of stinginess, and he who is prepared to take advantage of others, "He sinks to the bot­tom of the social ladder. . . ." (p. 126).

B.2.3 Kaoka (Guadalcanal)— A main-run big-man economy (Hogbin, 1933-34; 1937-38). "Reputation ... is enhanced not by accumulating wealth in order to use it for one's self but by giving it away. Every event of importance in a person's life—marriage, birth, death and even the construction of a new house or canoe—is celebrated by a feast, and the more feasts a man gives, and the more lavish he is in providing food, the greater is his prestige. The social leaders are those who give away most" (Hogbin, 1937-38, p. 290).

B.2.4 Kapauku — Described by the ethnographer as sort of upland New Guinea capitalists. The big-man pattern, however, is an ordinary (sweet potato) garden variety. "Loans" and "cred­it" put out by Kapauku big men (tonowi, generous richman) are not interest bearing in the standard sense (see above, A.2.4); they are means of developing status through generosi­ty (Pospisil, 1958, p. 129). "The society views its ideal man as a most generous individual, who through the distribution of his fortune satisfies the needs of many people. Generosity is the highest cultural value and an attribute necessary for acquiring followers in political and legal life" (p. 57). The big-man's status sinks if he loses the wherewithal for generos­ity (p. 59); if he is excessively demanding he is likely to face an egalitarian rebellion— " '. . . you should not be the only rich man, we should all be the same, therefore you only stay equal with us'. . . was the reason given by the Paniai people for killing Mote Juwopija of Madi, a tonowi who was not generous enough" (p. 80; cf. pp. 108-110). Wealth is not enough: "... a selfish individual who hoards his money and does not lend [sic] it, never sees the time when his word will be taken seriously and his advice and decisions followed, no matter how rich he may become. The people believe that the only justification for becoming rich is to be able to redistri­bute the accumulated property among one's less fortunate fellows, a procedure which also gains their support" (pp. 79-80). Big-men buy more cheaply than prevailing rates (p. 122). One big-man summed up well, if cynically, the rank-generating impetus delivered by generalized reciprocity. " 'I am a headman,' he said, 'not because the people like me but because they owe me money and are afraid' " (p. 95).

B.2.5 New Guinea Highlands — The big-man pattern, here worked out in a segmented lineage context, is general in the High­lands. "The Kuma 'big men' or 'men of strength' . . . who can command much wealth, are entrepreneurs in the sense that they control the flow of valuables between clans by making fresh presentations on their own account and choos­ing whether or not to contribute to others. Their profit in these transactions is incremental reputation. . . . The aim is not simply to be wealthy, nor even to act as only the wealthy can act: it is to be known to be wealthy. Further, a man does not really achieve his ambition until he can be seen to act as if wealth itself were of no account" (Reay, 1959, p. 96; see pp. 110-111, 130). There is also the usual Melanesian corol­lary of the big-man, the "rubbish man." "A man is a 'rubbish man' of no consequence if he has not enough food to offer many friends and relatives as well as meet his personal re­quirements" (p. 23).

The use of generalized reciprocity as a mechanism of status differentiation in another Highland instance (Kyaka) is suc­cinctly put by Bulmer: "These supporters of a leader are normally in a state of mutual obligation with him, having been helped by him with bridewealth payment and the like, or expecting help of this kind. Such assistance obligates them to channel through him such pigs of their own as they are putting into the Moka [interclan pig-exchange]" (Bulmer, I960, p. 9).

B.2.6 Lesu — "A rich man might pay five tsera for a pig for which another man would pay four. The more he pays the more prestige the buyer has. Everyone then knows he is a rich man. On the other hand, the owner of a pig would gain prestige if he sold it for four tsera when he might have received five"' (Powdermaker, 1933, p. 201).

B.2.7 To'ambaita (N. Malaita)— Another good description of a typical big-man order, conforming in all essential respects to those already discussed (Hogbin, 1939, pp. 61 f; 1943-44, pp. 258 0.

B.2.8 Manus— The Manus have—or had, in their "old lives"—a big-man pattern (Mead, 1934; 1937a). Their clans, however, were also ascriptively divided into two ranks, lapan (high) and lau (low). This ranking was, according to Mead, not of great political significance, but its economic side is of interest nonetheless. "Between lapan and lau there is a type of mutual helpfulness expected, not unlike a slight version of the feudal relationship—the lapan takes care of the economic needs of the lau and the lau works for the lapan" (Mead, 1934, pp. 335-336).

For discussion of other big-men systems see Sahlins, 1963. Among the well-described ones are the Arapesh (Mead, 1937a; 1938; 1947), the Abelam (Kaberry, 1940-41; 1941-42), and Tangu (Burridge, 1960). Deacon struck the general note: "Yet for all that the Malekulan is, as has been said, grasping and bourgeois in his attitude toward wealth, gener­osity and consideration for one's debtors are held up as vir­tues. ... To be stingy is to sink in public esteem; to be openhanded is to acquire fame, honour, and influence" (Dea­con, 1934, p. 200).

B.2.9 Sa'a — The generalized reciprocity principle in the context of a small scale redistributive system. "The good chief and the commoners regarded one another as mutually dependent on each other, and the people loved a chief who by his feasts brought glory on the place, and one of the reasons why [the chief] Wate'ou'ou was called. . . 'he who keeps the canoe on a straight course,' was because he was good at feasts" (Ivens, 1927, p. 255). "Stowed away safely in the lodge in bags is the chiefs possession in money, which in a measure is what Doraadi called the 'panga,' the 'bank' of the village because it is drawn on for communal purposes such as feasts or the payments of blood money. The Sa'a chiefs were wealthy men owing to the contributions made to them on public occasions by the commoners" (p. 32). "Chief and priest were exempted from the obligation to make a return for gifts received which held always in the case of commoners" (p. 8). "Chiefs were said to kuluhie hanue, succour the land, to draw the people up who came to them for protection, and the word kulu, draw or lift up, appears in the compound mdnikulu'e, glori­ous, a word associated with feasts and chiefs" (p. 129, cf. pp. 145, 147-148, 160 f, 221 f>

B.2.10 Trobriands— Generalized rank reciprocity organized as re­distribution. The underlying ethic was reciprocal assistance between chiefs and people. Malinowski's many statements of the economic obligations of chieftainship include several which highlight the status implications of generosity. For example: ". . . to possess is to be great, and .. . wealth is the indispensable appanage of social rank and attribute of per­sonal virtue. But the important point is that with them to possess is to give. ... A man who owns a thing is naturally expected to share it, to distribute it, to be its trustee and dispenser. And the higher the rank the greater the obligation. . . . Thus the main symptom of being powerful is to be wealthy, and of wealth is to be generous. Meanness, indeed, is the most despised vice, and the only thing about which the natives have strong moral views, while generosity is the es­sence of goodness" (1922, p. 97). Again: "Not in all cases, but in many of them, the handing over of wealth is the expression of the superiority of the giver over the recipient. In others, it represents subordination to a chief, or a kinship relation or relationship-in-law" (p. 175). "Relationship between Chiefs and Commoners.—The tributes and services given to a chief by his vassals on the one hand, and the small but frequent gifts which he gives them, and the big and important contri­bution which he makes to all tribal enterprises are character­istic of this relationship" (p. 193). The Trobriand chief's difficulties in holding on to his betel, and the little strategems he employed to save some for himself, are famous anecdotes of the introductory anthropology course (Malinowski, 1922, p. 97).

B.3.0 American Plains— Plains Indian chiefs were local equiva­lents of Melanesian big-men. The pattern is much the same; the cultural idiom varies. Generalized reciprocity here again a decisive starting mechanism of leadership. Military honors were an important attribute of leaders, but influence rested as much or more on generous dispositions of horses, of loot, of meat, of help to the poor and widowed, and the like. The chief's faction was a roving band, a cluster of lesser and often dependent people, for whose well-being the chief felt respon­sible and upon whom he might draw economically. Wealth in horses was an ultimate necessity for a band chief: the loss of this fund of generosity was the loss of influence.

B.3.1 Assiniboin— "The chief of a band is little more than the nominal father of all and addresses them as his children in a body" (Denig, 1928-29, p. 431). "A chief must give away all to preserve his popularity and is always the poorest in the band, yet he takes good care to distribute his gifts among his own relatives or the rich, upon whom he can draw at any time he be in need" (p. 449; cf. pp. 432, 525, 547-548, 563; on the element of calculation in Assiniboin generosity, see pp. 475, 514-515).

B.3.2 Kansa-Osage—"The chiefs and candidates for public pref­erment render themselves popular by their disinterestedness and poverty. Whenever any extraordinary success attends them in the acquisition of property, it is only for the benefit of their meritorious adherents, for they distribute it with a profuse liberality, and pride themselves in being esteemed the poorest man in the community" (Hunter, 1823, p. 317).

B.3.3 Plains Cree—"It is not an easy thing to be a chief. Look at this chief now. He has to have pity on the poor. When he sees a man in difficulty he must try to help him in whatever way he can. If a person asks for something in his tipi, he must give it to him willingly and without bad feeling" (Mandelbaum, 1940, p. 222; cf. pp. 195, 205, 221 f, 270-271).

B.3.4. Blackfoot — The same pattern, in essence (Ewers, 1955, pp. 140-141, 161 f, 188-189, 192-193, 240 f).

B.3.5 Comanche — The same (Wallace and Hoebel, 1952, pp. 36, 131, 209 f, 240).

B.4.0 Polynesia— I have elsewhere offered studies of the econo­mies of Polynesian chieftainship (Sahlins, 1958; 1963). Redis­tribution is the transactional form, generalized reciprocity the principle. The few notes here highlight particularly the principle.

B.4.1 Maori— Firth's excellent analysis of Maori economics pro­vides the mise en scene for considerations of rank-reciprocity in Polynesia. I cite two long passages: "The prestige of a chief was bound up with his free use of wealth, particularly food. This in turn tended to secure for him a larger revenue from which to display his hospitality, since his followers and rela­tives brought him choice gifts. . , . Apart from lavish enter­tainment of strangers and visitors, the chief also disbursed wealth freely as presents among his followers. By this means their allegiance was secured and he repaid them for the gifts and personal services rendered to him. All payment among the Maori was made in the form of gifts. There was thus a continual reciprocity between chief and people. The chief also acted as a kind of capitalist, assuming the initiative in the construction of certain 'public works' if the term may be so used. It was by his accumulation and possession of wealth, and his subsequent lavish distribution of it, that such a man was able to give the spur to these important tribal enterprises. He was a kind of channel through which wealth flowed, concentrating it only to pour it out freely again" (Firth, 1959a, p. 133). "The quantity and quality of... gifts received tended to increase with the rank and hereditary position of the chief in the tribe, his prestige, and the following which he was able to gather around him. But the relationship was by no means one-sided. If the income of a chief was largely dependent on his prestige and influence and the regard of his people, this in its turn was contingent upon his liberal treat­ment of them. There were constant calls upon his resources. His slaves and immediate dependents had to be fed, he was expected to assist those of his tribesmen who came to him in need, a crowd of relatives—and the Maori bonds of kinship stretched far—looked to him for a generous repayment of all the small social services they rendered him, and for an occa­sional douceur as a mark of appreciation of their loyalty. When presents of foodstuffs were made to him by people of other tribes his regard for his reputation required that he should distribute a considerable portion of them among his tribespeople. For all gifts made to him a return was expected, of equivalent or even greater value. . . . Again, the calls of hospitality were never ending. Entertainment had to be pro­vided on a lavish scale for visiting chiefs and their adherents. . . . Moreover, on occasions of the birth, marriage or death of any people of rank in the village his personal resources were drawn upon to a serious extent, while the occasional provision of a large feast also drained him of food supplies. In this connection he seems to have exercised control of the communal stores of food which he commanded to be dis­bursed as required. If the chiefs use of wealth be reviewed, then, it is seen that to the varied sources which provided him with his stores of goods corresponded a number of serious liabilities. The result was that a sort of equilibrium was main­tained between income and expenditure. In general, at no time was the chief the possessor of enormous quantities of valuables, though the system of receipt and redistribution of goods allowed a great quantity of them to flow through his hands" (pp. 297-298; cf. pp. 130 f, 164, 294 f, 345-346).

B.4.2 Hawaii— Chiefs had extensive call on the labor, the re­sources and products of the underlying (makaainand) pop­ulation, as well as control over certain specialists and enjoyment of certain sumptuary perquisites. The chiefdom, often embracing the whole of a large island, was an elaborate collection-redistribution apparatus. "It was the practice for kings [i.e. paramount chiefs of individual islands] to build storehouses in which to collect food, fish, tapas [bark cloth], malos [men's loin cloths], pa-us [women's loin skirts], and all sorts of goods. These store-houses were designed by the Ka-laimoku [chiefs executive] as a means of keeping the people contented, so they would not desert the king. They were like the baskets that were used to entrap the hinalea fish. The hinalea thought there was something good within the basket, and he hung round the outside of it. In the same way the people thought there was food in the storehouses, and they kept their eyes on the king. As the rat will not desert the pantry . . . where he thinks food is, so the people will not desert the king while they think there is food in his store­house" (Malo, 1951, p. 195). The tendency at the highest levels of chieftainship, however—and despite well meaning advice of counselors—was to press too heavily on the lesser chiefs and people, with the result that, as Malo puts it, "Many kings were put to death by the people because of their oppression of the makaainana [commonality]" (p. 195; cf. pp. 58, 61; Fornander, 1880: pp. 76, 88, 100-101, 200-202, 227-228, 270-271).

B.4.3 Tonga— A fine native statement of the chiefly economic ethic, attributed by Mariner to the chief Finau. Upon Mariner's explanation of the value of money: "Finow replied that the explanation did not satisfy him; he still thought it a foolish thing that people should place a value on money, when they either could not or would not apply it to any useful (physical) purpose. 'If,' said he, 'it were made of iron, and could be converted into knives, axes and chisels, there would be some sense in placing a value on it; but as it is, I see none.

If a man,' he added, 'has more yams than he wants, let him exchange some of them away for pork or gnatoo [bark cloth]. Certainly money is much handier, and more convenient, but then, as it will not spoil by being kept, people will store it up, instead of sharing it out, as a chief ought to do, and thus become selfish; whereas, if provisions were the principal property of man, and it ought to be, as being both the most useful and the most necessary, he could not store it up, for it would spoil, and so he would be obliged either to exchange it away for something else useful, or share it to his neighbors, and inferior chiefs and dependents, for nothing.' He conclud­ed by saying 'I understand now very well what it is that makes the Papalangis ["Europeans"] so selfish—it is this money!'" (Mariner, 1827 i, pp. 213-214).

Conversely, the upward flow: ". . . the practice of making presents to superior chiefs is very general and frequent. The higher class of chiefs generally make a present to the king, of hogs or yams about once a fortnight. These chiefs, about the same time, receive presents from those below them, and these last from others, and so on, down to the common people" (p. 210; cf. Gifford, 1929).

B.4.4 Tahiti— From indications of the Duff missionaries, it looks as if Ha'amanimani, theTahitian priest-chief, acted faithfully to the ideal expressed by Finau: "Manne Manne was very urgent for sails, rope, anchor, etc. for his vessel, none of which articles we had to spare: on which account, though the captain gave him his own cocked hat and a variety of articles, he was still discontented; saying, 'Several people told me that you wanted Manne Manne, and now I am come, you give me nothing.' An observation similar to this he once made to the missionaries: 'You give me,' says he, 'much parow (talk) and much prayers to the Eatora, but very few axes, knives, scis-sars, or cloth.' The case is, that whatever he receives he immediately distributes among his friends and dependents; so that for all the numerous presents he had received, he had nothing now to shew, except a glazed hat, a pair of breeches, and an old black coat, which he had fringed with red feathers. And this prodigal behavior he excuses, by saying that, were he not to do so, he should never be a king, nor even remain a chief of any consequence" (Duff missionaries, 1799, pp. 224-225). For all this it is apparent from the Duff journal as well as other early reports (e.g. Rodriguez, 1919) that Tahiti-an high chiefs might accumulate considerable stocks of goods and especially that they had very considerable power to de­mand foodstuffs from the underlying population. The tradi­tional counsel was the same as in Hawaii—"Your household must not be accused of food hiding. Let not your name be associated with hidden foods or hidden goods. The hands of the Arii must be always open; on these two things rest your prestige" (Handy, 1930, p. 41)—but apparently Tahitian chiefs were inclined, as it is said, to "eat the powers of the government too much." (Yet see also Davies, 1961, p. 87 note 1.)

B.4.5 Tikopia — A stream of gifts flow from below to the Tikopia chief, but then his obligation to be generous is at least as great as his ability to accumulate things. Generosity indeed was a jealousy guarded chiefly prerogative: "Chiefs are recognized as being proper persons to control large quantities of food, to have a number of valued objects stored away in their houses.... But the stocks which they accumulate are expect­ed to be dispersed in a manner which will yield benefit to their people. Great accumulation by a commoner must also be followed by a corresponding dispersal. But such a man would incur the charge from the chiefly families of fia pasak 'desiring to boast,' and would be watched by them lest he attempt to usurp some of their privileges. According to pre­cedent in Tikopia history they would probably take an oppor­tunity either to seize his goods or to kill him" (Firth, 1950, p. 243). The Tikopia chiefs, in short, would not tolerate starting mechanisms. This is not true throughout Polynesia. In the Marquesas, for example, upward mobility through "accumulating and dispensing wealth" was possible (Linton, 1939, pp. 150, 153, 156-157; Handy, 1923, pp. 36-37, 48, 53). (On other aspects of the reciprocity between Tikopia chiefs and people see Firth, 1936, pp. 382-383, 401-403; 1950, pp. 34, 58, 109 f, 172, 188, 190, 191, 196, 212 f, 321).

B.5.0 Miscellaneous

B.5.1 Northwestern North America — Generalized reciprocity per­meated the political economy of the Northwest Coast Indi­ans, both in the potlatch giveaways between chiefs and in the internal relation of chiefs and their respective followers. The Nootka are a clearly described case in point. Chiefs acquired a variety of dues: from the first catch of salmon traps, early pickings of berry patches, from large catches of fish taken by their people, and the like (e.g., Drucker, 1951, pp. 56-57, 172, 255, 272, et passim). Conversely, " 'Every time a chief got a lot of food of any kind, he gave a feast to give it away to his people* " (p. 370; see also Suttles, 1960, pp. 299-300; Barnett, 1938; Codere, n.d.).

The Tolowa-Tututni political economy is the same in prin­ciple as that prevailing to the north, albeit a slighter version. Drucker characterizes the chief-follower relation as "symbi­otic"—"The relationship uniting the rich-man and his kin-folk was essentially a symbiotic one. It is said that some of the richest men never worked; their henchmen hunted and fished for them. In return the rich-man gave feasts, and in lean times would share his stores with his people. He bought wives for the young men, or at least contributed most of the payment; but it was also he who accepted and held the bride prices paid for their sisters and daughters. Perhaps most important of all; it was the rich-man who was obliged to pay compensation for wrongs his henchmen committed, to save them, and himself, from retaliation ... he received a lion's share of any indemnities paid for injuries to one of them" (Drucker, 1937, p. 245; for indications of similar rank-reci­procity in California see Kroeber, 1925, pp. 3, 40, 42, 55; Goldschmidt, 1951, pp. 324-325, 365, 413; Loeb, 1926, pp. 238-239).

B. 5.2 Creek — One o f the finest descriptions o f chiefly redistribu­tion, again run on the underlying principle of generalized reciprocity, appears in W. Bartram's late eighteenth-century account of the Creek: "After the feast of the busk is over, and all the grain is ripe, the whole town again assemble, and every man carries of the fruits of his labour, from the part [of the town field] first allotted to him, which he deposits in his own granary; which is individually his own. But previous to their carrying off their crops from the field, there is a large crib or granary, erected in the plantation, which is called the king's crib; and to this each family carries and deposits a certain quantity, according to his [apparently meaning "their"] abili­ty or inclination, or none at all if he so chooses, this in appearance seems a tribute or revenue to the mico [chief], but in fact is designed for another purpose, i.e. that of a public treasury, supplied by a few and voluntary contributions, and to which every citizen has the right of free and equal access, when his own private stores are consumed, to serve as a surplus to fly to for succour, to assist neighboring towns whose crops have failed, accommodate strangers, or travel­lers, afford provisions or supplies, when they go forth on hostile expeditions, and for all other exigencies of the state; and this treasure is at the disposal of the king or mico; which is surely a royal attribute to have an exclusive right and ability in a community to distribute comfort and blessings to the necessitous" (Bartram, 1958, p. 326; cf. Swanton, 1928, pp. 277-278).

B.5.3 Kachin— "In theory then people of superior class receive gifts from their inferiors. But no permanent economic advan­tage accrues from this. Anyone who receives a gift is thereby placed in debt (hka) to the giver. . .. Paradoxically therefore although an individual of high-class status is defined as one who receives gifts ... he is all the time under a social compul­sion to give away more than he receives. Otherwise he would be reckoned mean and a mean man runs the danger of losing status" (Leach, 1954, p. 163).

B.5.4 Bemba— Exhibits classic redistributive economy, a classic generalized reciprocity between chief and people. "... the distribution of cooked food is an attribute of authority, and therefore prestige, and ... its reception puts a man under an obligation to return to the giver respect, service, or reciprocal hospitality" (Richards, 1939, p. 135), The paramount is most engaged in the distributive process, and this "is of course necessary to the chief if he is to make gardens and conduct tribal business through his councillors. But it is more than this. The giving of food, as in most African tribes, is an absolutely essential attribute of chieftainship, just as it is of authority in the village or household, and the successful or­ganization of supplies at the capital seems to be associated in the Bemba mind with the security and well-being of the whole tribe itself.... The whole institution of the kamitembo [the sacred kitchen and storehouse of the tribe] illustrates to my mind that close association between authority and the power to distribute provisions on which the tribal organiza­tion depends. The chief owns the food and receives tribute, and the chief provides for his subjects and distributes cooked food to them. Both of these attributes are symbolized in the kamitembo house" (pp. 148, 150). "I never heard a chief boast to another about the size of his granaries, but often about the amount of food brought to him and distributed by him. In fact chiefs particularly valued the fact that some of their food was brought to them and not grown in their gar­dens, for it gave them some kind of resource to fall back upon. The Bemba say: 'We will shake the tree until it gives up its fruit,' that is to say, we will nag the big man until he divides his supplies. If a chief attempted to dry meat and keep it for subsequent division his followers would sit and stare at it and talk about it until he was forced to give them some, but supplies brought irregularly from other villages provided constant fresh resources" (p. 214). "The people still definitely prefer their ruler to have a big granary. It gives them, I think, a sense of security—a feeling of certainty that there will be food at the capital and a knowledge that they are working for a powerful and successful man. . . . Besides this, a hungry man has technically the right to call upon his chief for help. I did not hear of this claim being made very often, but still, in a sense, the umulasa [tribute-labour] garden and umulasa granary are recognized as belonging to the people. A man can steal from the tribute garden of a chief, but not from those of his wives, and J have sometimes heard old natives speak with pride of 'our' granary, adding, 'It was we who filled it to overflowing.' Thus the commoner got by his labour the sense of supernatural support, a personal approach to his chief, food in return for his work, support in time of starva­tion, and . . . leadership in economic pursuits. The chief in return got extra supplies of food to distribute, the means of supporting his tribal council, the necessary labour for tribal undertakings such as road-building, and last, but not least, prestige" (p. 261; cf. pp. 138, 169, 178-180, 194, 215, 221, 244 f, 275,361-362).

B.5.5 Pilagd— Generosity is no starting mechanism, but it is a sustaining mechanism of rank. In Henry's tables (1951, pp. 194, 197, 214) it is the chief who gives more goods (and to more people) than anyone else. Henry comments regarding this: "It will ... be observed that in no case is the contribu­tion of his [i.e. the chiefs] family to any family equaled or exceeded by any other family. As a matter of fact, No. 28 [the chief] himself alone contributes on an average of 35% of the income, i.e. food received of each family. Thus the role of the chief and his family in Pilaga society is to support others. The chief and his family thus become the unifying factor in the village. It is this that gives meaning to the use of the father term for the chief and the child term for the members of the village. . . . The position of the chief, despite the 'prestige' it carries also entails burdens. All the people are his children (kokotepi) for whom he is responsible. Hence the word for chief, salyaranik, signifies one who is heavy" (pp. 214-215).

Appendix C

Date: 2014-12-21; view: 981