Logical Forms Accrue in and Through Inquiry

Dewey’s project is grounded in the reasoned logic of human experience. Particularly troublesome to him were philosophical assumptions based on a priori methodologies and corresponding assumptions of human epistemology. On this he sharply criticized idealists, rationalists, and positivists alike for evading the fundamental challenge of linking philosophical science to the requirements of life and to the possibilities of human flourishing within the context of concrete situations. Notwithstanding the criticism, Dewey drew heavily from the various schools of thought that he opposed, which resulted in a creative fusion that characterized his pragmatic vision.

One of Dewey’s (1938/1991) most basic assumptions is that “logical forms” are functionally grounded in that they both “originate” [italics in original] and are defined through and “in operations of inquiry” (p. 11). Noting the variance between his view and more traditional schools of formal thought (both rationalistic and empirical), Dewey argued, “inquiry can develop in its own ongoing course the logical standards and forms whichfurther [italics in original] inquiry shall submit” (p. 13). Thus, definitions and means of measuring progress in the attainment of literacy, while based on scientific reasoning, would develop from the inquiry process that this constructed term has undergone and will undergo in the future. This stance is essential on Dewey’s reading in order to establish science as an effective instrument in the resolution of existential problems in which the criteria of satisfaction can only be determined in the crucible of human values as lived. As he stated elsewhere, “Genuine empirical method sets out from the actual subject-matter of primary experience, recognizes that reflection discriminates a new factor in it…makes an object of that…to regulate, when needed, further experiences of the subject-matter already contained in primary experience” (Dewey, 1929/1958, p. 18). The challenge, to which Dewey (1938/1991) posited as the project of his entire Logic, is the dilemma on “How can inquiry originate logical forms…and yet be subject to the requirement of these forms” (p. 13).

The underlying issue is whether there is anything a priori in any theory of logic. In Dewey’s analysis there is at the most fundamental level, a habit of mind attuned to critical analysis of living experience. On this interpretation, knowledge itself takes on a functional role as an intermediary factor toward the movement from problem identified to progressive resolution. Consequently, axioms, what Dewey refers to as postulations, are also defined functionally as “stipulations,” rules, or even laws that emerge from and ground the logical premises of the specific study matter under investigation, which can never be more, but also can never be less exacting as the particular case allows. The determination of levels of precision in any axiomatic theorem is a discovery process itself that takes place as the investigation unfolds. “Only after inquiry has proceeded for a considerable time and has hit upon methods that work successfully [in any particular case], is it possible to extract the postulates that are involved” (p. 25). Even with Dewey, a priori reasoning is evident, though more in the manner of how the problem resolution process proceeds as a naturalistic form of inquiry, than with predetermined assumptions of how the mind works or fixed relationships between data and analysis.

Date: 2014-12-21; view: 879