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Various degrees of rationality in the principles assumed as the basis ofThis science The experimental method should not be confused with the empirical method, and it is not necessary for us to dwell on something that can be ascertained by reading any treatise on logic. In Political Economy, therefore, as in any other science, one must always find a way to go back to the more general and more rational causes, but every step must be taken with the utmost caution, leaving the firm ground of observation to soar into the unreliable realm of abstraction only for the shortest possible time. Marshall takes a big step, and he builds the science of economics on few principles; but Walras and the German schoolXIV go even further. They create a whole science from nothing, out of a single postulate – the hedonistic one. In this respect, the science of economics could be seen as being similar to astronomy, which rests entirely on a single principle. This attempt is worthy of great consideration and careful study. Even if this work does not turn out to be perfect, one can rest assured that it will be of some benefit to the science of economics, were it only for the increased rigour and precision that the demonstrations of that science will derive from it. However, all this does not detract from the merit of economists such as Smith, Mill, J.-B. Say,XV Ricardo, Ferrara,XVI and many others, to whom we owe all the truths we know in the science of economics. The new school does not always do them justice, and though understandable – since, being under attack, it strives to return blow for blow – this is not acceptable. Classic economics is found wanting in the areas of form, precision and demonstration rigour, but in actual fact we think these are very small flaws. The metaphysical concept of absolute perfection, which played a major role in preventing the ancients from considering concrete truths, and led them into the dreams of metaphysics, continues to cause damage in many sciences, Considerations, I, May 1892 5 among which we must include Political Economy. Recognizing a truth and providing a perfect proof of it are two quite different things. Almost every theorem we know was demonstrated in ways that were later replaced by better ones, without taking anything away from the discoverer’s merit. * Among the countless examples, suffice it to mention that until the beginning of this century, mathematicians used series without trying to demonstrate their convergence. But this is certainly not a good enough reason to detract from the fame of scientists such as D’Alembert,XVII Bernoulli,XVIII Euler, LagrangeXIX and Laplace.XX * In his course of analysis,8 Mr HermiteXXI does a calculation in which he says that he is using a well-known method devised by Laplace for certain approximate integrations. But anyone who checks that method in the Teoria Analitica delle Probabilità,XXII will soon find that, while Hermite’s demonstration is rigorous – as any by every other modern mathematician – Laplace’s demonstration is not rigorous at all. Nevertheless, Hermite does not even mention this fact, rightly judging, in our opinion, that the few words that must be added to Laplace’s demonstrations to give them the necessary rigour are of little importance, compared to the results achieved by that most accomplished mathematician. It is especially the concept of value that the new school sees as being wrong in the economists of the classic school. And we believe that many of the remarks made by Walras about the theories of Smith’s and J.-B. Say do hit the mark. But if these economists did not use perfectly correct expressions, if they even made mistakes in looking for the true cause of value, this did not prevent them from discovering its laws, and after all, this is essentially what mattered most. The times of ontology have gone, and all sciences now study the concrete properties of things without caring much about knowing their essence. It is necessary to abandon the concept, found in Plato, that in order to discuss correctly about any thing, one must first know its true nature. The value that goods have on the market is a fact; we can look for its laws without knowing from where that fact originates. It goes without saying that if someone is able to connect that fact to another, more general fact, that will be all the better for our science. * Astronomers do not care much at all about the true nature of gravity, and one day much bigger mistakes will perhaps be found in some of their ideas on this topic, than those for which Prof. Walras reproaches Smith and J.-B. Say. * Carnot, who is credited with the second principle of thermodynamics, XXIII did not express himself correctly in expounding it, and, not knowing the first principle,XXIV he made the mistake of believing that heat would not transform into work. Nevertheless, that second principle still bears the name of its illustrious discoverer, whose work was later brought to perfection. 6 Considerations, I, May 1892 Date: 2015-12-24; view: 845
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