MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Washington's Syria Dilemma

At the start of 2015, Stratfor forecast that Russia, unnerved by the developing U.S.-Iran rapprochement and locked in a standoff with the United States, would promote itself as a mediator of the Syrian conflict as leverage in its broader negotiation with Washington. Wherever the United States floundered in the Middle East, Russia would position itself as the problem-solver in a bid to rebuild its credibility in the region and make itself indispensable to the United States. That forecast was updated in the third quarter to say that the Russian-led project to cobble together a transitional peace plan for Syria would gain momentum but would ultimately perish on the battlefield as rebel factions and their sponsors lacked both the incentive and the trust to negotiate and uphold a sustainable power-sharing arrangement. These forecasts effectively set the scene for the fourth quarter as multiple interests converge and compete on the future of Syria.

With Russia providing critical reinforcement to loyalist forces in Syria, the regime's primary focus will be on filling out a statelet contoured against the stronghold of the ruling Alawite clan, a region that extends across the Hezbollah-dominated Bekaa Valley through Damascus and up the Homs-Hama corridor before anchoring on the Alawite coast. Under the claimed mandate of combatting terrorism, Russia and Iran will work together to help loyalist forces flush out rebel pockets along this corridor and repel encroaching rebels from Idlib in northeast Syria and Daraa, along the southwestern border with Jordan.

However, Russia's presence in Syria will be measured. Russia's primary political objectives are to safeguard an Alawite rump state, establish a long-term presence in the eastern Mediterranean, maintain its relationship with Iran and ultimatelydraw the United States into a strategic dialogue. These objectives can be achieved without committing divisions of Russian forces to large-scale combat. Russia will be well aware of the threat of mission creep and is not under any illusion that it can pacify Syria through its military might, diplomacy or any combination of the two. By establishing a large forward operating base on the Syrian coast, Russia will be able to commit military resources as needed to protect an Alawite statelet and weaken groups opposed to the al Assad government while emphasizing its diplomatic efforts to advance a peace proposal.

That proposal is unlikely to gain much traction this quarter. The rebel factions that constitute the bulk of the insurgency will stay away from the negotiating table, appealing instead for more weapons support and training from a group of external sponsors. These sponsors include Turkey, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan, all of which distrust Russia's intentions for Syria and feel compelled to step up their support for the rebels to rebalance the battlefield following Russia's surge of support. The United States, already working to keep a safe distance from the fight in Syria to focus its diplomatic and geopolitical force elsewhere — including the Russian periphery — will not try to match Russia's commitment in Syria. Instead, it will work with coalition partners to ramp up the volume of airstrikes in Syria and the training and arming of rebel factions. This dynamic will give the Sunni regional players more authority in vetting rebel groups, thus raising the long-term threat of blowback from Islamist rebel factions. Enhanced U.S. efforts in the Syria fight will still do little to steer the main rebel focus toward battling the Islamic State as opposed to the Syrian regime.

Date: 2016-04-22; view: 647