Institutions: coordination role of, 3-4; created by edict, 4; defined, xi; as equilibra in games, 3-5,144-45; examples of, 3-4,144-45, 148; stability

Of, 11-20. See alsoconventions; equilibrium interpersonal comparisons, 133-34

Junction, 156

Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, 135,141-42 Kandori, Michihiro, 72, 140 Kaniovski, Yuri, 87

Knowledge: common, 23,114,120; mut­ual, 112,120; partial, vii. See also information Kreps, David, 36

Learning: models of, 20, 27-30, 147; by observing actions of others, 26-27, 29, by personal experience, 26, 29. See also adaptive play; rationality Levine, David, 88 Liggett, Thomas M., 96,161 Lipman, Barton L., 81 Lipschitz continuity, 45-46 local conformity, 20,148

McClelland, James, 28 Malouf, Michael, 115 Markov chain. See Markov process Markov process: absorbing state of, 48; adaptive play as, 43; aperiodic, 49-50; discrete time, 48; ergodic and nonergodic, 48,173nl.3; irreducible, 48, 50-51, 59-62,151-52; perturbed, 54-56, 153; recurrent class of, 48-49; regular perturbed, 153; stationary distribution of, 49,151-52 marriage game, 136-38 Matsui, A., 35 Maynard Smith, John, xii memory: in adaptive play, 21,41-43; unbounded, 22,77,83-88. See also fictitious play Menger, Karl, 4 merry-go-round game, 40-41 Miyasawa, K„ 33 mode of a distribution, 20,148 Monderer, Dov, 33,38,108 Morris, Stephen, 101 Murnighan, J. Keith, ИЗ, 115,116

Nash, John, 116-17 Nash bargaining solution: alternating offers model, 23,117; asymmetric, 120, 123; defined, 117

Nash demand game, 23,118, 128, 176n7.1 Nash equilibrium: defined, 32; p dominant, 176n4.2; pure, 32; as singleton minimum curb set. 111; in spatial game, 93-94; strict, 32. See also conventions; equilibrium neighborhood segregation model, 6-10,

62-65 noise models, 80-83 NSldeke, Georg, 144 norms: bargaining, 115-17, 119, 129;

Relation to conventions, 145 ((-person game. Seegames Nydegger, R. V., 113

Owen, Guillermo, 113

Path dependence, 8-9, 48 payoffs, 30 Pearce, David, 111 perturbations. Seestochastic shocks Picard-Lindelof theorem, 174n3.1 players: in a game, 30; major and minor, 145

Playing the field model, 72-73,91 populations. Seeclasses potential game: convergence of fictitious play in, 36-38; defined, 36, 107; ordinal, 108; spatial, 95; weighted, 36 precedent: feedback and reinforcement effect of, 6,23-24,72,116-17,133-34, 144. See alsoexpectations predecessor, special, 156 Price, G. R., xii product set, 110-11 proposal game, 71-72,79 punctuated equilibrium, 20, 148

rationality: in evolutionary versus neoclassical theory, 5-6,112, 144; in standard game theory, xi, 23,62 recurrent classes, 48. See also

Communication class regular selection dynamic, 46 resistance: in bargaining games: 122, 127; in neighborhood segregation model, 63; in pure coordination games, 105; reduced, 105-6; of a rooted tree, 56; of a transition, 54; in 2x2 coordination games, 68-70. See alsostochastic potential

Risk dominance: in coordination games, 104; defined, 66-68; in Harsanyi-Selten theory, 66,104,176n7.1; relation to stochastic stability, 11, 19, 22, 104-6 risk factor, 67 Rob, Rafael, 140 Robinson, Julia, 31,32 Robson, Arthur, 89 roles in a game, 30, 129 Roth, Alvin E„ 113,114, 115,116 Rubinstein, Ariel, 23,117 Rumelhart, David, 28

Sampling: in fictitious play, 83-88; with heterogenoeous sample sizes, 77-80, 119-27; as a model of partial information, 42; in models of local interaction, 91-92; with replacement, 176n7.2 Samuelson, Larry, 144 Schelling, Thomas, xi, 6, 129 Schoumaker, Fran^oise, 116 Schumpeter, Joseph, 4 selection: among bargaining norms, 118-20; among contracts, 131-38; among forms of currency, 11-13, 72-73; among minimal curb sets, 109-11; among residential patterns, 62-65; among rules of road, 16-17, 98; among social conventions, 25-26, 71-72, 136; Harsanyi-Selten theory of equilibrium, 128-29,175n7.1; natural, 27; in pure coordination games, 131-38; stochastic stability and, 10-11; between technologies, 13-15, 26-27, 29; in weakly acyclic games, 106-9; between work norms, 17-19; in 2x2 games, 21-22,66-98. See alsoequilibrium Selten, Reinhard, 18, 66, 68, 104,128 Shapley, Lloyd, 33,38,39, 108 Sigmund, Karl, xii

sink: basin of, 106; in best-reply graph,

Date: 2016-04-22; view: 511