Interdependence, Democratizaton and Multilateralism

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Economic pre-eminence of the Asia-Pacific region is the cornerstone of the optimism in the future of Asia in general and North-East Asia in particular. The 15 members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) encompass more than 2 billion people, occupy 46 per cent of world trade, and account for more than 60 per cent of the total world production of goods and services. APEC's combined GNP amounts to $12 trillion and more than 25 per cent of global foreign direct investment flows. The region "saves more than the rest of the world", and is endowed with a "rich diversity in natural resources, wage levels, skills and technology".6 Furthermore, the World Bank estimates that half of the world's 10 largest economies will come from East Asia by the year 2020. Intra-regional trade and investment will continue to expand steadily. For the first time since the Industrial Revolution, the centre of the world economy is moving towards the Asia-Pacific region and away from Europe. With the well-publicized economic miracle in East Asia7 - Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and China as well as the USA - the North-East Asian region is being recognized as the centre of gravity for global trade and investment.

The first and most obvious consequence of rapidly growing economies in the region is the intensifying economic interdependence and "increasingly dense web of intra-Asian economic ties". As Friedberg has noted8, liberals predict that "flows of trade and investment among Asian states not only make all parties better off, they also tend to create incentives for continued cooperation and to dampen whatever tendencies there might otherwise be toward hostility and conflict". Today's advanced communication and transportation technology increases the potential return of cooperation, while multiplying the cost of war. In other words, liberal optimists believe, as did their forebears of the 18th and 19th century, that dynamic economic growth in the region promotes peace by fostering more trade and interdependence.9 As Asia's economic dynamism draws global attention, a renewed sense of international partnership, according to the liberalists, is replacing the patron-client relationship between Asia and the rest of the world. The formation of APEC was a step towards making the "Pacific Century" a reality. APEC, founded in 1989 in Canberra by 12 Asia-Pacific countries, now has 15 member countries. The APEC summit in Seattle in November 1993 was, in the eyes of the United States, a symbol of Asia's transformation from "troublesome security clients to a mature partner with the US in co- prosperity".10 APEC is neither a security forum, nor directly involved in the peacemaking role. But it is widely believed that it will in the future play a constructive role in deterring future threat to Pacific Rim prosperity, and significantly contribute to the reduction of security tensions that will inevitably be generated by the rapidly changing political and economic terrain of post-Cold War North-East Asia, such as the rise of China with its military preponderance, and possible collapse of North Korea and its absorption by South Korea (at great expense), as well as the reduction/withdrawal of US troops from Korea and Japan, and so on. In essence, the optimists tend to believe in the pacifying effects of the region's growing economic dynamism and intensifying interdependence.

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The liberalists also believe that Asia's economic success will be accompanied by brighter democratic prospects. Economic dynamism is gradually being matched by political pluralism, which may lead to greater individual freedoms, more political democracy and human rights. Economic growth contributes to the growth and maturity of social groups such as the middle class, intellectuals, business and professional people. As they rise in income and social standing, there will be demands and pressures for more rights and more freedom. The triumph of democracy elsewhere in the world inspires the Asian adherents to democracy and human rights.

The decline of undemocratic regimes and the emergence of new, reform-oriented leadership in many Asian countries are certainly encouraging signs to those who believe in the liberalist future. The traditional pattern of ruling party monopoly of power has been broken in South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. The Philippines has crossed the line of no return to its past undemocratic regime. Some Asian powers still lag behind their neighbours in this regard. For example, China's fight for democracy has not progressed since 1989. Russian democracy is in disarray. North Korea - along with Myanmar and Viet Nam in South-East Asia - stubbornly maintains socialist authoritarianism. But elsewhere in Asia - Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, for example - the pressure for more freedom and participation is evident. Thus, liberal-optimists predict that, sooner or later, the process of democratization in some parts of Asia is likely to spread to other countries in the region.

Democratization is important for the peace and security of Asia and the Pacific, because it is considered "the pivotal lynchpin of prosperity and peace".11 Democracy fosters economic growth and enables an efficient management of the economy, in order to enhance citizen welfare. Democracy has also brought about a safer, more peaceful world and a lower level of violence than non-democracies.12 We have seen recently, in countries like South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan, that economic development nurtures forces for democratic change. For economies to grow and mature, nations need to reach out and work for more stable and secure international economic-political environments. It is also true that open, democratic societies make better trading partners and more peaceful neighbours. Thus, liberal optimists expect that, as Asian powers achieve democracy, the possibility of building lasting peace will be greater. In the 21st century, therefore, Asians may become as democratic as the Europeans, and enjoy a new economic, social and cultural renaissance.

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A new feature of emerging trends which could bring about a "preferred" order in North-East Asia is the trend toward multilateral institutions. With the end of the Cold War, various kinds of multilateral institutions have begun to spring up in Asia. The first of such region-wide intergovernmental institutions is APEC, formed in 1989. Although it is aimed at promoting primarily trade and investment, it has security implications. Along with the rise of economic multilateralism, movements to institutionalize a multilateral co- operative framework in politics and the area of security have gained renewed vitality.

Multilateral frameworks in political and security cooperation still lag far behind the area of economics. But such a plan has been around for years in the Asia-Pacific region. In 1993, ASEAN formed a regional security forum called the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which is intended to foster cooperation on political and security issues. The Forum's annual meeting includes 18 countries, comprising all the ASEAN members and others such as the United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea. In addition, there has been a proliferaton of channels for security dialogue which are loosely organized and less formal. Some of them are "distinctively Asian", and many are non-governmental or quasi-official.13 Plans for multilateral security cooperation have also been proposed with more limited regional or subregional scope in North-East Asia by such countries as the US, Russia, Australia, Canada, Malaysia and so on. Moreover, in South Korea, Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo said in November 1993 that the time had come for countries in North-East Asia to join together in a multilateral security framework.

The liberalists believe that movement towards multilateral security networks, although slow, will help to build a lasting peace structure. For one, the existence of a multilateral security scheme would make it difficult for countries to attempt any drastic shifts in power and policy. It is also argued that increased participation in multilateral institutions facilitates better communication and, thus, makes it easier for countries to negotiate and cooperate instead of competing and confronting one another. The logic behind this proposition is put forward by Han Sung-joo:

Because the region [North-East Asia] is enjoying relative peace, it is important to ensure that the positive factors that have brought about this peace be preserved by institutionalizing them. Such an institution would enable the main players to make their actions and goals more transparent to one another and so bring down the level of distrust.14

Will these multilateral political and security networks in post-Cold War Asia, assisted by the trends towards interdependence and democratization, play a similar pacifying role? With this question in mind, we now turn to the major counter-observations on security in North-East Asia offered by the realist sceptics.

Security in North-East Asia: Sceptical Views

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Sceptics look at the world largely through the realist school of international politics. Realist analysts are less concerned with the character of regimes making up the international system than the shaping and distribution of power among the major states in the system. Power balancing and strategic equilibrium are the central pillars of the peace and stability of the international system. Hence, realists are less convinced by the liberalist claim that democracies are non-fighting. According to this school, the mode of power distribution among members of the international system determines the pattern of relationships among them. Inequality of power or rapid changes in the equilibrium among major powers are posited to lead to uncertainty, and are inherently worrisome. An emerging multipolar system in post-Cold War North-East Asia is destabilizing, since it makes it difficult for contending powers to maintain the state of equilibrium. High rates of economic growth make nations wealthier, but may also push them to generate more military power. Fast-rising China is troublesome in this respect, with its potential claim to overthrow the status quo.

Realists also dismiss the alleged "pacifying power of interdependence". For one, realists tend to treat trade, investment and aid as tools for power politics. For another, increased interdependence among unequal partners can lead to friction, especially when one side sees the other party as being unfair, as were the cases of the US-Japan or Korea-Japan relationships. Finally, when one party perceives that its vital security interests are at stake, even rising economic interdependence is not sufficient to keep peace. For instance, expanding economic ties with Taiwan have not dissuaded Beijing from threatening Taiwan with the use of force.

Realists are also sceptical of the peacemaking power of multilateral institutions. They argue that multilateral institutions in Asia have been slow to start off, difficult to develop and not particularly as fast moving as in other regions. The ones already in operation or new ones in the offing are often built on rather shaky foundations - of fear and suspicion and not on confidence and mutual trust. Past records of multilateral efforts, especially in North-East Asia, were also dismal - much "talk", "declaratory statements", "technical proposals", but little tangible results. Compared to Europe and the Atlantic area, institutions and procedures of multilateral cooperation are still underdeveloped. In fact, North-East Asia has been most resistant to new forms of multilateral security cooperation. The region lags far behind South-East Asia in the level of trust and confidence, as seen in the ASEAN structure. It is premature, therefore, to conclude that multilateralism in Asia will conform to the security requirement for peace in North-East Asia. In a region where hostility and mutual suspicion are rooted deeply in history and culture, the emergence of a new, shared sense of security community is an extremely slow and difficult process. The major actors in North-East Asia - the US, China, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas - have all fought each other bitterly in the past. Even having multilateral security dialogues is not sufficient to rule out the possibility of radical changes in the political map of the region. For example, major internal political disruptions in Russia, China or North Korea can result in radical shifts of the region's balance of power and threaten peace and stability. Unresolved historical legacies, asymmetry in power, conflicting national interests such as territorial disputes and national unification are limiting factors in the regional security system. The region also lacks prior habits and experiences of cooperation. Thus, in North-East Asia multilateral institutions are not only underdeveloped, but even those existing are not looked upon as essential for peace and security.

Another source of the region's security concern stems from the legacies of the Cold War and the fragile nature of regime transition in the former socialist countries. Among the potential crises, military conflict in the Korean peninsula looms largest. The days of North Korea's regime are numbered. Yet, it is heavily armed and, under certain circumstances, would opt for confrontation not only with South Korea, but also with those whose assistance it presently solicits. If this happens, none in the region would be immune to the potential blow-outs. Despite its global economic stature, Japan's political and security role in the region and the world remains unsettled. The relationship between China and its immediate neighbours is still troubled by claims to territorial rights on Taiwan and islands in the South China Sea. Moscow's difficult transition to a democracy and market economy continues to be watched. For a long time, therefore, North-East Asia will continue to see the coexistence of democracies, quasi-democracies, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, and thus the prospects for peace and order are not assuring.

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Peace and security in North-East Asia will continue to be, according to our analysis so far, a mix of reinforced optimism and potentially combustible uncertainty. Given the prevailing uncertainties, many policy makers subscribe to the perspective of realism. As they see it, security relations in North-East Asia are characterized by competition and conflict rather than cooperation and harmony. The process of change and adjustment towards peace, stability and democracy in North-East Asia will be smooth and peaceful. The awareness of interdependence lags behind the reality of cooperation. Multilateral arrangements in security matters still remain as ideas and intentions, with no clear definition of situations and common objectives at hand. Hostility and mutual suspicions still exist among the regional powers. Thus, the prospects of long-term peace in North-East Asia remain uncertain, as there is no guarantee against the expansionist aims of the major powers: "threatening US", "intervening China", "militaristic Japan" and so on. Recalcitrant North Korea may provoke armed conflicts or break the nuclear non-proliferation principle, provoking thereby a nuclear arms race among neighbouring countries. In addition, many Asians are still mired in hopeless poverty. No one can enjoy long-term stability, peace, democracy and prosperity if this poverty persists.

In addition, there are some voices calling for an exclusive regional bloc which would appear to exclude others in the region. Prominent Americans and Japanese insult each other from time to time, ignoring the fact that neither can sustain continued prosperity without the well-being of the other. Some even fear that the US is "scheming to transform the APEC into a trading bloc with discriminatory outside tariffs". Sceptics have also expressed the view that APEC may turn into a "big brother" in a new form, with Asia as an alternative market that the US can dominate should the world trading negotiations collapse. Nevertheless, the reality is that no nation in North-East Asia can prosper in isolation from the others. Instability in one country will create difficulties elsewhere. Thus, the current level of interdependence and relative peace in the region needs to be nurtured to take firmer root. What therefore needs to be done immediately and on a long-term basis? First, the challenge of building an effective regional security order requires, at the minimum, ensuring that no state attempts to dominate the norms and structure of the region's political and security constellation. At the same time, major actors in the region must work together to achieve a more normal and natural order for the region. A precondition for this would be that none of them commits actions detrimental to the stability of the region. These countries must also act together positively to cater to human needs and interests that go beyond the scope of the narrowly defined "national interests", especially in such areas as education, the environment and preservation of natural resources.

Secondly, it is vital that every effort is made to bring North Korea into a harmonious regional order. No nation in North-East Asia will feel safe if North Korea is perceived as a nuclear threat. If Pyongyang does not comply with the inspection requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency, every country in its proximity will suspect that North Korea has actual possession of nuclear weapons. When the nuclear issue is resolved, Pyongyang can improve its relations with South Korea, and hopefully reach normalization with the US and Japan. Lifting the economic sanctions and providing foreign assistances badly required for its regime's survival and economic development can follow afterwards.

Thirdly, China is undergoing a great historical experiment. By 2020, China and Japan are predicted to become the two largest economies in the world. Politically, China is maintaining socialist authoritarianism, while reforming its economy along the market system. So far the experiment seems to be working, with double-digit annual GDP growth rates in recent years. A non-intervening China, with its success in economic development and political reform, is the central pillar upon which to build a peaceful Asia-Pacific as well as a stable North-East Asia. Will China succeed in its economic reform and political experiment and pursue a policy of good neighbourliness towards the outside world, especially towards its smaller neighbours?

Fourthly, Japan is seeking a new political role, and looking for a new leadership in the region. The LDP's monopoly of power for the whole period since World War II was dramatically broken in 1993, opening the way for a new kind of coalition politics. Despite strong ties with the West, the Japanese people are inclined to identify themselves with Asia. However, history has proven that Japanese Asianism divorced from the outside world would make Japan's relations with other Asians more difficult.15 In this respect, Japan's foreign policy and its role in Asia are still ill-defined. The question then is what kind of Asia the Japanese see themselves as part of - a broad and inclusive one, or one that is narrow and resentful. The souring of Japan's relations with Europe or the US or both can result in the latter. Will Japan continue to depend on the US security umbrella, or will its political role commensurate with its economic power lead Japan to rearmament and tensed relations with its neighbours?

Date: 2015-01-11; view: 819