Special Problem: Kant and Aristotle – Moral Duty and For the Sake of the Noble
There is a widely shared agreement among philosophers that Kant’s deontological ethics and Aristotle’s virtue ethics can be easily distinguished by acknowledging the simple fact that Kant is concerned with acting from duty or on the moral principle or because one thinks that it is morally right; while Aristotle’s approach completely lacks this particular idea of moral motivation and, hence, it would be unsound to claim that the virtuous person is morally obligated to act in a way similar to the Kantian agent. In other words, there is no such thing as acting from a sense of duty in virtue ethics. The common view has been challenged by, for example, neo-Aristotelians (for example Hursthouse 2010) who claim that there is not only a strong notion of moral motivation in Aristotle’s approach, but also that the virtuous person is better equipped to meet the demands of acting from a sense of duty than the Kantian moral agent. The following sketches out the main line of reasoning (see, also Engstrom and Whiting 1998; Jost and Wuerth 2011).
Hursthouse claims in her book On Virtue Ethics that “there is a growing enthusiasm for the idea that the ideal Kantian agent, the person with a good will, who acts “from a sense of duty”, and the ideal neo-Aristotelian agent, who acts from virtue – from a settled state of character – are not as different as they were once supposed to be” (2010: 140). Her view is supported by some important works of Hudson (1990), Audi (1995), and Baron (1995). This fact, however, has also been acknowledged by neo-Kantian philosophers such as Korsgaard (1998) and Herman (1998). In this respect it reflects a lack of awareness about current developments in virtue ethics and neo-Kantianism if one still up-holds the claim of the clear distinction between ancient ethics and modern morality, in particular, concerning Aristotle and Kant that has been proposed for hundreds of years. A related issue concerning the question of whether there is a fundamental distinction between aretaic and deontic terms has been critically discussed by Gryz (2011) who argues against Stocker (1973) who claims that “good” and “right” mean the same thing. Gryz is convinced that even if both groups of terms converge (as close as possible), there will still either remain an unbridgeable gap or in case that one attempts to define one group of terms by the other group, it follows that something is left behind which cannot be explained by the second group. This contemporary debate shows that there is still no common view on the relationship between ancient ethics and modern morality.
Kant claims in the Groundwork that the morally motivated agent acts from good will. In more detail, to act from duty or to act because one thinks that it is morally right is to perform an action because one thinks that its maxim has the form of a law (Korsgaard 1998: 218). For example, if a person is in need the Kantian agent does the right action not because – as Korsgaard claims – that it is her purpose to simply do her duty, but because the person chooses the action for its own sake that means her purpose is to help (Korsgaard 1998: 207).
Even if the Ancient Greeks lacked the particular notions that can be translated as moral ought, duty, right, and principle (for example Gryz 2011, Hursthouse 2010), it seems nonetheless correct to claim that the idea of doing the right thing because it is right or because one is required to do it is also a well-known phenomenon in classic virtue ethics in general and with regard to Aristotle and stoicism in particular. There are quite a few passages in the Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle clearly claims that morally good actions are done for their own sake or because it is the morally right thing to do:
Now excellent actions are noble and done for the sake of the noble. (EN IV, 2, 1120a23–24)
Now the brave man is as dauntless as man may be. Therefore, while he will fear even the things that are not beyond human strength, he will fear them as he ought and as reason directs, and he will face them for the sake of what is noble; for this is the end of excellence. (EN III, 10 1115b10-13)
The standard of all things is the good and the good man; he is striving for the good with all his soul and does the good for the sake of the intellectual element in him. (EN IX, 4, 1166a10–20)
The good man acts for the sake of the noble. (EN IX, 8, 1168a33-35)
For the wicked man, what he does clashes with what he ought to do, but what the good man ought to do he does; for the intellect always chooses what is best for itself, and the good man obeys his intellect. (EN IX, 8, 1169a15–18)
If the virtuous person acts because she thinks that it is the right thing to do, because she acts for the sake of the noble without any inclination other than to do good for the sake of the noble, then she is comparable with the Kantian moral agent. For example, according to Aristotle the noble is “that which is both desirable for its own sake and also worthy of praise” (Rhetoric I, 9, 1366a33); and in 1366b38–67a5 he holds the view that nobility is exhibited in actions “that benefit others rather than the agent, and actions whose advantages will only appear after the agent’s death, since in these cases we can be sure the agent himself gets nothing out of it” (Korsgaard 1998: 217). Hence it follows, the virtuous person will not be able to act in a non-virtuous way because he or she acts from a strong inner moral obligation to act according to the morally right thing, since it is the very nature of the virtuous person to act virtuously. The Kantian agent, instead, sometimes acts according to the universal law and hence performs a morally right action, and on other occasions he or she fails to do so. This is because he or she has no stable and firm disposition to always act in accordance with the universal law. That is the very reason why the Aristotelian virtuous person can be seen as an agent who is not only acting from duty in the sense of doing the right thing because it is right, but also because the virtuous person constantly perceives and adheres to the moral duty, that is, to act virtuously.
5. Conclusion
The upshot is, however, that the vital question of how to live a good life cannot be separated from the essential question of how one should act. Conceptually and phenomenologically, both questions are intimately interwoven and a complete ethical theory will always be concerned with both issues, independently of whether the theory is of ancient or modern origin.
6. References and Further Reading
§ Altman, M. 2011. Kant and Applied Ethics: The Uses and Limits of Kant's Practical Philosophy.Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
§ Annas, J. 1992. “Ancient Ethics and Modern Morality.” Philosophical Perspectives 6: 119-136.
§ Anscombe, E. 1958. “Modern Moral Philosophy.“ Philosophy 33 (124): 1-19.
§ Apelt, O, trans. 1998. Diogenes Laertius: Leben und Meinungen berühmter Philosophen. Hamburg: Meiner.
§ Aristotle. 1985. “Nicomachean Ethics.” Translated by W.D. Ross. In Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by J. Barnes, 1729-1867. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
§ Aristotle. 2007. Rhetoric. Translated by George A. Kennedy. New York: Oxford University Press.
§ Audi, R. 1995. “Acting from Virtue.” Mind 104 (415): 449-471.
§ Baron, M. 1995. Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology. New York: Cornell University Press.
§ Bayertz, K. 2005. “Antike und moderne Ethik.“ Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 59 (1): 114-132.
§ Bentham, J. 1962. „The Principles of Morality and Legislation” [1798]. In J. Bowring (ed.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, edited by J. Bowring, 1-154. New York: Russell and Russell.
§ Broadie, S. 1991. Ethics with Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
§ Cicero, M.T. 2001. On Obligations. Translated by P.G. Walsh. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
§ Cooper, J.M. 1998. “Eudaimonism, the Appeal to Nature, and ‘Moral Duty’ in Stoicism.” In Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty, edited by S. Engstrom and J. Withing, 261-284. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
§ Döring, K. 1988. Der Sokratesschüler Aristipp und die Kyrenaiker. Stuttgart, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.
§ Dworkin, R. 1984. “Rights as Trumps.”In Theories of Rights, edited by J.Waldron, 152-167. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
§ Eisler, R. 2008. Kant Lexikon: Nachschlagewerk Zu Kants Sämtlichen Schriften, Briefen Und Handschriftlichem Nachlaß. Hildesheim: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
§ Engstrom, S. and J. Withing. 1998. Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. Rethinking Happiness and Duty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
§ Erler, M. and M. Schofield. 2007. “Epicurean Ethics.” In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfield and M. Schofield, 642-669. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
§ Foot, P. 1978. Virtues and Vices and other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Berkeley: University of California Press.
§ Foot, P. 2001. Natural Goodness. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
§ Gryz, J. 2010. “On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (5): 493–501.
§ Herman, B. 1998. “Making Room for Character.” In Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. Rethinking Happiness and Duty, edited by S. Engstrom and J. Withing, 36-60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
§ Hudson, S. 1990. “What is Morality All About?” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 20 (1-2): 3-13.
§ Hursthouse, R. 1991. “Virtue Theory and Abortion.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (3): 223-246.
§ Hursthouse, R. 2010. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
§ Hursthouse, R. 2007. “Environmental Virtue Ethics.” In Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, edited by R.L. Walker and P.J. Ivanhoe,155-171. New York: Oxford University Press.
§ Hutcheson, F. 2005. A System of Moral Philosophy, in Two Books [1755]. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
§ Inwood, B. and P. Donini. 2007. “Stoic Ethics.” In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy,edited by K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfield and M. Schofield, 675-736. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
§ Jost, L. and J. Wuerth. 2011. Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
§ Kant., I. 1991. Metaphysics of Morals [1797]. Translated by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
§ Kant, I. 1997. Critique of Practical Reason [1788]. Translated by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
§ Kant, I. 2005. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals [1785]. Translated by A.W. Wood. New Haven CT: Yale University Press.
§ Korsgaard, C.M. 1996. Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
§ Korsgaard, C.M. 1998. “From Duty and From the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action.” In Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. Rethinking Happiness and Duty, edited by S. Engstrom and J. Withing, 203-236. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
§ Long, A.A. 2007. “The Socratic Legacy.” In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfield and M. Schofield, 617-639. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
§ Long, A.A and D.N. Sedley. 2000. The Hellenistic Philosophers, Volume 2: Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
§ Long, A.A. and D.N. Sedley. 2011. The Hellenistic Philosophers, Volume 1: Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
§ MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue. London: Duckworth.
§ Mill, J.S. 1998. Utilitarianism [1863]. Edited by R. Crisp. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
§ Nussbaum, M.C. 1992. “Human Functioning and Social Justice. In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism.” Political Theory 20 (2): 202-246.
§ Nussbaum, M. 1993. “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach.” In The Quality of Life,edited by M.C. Nussbaum and A. Sen, (1-6). New York: Oxford University Press.
§ Nussbaum, M. 1995. “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics.” In World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, edited by J.E.J. Altham and R. Harrison, 86-131. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
§ Paley, W. 2002. The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy [1785]. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
§ Paton, H. J. 1967. The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. London: Hutchinson & co.
§ Regan, T. 1985. The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press.
§ Russell, D.C. 2009. Practical Intelligence and the Virtues. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
§ Schneewind, J.B. 1998. “Kant and Stoic Ethics.” In Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty, edited by S. Engstrom and J. Withing, 285-302. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
§ Schopenhauer, A. 1995. On the Basis of Morality [1841].Translated by E.F.J. Payne. Providence: Berghahn Books.
§ Slote, M. 2001. Morals from Motives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
§ Steinfath, H. 2000. „Ethik und Moral.“ In Vorlesung: Typen ethischer Theorien, 1-21 (unpublished)
§ Stocker, M. 1973. “Rightness and Goodness: Is There a Difference?” American Philosophical Quarterly10 (2): 87–98.
§ Swanton, C. 2003. Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
§ Timmermann, Jens. 2010. Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
§ Urstad, K. 2009. “Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life in Aristippus.” Journal of Ancient PhilosophyIII (1): 1-22.
§ Williams, B. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.