The Self: Ontological Security and Existential Anxiety
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Note: 1 Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory (1979) and The Constitution of Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).
Note: 2 Harold Garfinkel, `A conception of, and experiments with, "trust" as a condition of stable concerted actions', in O. J. Harvey, Motivation and Social Interaction (New York: Ronald Press, 1963); see on this issue also John Heritage, Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).
Note: 3 For a fuller exposition, see Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity; and, in the original source, Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: Norton, 1950).
Note: 4 D. W. Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment (London: Hogarth, 1965), pp. 57, 86.
Note: 5 D. W. Winnicott, `Creativity and its origins', in his Playing and Reality (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), p. 83.
Note: 6 Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), p. 395.
Note: 7 Sigmund Freud, `Anxiety', in ibid.
Note: 8 Harry Stack Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry (New York: Norton, 1953).
Note: 9 Ibid., p. 14.
Note: 10 Cf. Rollo May, The Meaning of Anxiety (New York: Washington Square Press, 1977).
Note: 11 Freud, `Anxiety'.
Note: 12 Erving Goffman, Relations in Public (London: Allen Lane, 1971).
Note: 13 Sören Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread (London: Macmillan, 1944), p. 99.
Note: 14 Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method (London: Macmillan, 1981).
Note: 15 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (London: Collins, 1977).
Note: 16 Sören Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 147.
Note: 17 Quotations from Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), pp. 143-5.
Note: 18 Sören Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989).
Note: 19 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 98.
Note: 20 Of course, this issue has been much debated by philosophers, particularly following the lead of Hume. A very large literature relevant to the problem has accumulated over the past twenty years.
Note: 21 R. D. Laing, The Divided Self (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965).
Note: 22 In ibid., p. 108.
Note: 23 Ibid., p. 112.
Note: 24 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). On narratives of self-identity see also Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981).
Note: 25 Giddens, Constitution of Society, ch. 2.
Note: 26 Goffman, Relations in Public.
Note: 27 Ibid., p. 248.
Note: 28 Ibid.
Note: 29 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (London: Allen Lane, 1979).
Note: 30 Goffman, Relations in Public, p. 250.
Note: 31 Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death
Note: 32 Bruno Bettelheim, The Informed Heart (London: Palladin, 1970). For further discussion, see Giddens, Central Problems.
Note: 35 Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).
Note: 36 For this analysis, I draw on the work of Thomas J. Scheff and Suzanne Retzinger, Emotion and Violence (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), although I do not, as they do, pursue the connections between shame, rage and violence.
Note: 37 See Rom Harré, Personal Being (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
Note: 38 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (London: Methuen, 1969).