The statement of the problem

REPORT

Security Council

North Korea: the World under the pressure

Introduction

An independent kingdom for much of its long history, Korea was occupied by Japan beginning in 1905 following the Russo-Japanese War. Five years later, Japan formally annexed the entire peninsula. Following World War II, Korea was split with the northern half coming under Soviet-sponsored communist control. After failing in the Korean War (1950-53) to conquer the US-backed Republic of Korea (ROK) in the southern portion by force, North Korea (DPRK), under its founder President KIM Il Sung, adopted a policy of ostensible diplomatic and economic "self-reliance" as a check against outside influence. The DPRK demonized the US as the ultimate threat to its social system through state-funded propaganda, and molded political, economic, and military policies around the core ideological objective of eventual unification of Korea under Pyongyang's control.

KIM Il Sung's son, KIM Jong Il, was officially designated as his father's successor in 1980, assuming a growing political and managerial role until the elder KIM's death in 1994. KIM Jong Un was publicly unveiled as his father's successor in 2010. Following KIM Jong Il's death in 2011, KIM Jong Un quickly assumed power and has now taken on most of his father's former titles and duties. After decades of economic mismanagement and resource misallocation, the DPRK since the mid-1990s has relied heavily on international aid to feed its population. The DPRK began to ease restrictions to allow semi-private markets, starting in 2002, but then sought to roll back the scale of economic reforms in 2005 and 2009. North Korea's history of regional military provocations; proliferation of military-related items; long-range missile development; WMD programs including tests of nuclear devices in 2006, 2009, and 2013; and massive conventional armed forces are of major concern to the international community. The regime in 2013 announced a new policy calling for the simultaneous development of its nuclear weapons program and its economy[1].

The statement of the problem

North Korea has threatened Washington and Seoul in reaction to the start of US-South Korean military drills. Such threats have been a staple of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, since he took power after his father’s death in December 2011. But they tend to increase when Washington and Seoul stage what they describe as annual defensive springtime exercises. Pyongyang says the drills are rehearsals for invading.

North Korea’s powerful National Defence Commission threatened strikes against targets in South Korea, US bases in the Pacific and the US mainland. There is also considerable outside debate about whether North Korea is even capable of the kind of strikes it threatens. The country makes progress with each new nuclear test, having staged its fourth in January, but many experts say North Korea’s arsenal may consist only of still-crude nuclear bombs.

There is uncertainty as to whether it has mastered the miniaturisation process needed to mount bombs on warheads and widespread doubt over whether the country has a reliable long-range missile that could deliver such a bomb to the US mainland. But North Korea’s bellicose rhetoric raises unease in Seoul and the US, not least because of the huge number of troops and weaponry facing off along the world’s most heavily armed border, which is an hour’s drive from the South Korean capital of Seoul and its 10 million residents.

Relations between North Korea and Seoul and Washington have worsened since North Korea’s nuclear test in January and a long-range rocket test last month, which outsiders said was a test of banned ballistic missile technology. The United Nations recently imposed strong new sanctions on North Korea .

Similar nuclear threats by North Korea were made in 2013, around the time of the springtime military drills, after it was sanctioned by the UN over a nuclear test and long-range rocket launch.

Skeptics of North Korea’s nuclear threat, and there are many, have long clung to two comforting assurances. While the North has the bomb, it doesn’t have a warhead small enough to put on a long-range rocket. And it certainly doesn’t have a re-entry vehicle to keep that warhead from burning up in the atmosphere before it could reach threatened targets.

Today North Korea suggested it would soon be ready to show the world it has mastered both technologies. This may be just the latest case of Pyongyang’s propaganda, but if true it would represent a huge advance in the country’s suspected nuclear capabilities, and undermine suggestions that its claims are all bluff and bluster.

The authoritarian leader Kim Jong-un has made the comment after meeting scientists and technicians following, what it claimed, was a successful test of a re-entry vehicle.

Kim Jong-un ordered preparations for a “nuclear warhead explosion test” and test-firings of “several kinds of ballistic rockets able to carry nuclear warheads”. With no way independently verifying any of these claims, it’s difficult to separate Pyongyang’s rhetoric from its reality.

Nuclear arsenal

Kim’s most likely candidate for an intercontinental ballistic missile is KN-08, or the Hwasong as it is known in North Korea. The three-stage rocket has an estimated range of 5,000-6,000km (3,100-3,700 miles), but could be modified to increase this. That range would be ample for attacks on US military bases in Japan, but not New York. But a militarised version of the rocket used to put a North Korean satellite into orbit last month is believed to have potentially a much longer range – one that could reach the US mainland.[2]

Conclusion

The timing of Pyongyang’s recent moves is crucial. The regime faces a new UN sanctions package after its 6 January nuclear test, which it claimed was an “H-bomb”, and has significantly amped up its rhetoric while the US and South Korea carry out annual joint military exercises.

Standing firm on nukes bolsters his credibility with hard-liners in the military and reinforces his regime’s defiant, dangerous reputation against its key antagonists.

It also has domestic propaganda value, showing how North Korea, singlehandedly and against all odds, can make breakthroughs few countries have accomplished. Of course, that logic breaks two ways: if the country hasn’t made major advances, exaggerating them is the next best thing.

But we have expressed concern that Washington, in particular, has a pattern of not taking the North’s purported capabilities seriously enough. While it might declare success prematurely, as with the recent H-bomb claims, North Korea has an established track record of getting there eventually.[3]

Security Council condemned North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and launch using ballistic missile technology. We demand that North Korea abandon all weapons of mass destruction programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and calls for the resumption of the six party talks.

Security Council aims to cease further progress on its nuclear and missile programs by North Korea by imposing new financial sanctions to stop the flow of cash to these illicit activities, and imposes new sanctions on shipping which aim to eliminate the possibility of trafficking prohibited goods into and out of North Korea. Security Council also prohibits states from providing any specialized teaching or training of North Korean nationals in disciplines which could contribute to North Korea’s proliferation.

The North Korean regime has seriously neglected to meet the needs of the North Korean people and has instead prioritized development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs in contravention of demands in previous Security Council resolutions and sanctions.[4]

[1][1] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html

[2] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/15/north-korea-nuclear-threat-manhattan-not-bluffing

[3] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/07/north-korea-threatens-to-reduce-us-and-south-korea-to-flames-and-ash

[4] https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea#res2270

Date: 2016-04-22; view: 879