Group decision making is significantly more complex than are decisions made by individuals. Several new issues arise: combining multiple beliefs and preferences, social interaction of decision makers, and conflict and cooperation. In this section we examine research that addresses these issues in terms of group decision making for certain and uncertain outcomes, technology designed specifically to aid group decision making, and negotiation between two parties.
) Group Decision Making
Two new phenomena have been discovered in group decision making: groupthink and the risky shift. Janis (1972) defined S^uptkink as "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when foe members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action" (P- 9). A classic case example is the failed Bay of Pigs inva-s'on, in which the American military sent Cuban exiles to overthrow the dictator Fidel Castro. These groupthink deci-slons are characterized by highly cohesive groups that are under high stress from an external threat and have low self-esteem due to an earlier failure or decision difficulty. Several toer attributes may also contribute to groupthink: an illusion 01 ^vulnerability, collective rationalization, belief in the indent morality of the group, insulation, lack of impartial
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leadership, direct pressure on dissenters, stereotypes of out-groups, and lack of a decision-making procedure. However, note that merely increasing group familiarity alone is not sufficient to cause groupthink: Watson, Michaelsen, and Sharp (1991) found that groups who spent more than 30 hours on decision-making tasks were more effective than were individual decision makers.
The risky shift (Stoner, 1961) is the tendency for decisions made by groups to be more risk seeking than would be predicted by the individual members' risk preferences. However, as Bazerman {1998) pointed out, most of the studies finding the risky shift used Stoner's (1961) Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (CDQ) method. Other studies using different methodologies have found either no shift or a cautious shift (i.e., more risk averse).
Are groups better or worse decision makers than individuals? The answer depends on the situation and decision to be made (and, of course, on the criteria for "good"; in many settings a technically inferior decision to which the whole group is agreed may be an excellent choice). There is no clear pattern of group effects in either reducing or increasing decision biases. The hindsight bias was reduced slightly with groups compared to individuals (Stahlberg, Eller, Maass, & Frey, 1995), although Bukszar and Connolly (1988) found no effect. However, groups were even more affected than individuals by the representativeness heuristic in a base-rate (cab) problem (Argote, Seabright, & Dyer, 1986). And groups, like individuals, appear to be biased in their information search {Schulz-Hardt, Dieter, Luethgens, & Moscovici, 2000). Tindale (1993) argued that group effectiveness depends on the demonstrability of the solution. If there is a solution that one or more members of the group can demonstrate as the correct answer, then the group will usually adopt this solution. However, if the solution cannot be easily demonstrated (as in the cab problem), then the group decides by majority rule (Tindale & Davis, 1985). Because most individuals neglect base rates in situations such as the cab problem, the majority will also fall prey to this bias. Tindale (1993) presented data in which decision biases are reduced or enhanced with groups as compared to individuals.
Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer (1996) reviewed studies investigating decision biases at both the individual and the group level. They also concluded that the strength of decision biases can either be lower, equal to, or higher for groups as compared to individuals depending on the type of decision, the initial values of the individuals, and how individual values are aggregated into group decisions. They organized the various results into a formal model of group decision making called the social decision scheme (SDS) model (Davis, 1973; see the special issue of Organizational Behavior and Human
510Judgment and Decision Making
Decision Processes, 1999, on this topic). This model provides a framework for answering the question about how individual values are aggregated into a group decision and what decisions will emerge given different decision rules such as "majority wins," "truth wins," or "equiprobability," in which every option has an equal probability of being selected as long as it has a single advocate. For example, Whyte and Sebenius (1997) found that groups did not debias individual estimates that were improperly and inappropriately anchored. Using SDS methodology, the authors showed that group estimates were based on the majority point of view that was biased before group discussion began.
Although it is unclear whether groups are better or worse at making decision than individuals, there are certain conditions in which groups can increase decision-making quality. Several studies of heterogeneous groups (in terms of many attributes such as personalities, gender, attitudes, and experience) indicate that heterogeneity is positively related to creativity and decision effectiveness (Jackson, May, & Whitney, 1995). Guzzo and Waters (1982) found that the quality of group decisions and the number of diverse alternatives increased when expression of emotion was delayed until alternative solutions were discussed. They suggested that early expression of emotions may reduce the group energy and narrow the range of accepted ideas. Under time pressure, quality of decisions generally decline; task cohesion can help groups maintain decision quality at a level comparable to low time pressure situations (Zaccaro, Gualtierei, & Minionis, 1995).