Name Consultant Research Grant Scientific Advisory Board Expert Witness TestimonyDr. N. A. Mark Estes III ● Guidant ● Guidant ● Guidant (Executive Committee) None
● Medtronic ● Medtronic
Dr. Mark S. Link None ● Guidant None None
● Medtronic
Dr. Barry J. Maron None ● Medtronic None ● 1996, Defense, Knapp vs. Northwestern
Task Force 12: Legal Aspects of the
36th Bethesda Conference Recommendations
Matthew J. Mitten, JD, Chair
Barry J. Maron, MD, FACC, Douglas P. Zipes, MD, MACC
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
In 1994, when the 26th Bethesda Conference recommendations
were formulated, no court had yet considered whether an
athlete with a cardiovascular abnormality could be involuntarily
excluded from a competitive sport if physicians disagreed in
their participation recommendations (1–3). However, new
data have subsequently become available, and several highly
visible cases involving the sudden deaths of elite competitive
athletes (4,5) have brought medical-legal and liability considerations
into prominent focus. A 1996 lawsuit brought by a
student-athlete claiming the legal right to play intercollegiate
basketball contrary to a university team physician’s
medical recommendation has established a developing legal
framework for medical decisions regarding the eligibility or
disqualification of trained athletes with cardiovascular disease
to participate in competitive sports. In this case, Knapp
vs. Northwestern University (6,7), a federal appellate court
recognized the appropriateness of a physician’s reliance on
current consensus medical guidelines when making a participation
recommendation for an athlete with a cardiovascular
abnormality. Consequently, judicial precedent now
provides some guidance regarding the role of the present
36th Bethesda Conference recommendations in resolving
legal issues relating to athletic participation disputes.
In the Knapp case, the court upheld Northwestern
University’s legal right to accept its team physician’s recommendation,
which was consistent with the then-current
26th Bethesda Conference guidelines, to medically disqualify
a student-athlete from playing college basketball (6).
As a high school senior, Nicholas Knapp suffered sudden
cardiac arrest while playing in an informal basketball
game, which required cardiopulmonary resuscitation and
defibrillation to restore sinus rhythm. Thereafter, he had a
cardioverter-defibrillator (ICD) implanted. He resumed
playing recreational basketball without any subsequent cardiovascular
events, and three cardiologists medically cleared
him to play college basketball.
Knapp had received a full athletic scholarship at Northwestern
University to play intercollegiate basketball. While
Northwestern honored Knapp’s scholarship, it barred him
1373 JACC Vol. 45, No. 8, 2005 Mitten et al.
April 19, 2005:1373–5 Task Force 12: Legal Aspects
from playing on its basketball team based on the team
physician’s medical recommendation. The team physician
considered Knapp’s medical records and history, the 26th
Bethesda Conference recommendations (1), and the opinions
of two consulting cardiologists who concluded that
Knapp would expose himself to a medically unacceptable
risk for ventricular fibrillation during competitive athletics.
All medical experts agreed on the following facts: 1)
Knapp had suffered a cardiac arrest; 2) even with the ICD,
playing college basketball placed Knapp at a higher risk of
sudden cardiac death as compared to other male college
basketball players; 3) the ICD had never been tested under
the conditions of intercollegiate basketball; and 4) no person
currently played or had ever played college or professional
basketball after having an ICD implanted. However, the
experts disagreed whether Knapp should be medically disqualified
from playing intercollegiate basketball.
The trial court ruled that Northwestern should restore
Knapp’s eligibility to play on its basketball team and
mandated a courtside defibrillator and cardiologist to be
present at all games and practices. However, the appeals
court overruled that decision and held that a university has
a legal right to establish legitimate physical qualifications for
its intercollegiate athletes. Northwestern did not violate the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, a federal law prohibiting discrimination
against persons with disabilities, by following
its team physician’s reasonable medical advice. An athlete
may be medically disqualified and excluded from a sport if
necessary to avoid an enhanced risk of death or serious injury
during competitive athletics that cannot be eliminated through
the use of medication, monitoring, or protective equipment.
The court explained that Northwestern’s decision to exclude
Knapp from its basketball team was legally justified:
“We do not believe that, in cases where medical experts
disagree in their assessment of the extent of a real risk of
serious harm or death, Congress intended that the courts—
neutral arbiters but generally less skilled in medicine than
the experts involved—should make the final medical decision.
Instead, in the midst of conflicting expert testimony
regarding the degree of serious risk of harm or death, the
court’s place is to ensure that the exclusion or disqualification
of an individual was individualized, reasonably made,
and based upon competent medical evidence. . . . [W]e wish
to make clear that we are not saying Northwestern’s decision
is necessarily the right decision. We say only that it is not an
illegal one under the Rehabilitation Act” (6).
Knapp eventually left Northwestern and pursued collegiate
basketball at another university where the team physician
cleared him to play. Shortly thereafter, his ICD delivered an
apparently appropriate shock during a basketball game.
The present 36th Bethesda Conference recommendations
update the 26th Bethesda Conference guidelines of
1994 (1) (which modified the 16th Bethesda Conference
guidelines of 1984), taking into account the most recent and
relevant developments in the diagnosis and management of
cardiovascular disease. These new guidelines represent the
most current consensus opinion of a distinguished group of
cardiologists regarding the medical risks of participation in
competitive sports by athletes with cardiovascular abnormalities.
Thus, we anticipate that the 36th Bethesda Conference
recommendations will be recognized and accepted
by physicians but also by the legal community and courts, as
the most contemporary consensus opinion of a distinguished
expert panel of cardiologists regarding medical
eligibility and disqualification recommendations for competitive
athletes with cardiovascular disease.
The Knapp case recognized the appropriateness of physician
reliance on current consensus guidelines in making
medical clearance recommendations. However, the court
did not rule that the 26th Bethesda Conference guidelines
would always be legally determinative in resolving athletic
participation disputes involving athletes with cardiovascular
abnormalities. Therefore, consistent with legal precedent established
by Knapp vs. Northwestern University, a physician
may justifiably consider and rely upon the updated 36th
Bethesda Conference recommendations in making medical
eligibility recommendations for competitive athletes with cardiovascular
disease. Nevertheless, the law continues to require
that these recommendations be applied on an individualized
basis rather than used to exclude categorically all competitive
athletes who have a particular cardiovascular abnormality.
The Knapp case establishes an important precedent
regarding the medical exclusion of college and high school
athletes with cardiovascular disease from intercollegiate and
interscholastic athletics, for whom sports is an avocation or
extracurricular activity incidental to one’s education (6,7). It
is presently uncertain whether this same legal framework
will be applied to resolve future participation disputes that
involve professional athletes (for whom sports is an incomegenerating
livelihood) (8). However, it is notable that the
U.S. Supreme Court recently held that an enhanced risk of
significant harm to personal health is a legitimate ground for
exclusion from employment (9), which suggests that the
legal framework developed in the Knapp case may be
applied to professional sports.
Currently there is no well-defined legal precedent regarding
a physician’s potential malpractice liability for medically
clearing an athlete with a cardiovascular abnormality to
participate in a competitive sport contrary to consensus
recommendations (10). The law generally requires a physician
to have and use the current knowledge, skill, and care
ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the
medical profession in good standing. The applicable legal
standard of physician conduct is “good medical practice”
within the physician’s area of specialty practice, which
depending on the jurisdiction means either “reasonable,”
“customary,” or “accepted” medical care under the circumstances
(10). This general standard applies to physicians
who provide cardiovascular medical treatment to a competitive
athlete, including evaluation of his or her medical
fitness to participate in a sport.
1374 Mitten et al. JACC Vol. 45, No. 8, 2005
Task Force 12: Legal Aspects April 19, 2005:1373–5
Courts generally have recognized “guidelines” established
by national medical associations as evidence of good medical
practice, but they are not conclusive evidence of the standard
of care (11–13). Indeed, consistent with the requirements
of the federal disability discrimination laws as interpreted
in the Knapp case, it is important to emphasize that
the Bethesda Conference recommendations permit the
exercise of a physician’s medical judgment in individual
cases. The recommendations do not, per se, rigidly restrict
clinical practice or medical decision making. A clinician has
the flexibility to deviate from the recommendations if he or
she believes it is in the best interests of a patient-athlete to
reach an alternative decision and strategy.
The controlling legal issue is whether adherence to (or
deviation from) consensus recommendations is consistent
with reasonable, customary, or accepted medical practice in
an individual patient’s case. Although the recommendations
of the 36th Bethesda Conference do not represent formal
guidelines endorsed by the American College of Cardiology,
they are well-considered views of a group of experts
convened to address the medical risks imposed by competition
on an athlete with a cardiovascular abnormality.
Therefore, deviations from the 36th Bethesda Conference
recommendations that are nevertheless consistent with good
medical practice and are protective of an athlete’s health may be
appropriate in particular cases and do not necessarily create
physician liability for medical malpractice. Conversely, compliance
with the 36th Bethesda Conference recommendations
is some evidence that a physician has satisfied this legal
requirement, and in future legal disputes may form the basis of
a successful defense against allegations of malpractice (14).
doi:10.1016/j.jacc.2005.02.019
TASK FORCE 12 REFERENCES
1. Maron BJ, Mitchell JH. 26th Bethesda Conference: recommendations
for determining eligibility for competition in athletes with cardiovascular
abnormalities. J Am Coll Cardiol 1994;24:845–99.
2. Maron BJ, Brown RW, McGrew CA, Mitten MJ, Caplan AL, Hutter
AM Jr. Ethical, legal, and practical considerations affecting medical
decision-making in competitive athletes. J Am Coll Cardiol 1994;24:
854–60.
3. Mitten MJ, Maron BJ. Legal considerations that affect medical
eligibility for competitive athletes with cardiovascular abnormalities
and acceptance of Bethesda Conference recommendations. J Am Coll
Cardiol 1994;24:861–3.
4. Maron BJ. Sudden death in young athletes: lessons from the Hank
Gathers affair. N Engl J Med 1993;329:55–7.
5. Maron BJ. Sudden death in young athletes. N Engl J Med 2003;349:
1064–75.
6. 101 F. 3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1274 (1997).
7. Maron BJ, Mitten MJ, Quandt EF, Zipes DP. Competitive athletes
with cardiovascular disease—the case of Nicholas Knapp. N Engl
J Med 1998;339:1632–5.
8. Mitten MJ. Enhanced risk of harm to one’s self as a justification for
exclusion from athletics. Marq Sports L J 1998;8:189 –223.
9. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. vs. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
10. Mitten MJ. Emerging legal issues in sports medicine: a synthesis,
summary, and analysis. St John’s L Rev 2002;76:5– 86.
11. Stone vs. Proctor, 131 S.E.2d 297, 299 (N.C. 1963).
12. Pollard vs. Goldsmith, 572 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
13. Swank vs. Halivopoulos, 260 A.2d 240, 242-43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1969).
14. Mitten M. Team physicians and competitive athletes: allocating legal
responsibility for athletic injuries. Univ Pitt L Rev 1993;55:129–60.
Appendix 1. Author Relationships With Industry and Others
Date: 2016-03-03; view: 892
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