The Impact of Regionalization

The final issue I want to discuss here concerns the consequences of regionalization in terms of security and development. What are, first, the security problems to which regionalization may provide a solution? They can be summarized in the metaphor of "black holes", or what in UN terminology is referred to as "failed states". National disintegration seems to reinforce the process of regionalization via threats to regional security, provoking some kind of reaction on the regional level. It may even form part of the process of regionalization, since the enlargement of political space provides opportunities for different sub-national and micro-regional forces, previously locked into state structures, to reassert themselves.

The collapse of political authority at one level of society tends to open up a previously latent power struggle at lower levels, and in a complex multi-ethnic polity the process of disintegration may go on almost indefinitely. However, sooner or later there must be some reorganization of social power and political authority on a higher level of societal organization, most probably the region.

This is likely to be preceded by some form of external intervention with the purpose of reversing the disintegration process. Again the region may play a role, but there are also other, and so far more important, actors. A distinction can be made between five different modes of external intervention: unilateral, bilateral, pluri-lateral, regional and multilateral.

The unilateral can either be carried out by a concerned neighbour trying to avoid a wave of refugees or by a regional/superpower having strategic interests in the region.

In the bilateral case there is some kind of (more or less voluntary) agreement between the intervener and the country in which the intervention is made.

The pluri-lateral variety can be an ad hoc group of countries or some more permanent form of alliance.

The regional intervention is carried out by a regional organization and thus has a territorial orientation.

The multilateral, finally, normally means a UN-led or at least UN-sanctioned operation.

These distinctions are not very clear-cut, and in real world situations several actors at different levels may be involved, the number increasing with the complexity of the conflict itself. However, it is my belief that future external interventions will be a combination of regional and multilateral operations, but with an increasingly important role for the former. The record of regional intervention in domestic conflicts and regional conflict resolution is a recent one and therefore the empirical basis for making an assessment is weak. However, in almost all world regions there have been attempts at conflict resolution with a more or less significant element of regional intervention, often in combination with multilateralism (UN involvement). Perhaps the future world order can be characterized as regional multilateralism?

Secondly, the new regionalism may provide solutions to development problems, which in fact can be seen as a form of conflict prevention, since many of the internal conflicts are rooted in development problems of different kinds. Under the old regionalism, free trade arrangements reproduced centre-periphery tensions within the regions, which made regional organizations either disintegrate or fall into slumber. Let me propose the following seven arguments in favour of a more comprehensive development regionalism:

Although the question of size of national territory might be of lesser importance in a highly interdependent world, regional cooperation is nevertheless imperative, particularly in the case of micro states, which either have to cooperate to solve common problems or become client states of the "core countries" (the "sufficient size" argument);

Self-reliance, rarely viable on the national level, may yet be a feasible development strategy at the regional, if defined as coordination of production, improvement of infrastructure and making use of complementarities (the "viable economy" argument);

Economic policies may remain more stable and consistent if underpinned by regional arrangements which cannot be broken by a participant country without provoking some kind of sanctions from the others (the "credibility" argument);

Collective bargaining on the level of the region could improve the economic position of marginalized countries in the world system, or protect the structural position and market access of emerging export countries (the "effective articulation" argument);

Regionalism can reinforce societal viability by including social security issues and an element of redistribution (by regional funds or specialized banks) in the regionalist project (the "social stability" argument);

Ecological and political borders rarely coincide. Few serious environmental problems can be solved within the framework of the nation state. Some problems are bilateral, some are global, quite a few are regional, the latter often related to water: coastal waters, rivers and groundwater. The fact that regional management programmes exist and persist, in spite of nationalist rivalries, shows the imperative need for environmental cooperation (the "resource management" argument);

Regional conflict resolution, if successful and durable, eliminates distorted investment patterns, since the "security fund" (military expenditures) can be tapped for more productive use (the "peace dividend" argument).

In sum, development regionalism contains the traditional arguments for regional cooperation such as territorial size and economies of scale, but, more significantly, add some which are expressing new concerns and uncertainties in the current transformation of the world order and world economy.

During the Cold War a common argument (the "common security" approach) against nuclear armament was that the destructive capacity of the military establishments was excessive and therefore irrational, and that whatever reduction of the level of armament that could be negotiated might be used for civil (development) purposes. Some regions, such as East Asia and Europe (and within these regions Japan and West Germany in particular) were seen as "free riders" of the security order since they could devote more resources to investment and economic growth.

In the post-Cold War order these regions have been encouraged to take a larger responsibility for their own security. At the same time the removal of the Cold War "overlay" permitted latent conflicts to re-emerge, giving rise to costly (conventional) armaments races. The security situations differ from region to region, with vacuum problems in East Asia and Europe, eruptions of older conflicts in South Asia and the Middle East, breakdowns of political order leading to "tribal ism" in Africa and the Balkans. The only region experiencing relative peace is Latin America, which now may be said to have a comparative advantage in peace and political stability. The peace in East Asia seems less stable, but in view of the high degree of economic independence, the states have a high stake in regional security. Here the circle is closed: regional cooperation for development reduces the level of conflict and the peace dividend facilitates further development cooperation. This positive circle can also be turned into a vicious circle, where conflict and underdevelopment feed on each other. Security and development form one integrated complex, at the same time as they constitute two fundamental imperatives for regional cooperation and increasing regionness. The levels of regionness between regions in the process of being formed will continue to be uneven. Only the future will decide where these levels will be, and where the balance between regionalization and globalization will be struck. However, political will and political action will certainly play their part in breaking the vicious circle of regional conflict, insecurity and underdevelopment.

II. Regionalism in "the Pacific Age"

Asia-Pacific is becoming the new centre of global capitalism. It can also be seen as an emerging trade bloc under the leadership of Japan, its distinctness depending on the relative degrees of cooperation and conflict among competing capitalisms: North America, Europe and Asia-Pacific. It contains several potential regional formations, the shapes of which, due to unresolved security dilemmas, are still uncertain. It is thus not so easy to tell what is intraregional and interregional in the case of Asia-Pacific. So far the three regions within the Asia-Pacific area show a low degree of regionness. East Asia lacks any kind of formal regionalist framework. South-East Asia earlier contained two regional formations: the now more or less post-Communist Indo-China and the previously anti-Communist ASEAN grouping. The political rationales for these formations have thus completely changed, much like in Europe, and there are new possible alignments. The "European Pacific" (Australia and New Zealand) may turn Euro-Asian, but they may also be seen as regional great powers in a fourth "region" of Pacific micro states: the South Pacific. In the sections below we first describe the historical heterogeneity of the Pacific region, secondly experiences of regional conflict and conflict resolution, and thirdly integrative forces that nevertheless exist.

Pacific Regions and Regional Identity

In the first section of this chapter an argument was made that regionalization is a worldwide process forming a part of global transformation. A crucial issue is thus what regional formations can be found in this particular geographical area, and what, if any, shared cultural basis there is to form a regional identity. The Asia-Pacific area, which in itself hardly constitutes a region except in a purely geographical sense, contains three more distinct regional formations: East Asia, South-East Asia and Australia/New Zealand, which, although physically distant from Europe, have cultural European origins. Under the impact of successive immigrations this heritage is becoming less distinct and economically the region is becoming part of Asia. Sixty-five per cent of Asia-Pacific trade is now intraregional (compared to 62% in the EC). Also the embryonic security network (ASEAN Regional Forum) is extended throughout the Asia-Pacific area. The Pacific also includes the South Pacific islands of Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia, and reaches parts of the USA and Latin America. Although not seen as "Asian" (being far away from the Asian continent), the South Pacific is also becoming part of the East Asian economic space. Thus regionalism can be discussed in terms of maximalist and minimalist regionalist options (Öjendal 1996a).

East Asia is the most dynamic of the world regions, containing a hegemonic contender (Japan), an enormous "domestic" market (China), three NICs (South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong) and a socialist autarky (North Korea), in the midst of major changes which may fundamentally alter the pattern of cooperation within the region. A reunification of Korea, a democratization of China and a more independent Japanese role would release an enormous potential. These changes are admittedly not imminent, but on the other hand quite feasible. At present the East Asian region is a region largely in the geographical, economic and perhaps cultural (Confucian-Buddhist) sense of the concept, while a regional security order is missing. Previous experiences of "regionalism" have been rather imperialistic. The degree of "regionness" is thus low in spite of the fact that unplanned economic integration is now taking place due to the dominance of the yen. Regional integration thus takes place without much formal institutionalization (Palmer 1991, p. 5). The end of the Cold War opened up new possibilities for inter-subregional contacts, widening the potential regional cooperation. The Confucian model provides a dominant pattern of social and political organization, which now frequently is hailed as a cultural alternative to Westernization (Herald Tribune, 13 July 1992). Many countries are facing internal basic policy options which will have a crucial impact on further regionalization and future regional configurations.

Perhaps the most complex issue in the region is the future role of Japan. Will it remain number two in Pax Americana or take a more independent global or regional role? The latter, and perhaps more likely option, would imply the accumulation of military strength and a break with the introverted Japanese world view. It also implies reversing the process of "de-Asianization" begun in the 19th century. The former course presupposes that the US itself does not turn to isolationism, which would create great confusion as far as Japan is concerned (Tamamoto 1990). References to "global partnership" cannot hide the fact that the old security order is defunct, due to the disappearance of the main threat, against which the order was built, and the emergence of new threats which may necessitate new approaches. There is, as yet, no national consensus in Japan regarding her proper role in the world. The erosion of the hegemonic position of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) implies that different options will be more politically articulated and possibly that future lines of action will be based on a changing pattern of political alliances. The pressure on Japan from outside also increases, due to the regionalist and protectionist trend in the world economy.

Japan, not a great practitioner of but increasingly dependent on free trade, has so far been rather negative or at least neutral to the idea of regionalism. It would, if regionalization were to be the main trend, appear as a regional power in more than one sense, which is bound to create suspicions throughout the region. Some countries have the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere in vivid memory, and even today the Japanese attitude towards Asia is not free from arrogance. As in the case of Germany in the EC/EU, a comprehensive regional framework would help protect Japan against itself, an Asianized Japan rather than a Japanized Asia. Japan has, however, a rather weak identity as an Asian power, and the prospect of "re-Asianization" does not seem to be very popular. At the moment, Japan has "a regional policy for Asia but not a policy of regionalism" (FEER, 18 June 1992). The latter would necessitate that Japan acted more like a powerful nation state, less like an international trading firm (Pyle 1993).

Much will of course depend on the future behaviour of China in the region. China will continue the long road towards a more open economy in spite of the temporary isolation which followed in the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident. China's self-reliance-oriented economy built in the Cold War context is in need of transformation, which (as in the case of Viet Nam) implies a change in the domestic balance of power away from Beijing and towards the south, where foreign investments flow. Guangdong Province is forging links with Hong Kong, Fujian with Taiwan, Japan invests primarily in the Shanghai area, and South Korea in Shandong Province. China as a centralized empire is probably doomed, but its eventual dissolution could hopefully be less turbulent than the dissolution of the Soviet empire proved to be.

Date: 2015-01-11; view: 917