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Notes on Reciprocity and Wealth

 

C.0.0 Reciprocity and Wealth — The following notes mostly con­cern societies already considered in other contexts. The cita­tions illustrate particularly the association between wealth differences and generosity (generalized reciprocity). That food is the item so often shared is significant. Examples that indicate sharing in favor of need between socially distant parties—those who would ordinarily enter balanced ex­change—especially underscore the assertions of this section.

C.1.0 Hunters and gatherers

C.l.l Andamans— "It has been stated above that all food is pri­vate property and belongs to the man or woman who has obtained it. Everyone who has food is expected, however, to give to those who have none.... The result of these customs is that practically all the food obtained is evenly distributed through the whole camp ..." (Radcliffe-Brown, 1948, p. 43).

C.1.2 Bushmen — "Food, whether vegetable or animal, and water are also private property, and belong to the person who has obtained them. Everyone who has food is, however, expected to give to those who have none. . . , The result is that practically all food obtained is evenly distributed through the whole camp" (Schapera, 1930, p. 148). Compare these last two quotations! It is an extremely rare fortune in anthropolo­gy, and fills one with humble awe, to enter the presence of a great natural law. Actually, the elided parts of these cita­tions indicate some difference in manner of distribution. An older married man among the Andamanese will share out food after he has reserved sufficient for his family; a younger man hands over the pigs to elders for distribution (see also Radcliffe-Brown, 1948, pp. 37-38, 41; Man, n.d., pp. 129, 143 note 6). The one who takes game or veldkos among the Bushman does the sharing out, according to Schapera.

The Andamanese who is lazy or helpless is still given food, despite the probability or certainty of no reciprocation (Rad­cliffe-Brown, 1948, p. 50; Man, n.d., 25). A lazy hunter fares badly among the Bushmen; a crippled one is abandoned by all save his nearest relations (Thomas, 1959, pp. 157, 246; see also Marshall, 1961, on Bushman sharing).

C. 1.3 Eskimo— The Alaskan seal-hunter is often solicited for meat, especially in lean winter months, and these requests are very rarely refused (Spencer, 1959, pp. 59, 148-149). "In times of food shortage, it was the successful hunter and his family who might go hungry, since in his generosity he gave away whatever he had at hand" (p. 164). Notable are the obligations of the fortunate toward non-kin in the camp: "Generosity was a primary virtue and no man could risk a miserly reputation. Thus anyone in the community, whether inland or coastal, could ask aid of a man of wealth and it was never refused. This might mean that the men of wealth would be obliged to support an entire group in times of stress. Here, too, aid was extended to non-kin" (p. 153; presumably these non-kin might at other times enter balanced exchanges, as in the "bidding game"—see A. 1.7). Lazy people take ad­vantage of a hunter's bounty, and do not necessarily recip­rocate even if they have their own stores (pp. 164-165; see also pp. 345-351, 156-157 for giveaways in which poor stand to gain materially).



Generally among Eskimo large game is "common proper­ty," though smaller animals are not; yet the hunter might in any case invite people of the camp to a meal (Rink, 1875, p. 28 f; Birket-Smith, 1959, p. 146; see also Boas, 1884-85, pp. 562, 574, 582; Weyer, 1932, pp. 184-186).

Spencer's note of the reaction of Alaskan Eskimo to the Great Depression of the 1930s is of interest in the context of economic behavior during general shortage. "More so than in a time of prosperity, the community sense of in-group consciousness appears to have developed. Those who did engage in hunting were obliged by custom to share their catch—seal, walrus, caribou, or any other game—with the less fortunate members of the community. But while this factor of sharing operated between non-kin, the economic circumstances of the period furthered the aboriginal family system as a cooperative institution. Families worked together and extended their joint efforts to the benefit of the commu­nity at large. The return to the aboriginal social patterns at a time of economic stress appears to have lent the family system a force which it still possesses. As may be seen, how­ever, the cooperative arrangement between non-kin in the community tends to break down with the addition of new wealth" (Spencer, 1959, pp. 361-362).

C.1.4 Australian Aboriginals— Local communities of Walbiri or of friendly tribes could drop in on neighboring Walbiri when in need. They were welcomed, even if the hosts' supplies were limited, but there was some degree of balance in the eco­nomic relationship. The requests of hungry communities "of­ten took the form of appeals to actual kinship ties and, couched in these terms, could hardly be refused. The sup­pliants, then or later, made gifts of weapons, hair-string, red ochre and the like to express their gratitude and, equally important, to rid themselves of feelings of shame or embar­rassment" (Meggitt, 1962, p. 52). In lean seasons among the Arunta, everyone shared in available supplies, ordinary gen­eration, sex, and kinship-status considerations notwithstand­ing (Spencer and Gillen, 1927 i, pp. 38-39, 490).

C. 1.5 Luzon Negritos — Large quantities of food are shared; when­ever a good find is made neighbors are invited to partake until it is eaten up (Vanoverbergh, 1925, p. 409).

C.1.6 Naskapi— The same (e.g. Leacock, 1954, p. 33).

C. 1.7 Congo Pygmies — A hunter cannot very well refuse—in view of public opinion—to share out game in the camp (Putnam, 1953, p. 333). Larger animals, at least, were generally shared through extended family groups; vegetables were not so dis­tributed unless some family had none and then others "come to their assistance" (Schebesta, 1933, pp. 68, 125, 244).

C. 1.8 Western Shoshoni — Essentially the same customary sharing of large game, and of lesser family supplies in favor of need, in the camp (Steward, 1938, pp. 60, 74, 231,253; cf. also pp. 27-28 on helping families whose traditional pinion haunts were not bearing).

C. 1.9 Northern Tungus (mounted hunters)— The hunting spoil, by the custom of nimadif, went to the clan—"in other words, the fruit of the hunting does not belong to the hunter, but to the clan" (Shirokogoroff, 1929, p. 195). There was great readiness to assist clansmen in need (p. 200). Reindeer were allocated to the poor of the clan following epizootics, with the results that families holding over sixty deer were not to be seen (p. 296).

C. 1.10 Northern Chipewayan and Copper Indians — Samuel Hearne notices an outbreak of "disinterested friendship" among members of his crew as they prepare to attack some Eskimos: "Never was reciprocity of interest more generally regarded among a number of people, than it was on the present occa­sion by my crew, for not one was a moment in want of anything that another could spare; and if ever the spirit of disinterested friendship expanded the heart of a Northern Indian, it was here exhibited in the most extensive meaning of the word. Property of every kind that could be of general use now ceased to be private, and every one who had any thing that came under that description seemed proud of an opportunity of giving it, or lending it to those who had none, or were most in want of it" (Hearne, 1958, p. 98).

C.2.0 Plains Indians— In many northern tribes there was insuffi­ciency of good buffalo horses and unequal possession of them. Those without horses, however, did not suffer for food in consequence; the meat circulated to have-nots, in various ways. For example:

C.2.1 Assiniboin— Denig notes that in a large camp men who lacked horses, and the old and infirm as well, would follow the hunt, taking meat as they would but leaving the hide and choice parts for the hunter, and they got as much meat as they wanted (Denig, 1928-29, p. 456; cf. p. 532). When food was scarce people would spy out lodges that were better supplied and drop in at mealtimes, as "No Indian eats before guests without offering them a share, even if it is the last portion they possess" (p. 509; cf. p. 515). The successful horse raider might be flattered so by old men upon his return from the raid that by the time he reached his lodge he ("fre­quently") had given all the loot away (pp. 547-548).

C.2.2 Blackfoot— The poor in horses might borrow from the wealthy—the latter thus adding to the number of followers — and people whose herds had been depleted by misfortune were particularly so helped by those more fortunate (Ewers, 1955, pp. 140-141). A person who borrowed a horse for a chase might return to the owner the best of the meat taken, but this evidently was conditional upon the horse-owner's own supply (pp. 161-162). If borrowing was not possible, the man would have to rely on the "rich" for meat and usually had to take the lean (pp. 162-163; but see pp. 240-241). A case cited of an amputee warrior thereafter supplied with a lodge, horses and food by his band (p. 213). Those who captured horses on raids were supposed afterward to share their loot with less fortunate comrades, but arguments were frequent here (p. 188; compare with Plains Ojibway generosi­ty before the raid, C.2.5). Note how wealth differences gener­alize exchange: in intratribal trading, rich men paid more dearly for things than did others; the average man, for exam­ple, gave two horses for a shirt and leggings, the rich man three to nine horses fdr the same thing (p. 218). A man, in addition, frequently gave horses to the needy "to get his name up," and the poor might take advantage of the rich by giving small presents to the latter or simply praising them loudly in the hopes of a horse return (p. 255). Ewers thus summarizes the economic relation between rich and poor: "Generosity was felt to be a responsibility of the wealthy. They were expected to loan horses to the poor for hunting and moving camp, to give food to the poor, and to give away horses occasionally. They were expected to pay more in in­tratribal barter than were Indians who were not well to do. If the man of wealth had political ambitions it was partic­ularly important that he be lavish with his gifts in order to gain a large number of followers to support his candidacy" (p. 242).

The reaction to general shortage was heightened sharing. Lean winter periods were common: "Then the wealthy, who had put up extensive winter supplies the previous fall, had to share their food with the poor" (Ewers, 1955, p. 167). The rank structure of the band was also engaged to organize relief: hunters had to turn over their bag to the band chief, who had it cut up and divided equally to each family. When game became more plentiful, this "primitive form of food rationing" was discontinued and the chief stepped out of the central distributive role (pp. 167-168).

C.2.3 Plains Cree— The same inclination of those better off to share meat to people without horses, to give horses away on occasion—for which from the poor one received in return not meat but fealty (Mandelbaum, 1940, p. 195)—and other generosities found in the Plains in connection with wealth differences (pp. 204, 221, 222, 270-271; see also Wallace and Hoebel, 1952, p. 75 etpassim on the Comanche; Coues on the Mandan (village Indians), 1897, p. 337).

C.2.4 Kansa — Hunter writes that if one party to an agreed ex­change could not meet his obligations due to ill health or bad hunting luck, he was not dunned, nor did friendly relations with his creditors cease. But one who failed of his obligations for reason of laziness was a bad Indian and would be aban­doned by his friends—such types, however, were rare (Hunt­er, 1823, p. 295). Moreover, ". . . no one of respectable standing will be allowed to experience want or sufferings of any kind, while it is in the power of others of the same community to prevent it. In this respect they are extrava­gantly generous; always supplying the wants of their friends from their own superabundance" (p. 296).

Generalized reciprocity apparently intensified during shortage. "Whenever a scarcity prevails, they reciprocally lend, or rather share with each other, their respective stores, till they are all exhausted. I speak now of those who are provident, and sustain good characters. When the case is otherwise, the wants of such individuals are regarded with comparative indifference; though their families share in the stock, become otherwise common from public exigency" (p. 258).

C.2.5 Plains Ojibway— Tanner and his Ojibway family, destitute, reach a camp of Ojibway and Ottawa; the chiefs of the camp meet to consider their plight and one man after another volunteers to hunt for Tanner's people; Tanner's FaBrWi is stingy to them, but her husband beats her for it (Tanner, 1956, pp. 30-34). In similar circumstances, an Ojibway lodge insisted on silver ornaments and other objects of value in return for giving Tanner's family some meat one winter. This insistence on exchange struck Tanner as despicable, for his people were hungry—"I had not before met with such an instance among the Indians. They are commonly ready to divide what provisions they have with any who come to them in need" (p. 47; see also pp. 49, 60, 72-73, 75, 118, 119).

During a period of epidemic and general food shortage in an Ojibway camp, Tanner and another hunter managed to kill abear. "Of the flesh of this animal," he wrote, "we could not eat a mouthful, but we took it home and distributed to every lodge an equal portion" (p. 95). On another similar occasion, an Indian who had shot two moose tried to get Tanner to secretly share them, keeping the meat from the rest of the camp. Tanner, a better Indian than this, refused, went out hunting, killed four bears and distributed the meat to the hungry (p. 163).

On special economic behavior of the warpath: if a man of the war party was short of moccasins or ammunition he took out one of that object and walked about the camp before a person well supplied; the latter ordinarily gave over the thing desired without the necessity of anyone speaking, or else, the leader of the party went from man to man taking what was needed by the person who was short (p. 129).

C.3.0 Miscellaneous

C.3.1 Nuer— See the citations in the text of this section: "Kins­men must assist one another, and if one has a surplus of a good thing he must share it with his neighbors. Consequently no Nuer ever has a surplus" (Evans-Pritchard, 1940, p. 183). Generalized reciprocity characteristic between haves and have nots, especially if close kin and neighbors, in the com­pact dry season camps, and during seasons of generally low supplies (pp. 21, 25, 84-85, 90-92; 1951, p. 132; Howell, 1954, pp. 16, 185-186).

C.3.2 Kuikuru (upper Xingu)—The contrast between the handling of the major crop, manioc, and the disposition of maize is an instructive illustration of the relation of sharing to supplies on hand. Kuikuru households are in general self-sufficient; there is little sharing between them, especially of manioc which is produced with ease and in quantity. But during Carneiro's stay, maize was planted by only five men of the village, and their harvest was divided through the community (Carneiro, 1957, p. 162).

C.3.3 Chukchee— Despite an anthropological reputation some­thing to the contrary, the Chukchee are remarkably generous "toward everyone who is in need" (Bogoras, 1904-09, p. 47). This includes aliens, such as poor Lamut families who got sustenance from neighboring rich Chukchee without pay­ment, and also starving Russian settlements in whose favor Chukchee have slaughtered their herds for little or no return (p. 47). At the annual fall slaughter, about one-third of the deer were given to guests, who need not make returns, espe­cially if poor; neighboring camps, however, might exchange slaughtered beasts at this time (p. 375). At serious setbacks to herds, neighboring camps—these need not be related— might render assistance (p. 628). Tobacco is highly valued by Chukchee but is not hoarded when scarce; ". . . the last pipeful be divided or smoked by turns" (pp. 549, 615 f, 624, 636-638).

C.3.4 California-Oregon — The Tolowa-Tututni "rich-man" was, as we have noted, a source of aid to his people (Drucker, 1937). Poorer people depended on the bounty of richer. "Food was shared by the provident with the improvident within the village group" (DuBois, 1936, p. 51). Of the Yu-rok, Kroeber writes that food was sometimes sold, "but no well-to-do man was guilty of the practice" (1925, p. 40), implying that the exchange would be generalized rather than balanced (selling) in this case. Similarly Kroeber remarks that small gifts among the Yurok were ordinarily reciprocat­ed, as "Presents were clearly a rich man's luxury" (p. 42; cf. p. 34 on the liberal disposition of fish by successful fisher­men). Meat, fish and the like taken in large quantities by Patwin families went to the village chief for distribution to families most in need; a family, moreover, might demand food of fortunate neighbors (McKern, 1922, p. 245).

C.3.5 Oceania—The Melanesian big-man complex, wherever it exists, argues the prevalence of generalized reciprocity in exchange between people of different fortune.

The Duff missionaries' description of Tahitian generosity, especially of richesse oblige, is probably too good to be true, anyhow too good to be analytically adequate: "All are friend­ly and generous, even to a fault; they hardly refuse anything to each other if importuned. Their presents are liberal, even to profusion. Poverty never makes a man contemptible; but to be affluent and covetous is the greatest shame and re­proach. Should any man betray symptoms of incorrigible avariciousness and refuse to part with what he has in time of necessity, his neighbors would soon destroy all his proper­ty, and put him on a footing with the poorest, hardly leaving a house to cover his head. They will give the clothes from their back, rather than be called peere, peere, or stingy" (1799, p. 334).

Firth's discussion of Maori sharing in favor of need is more measured: "At a time of shortage of provisions . . . persons did not as a rule keep to themselves the product of their labour, but shared it out among the other people of the village" (Firth, 1959, p. 162). It is as true in the forests of New Zealand as the savannahs of the Sudan that "Starvation or real want in one family was impossible while others in the village were abundantly supplied with food" (p. 290).

Of interest in connection with responses to general scarcity is the development in food-poor Polynesian atolls of reserve lands administered in group interests, the products of which were periodically pooled by communities (e.g. Beaglehole, E. and P., 1938; Hogbin, 1934; MacGregor, 1937). The restudy of Tikopia by Firth and Spillius, however, provides probably the most comprehensive report of the reaction of a primitive society to prolonged and intense food shortage. The reaction proceeded far: while traffic in food did not develop, theft certainly did and contraction of foodsharing to the house­hold sphere did too. These latter responses, increases in nega­tive reciprocity and diminution of the sector of generalized exchange, were apparently progressive, augmenting as the crisis deepened. It is impossible to do justice here to Firth's and Spillius' analyses, but it is at least useful to excerpt some remarks from Firth's summary of exchange behavior during the famine: "In general it can be said . . . that while morals degenerated under the strain of famine, manners remained. At the times of greatest food shortage the ordinary modes of serving food were kept up. . . . But while in matters of hospitality all the forms of etiquette continued to be main­tained throughout the period of famine, its substance radical­ly altered. No longer was food actually shared with visitors. Moreover, after food had been cooked it was ... concealed— sometimes even locked up in a box. ... In this development kinship ties were affected, though not quite in the same way as the more general rules of hospitality. Kin who called in were treated as ordinary visitors; food was not shared with them.... In many cases if food was left in a house a member of the household remained behind to guard it. Here, it was stated to Spillius, the inmates were often not so much afraid of theft by strangers but of the inroads of kin who normally would have been welcome to come and take what they pleased. In the definition of kin interests that took place under the stress of famine there was some atomization of the larger kin groups on the consumption side and a closer inte­gration of the individual household group. (This normally meant elementary family but often included other kin.) Even at the height of the famine it appeared that within an elemen­tary family full sharing of food continued to be the norm. The atomization tended to be most strong where food was most desparately short—and it must be remembered that supplies varied considerably in different groups, depending on their size and their wealth in land. But in one respect the strength of kin ties was manifested, in the common practice of pooling supplies, especially where food—though scarce— was not desperately short. Closely related households 'linked ovens' (tau umu) by each drawing upon its own stock of food and then sharing in the work of the oven and in a common meal . . . the Tikopia avoided where possible their general responsibility or undefined responsibility for kin during the famine but showed no disposition to reject responsibility which had been specifically defined by the undertaking. What the famine did was to reveal the solidarity of the elementary family. But it also brought out the strength of other kin ties personally assumed . . ." (Firth, 1959, pp. 83-84).

C.3.6 Bemba —High incidence of generalized reciprocity associat­ed with differential food stocks, and also during general hunger seasons. Thus, "If a man's crops are destroyed by some sudden calamity, or if he has planted insufficient for his needs, relatives in his own village may be able to help him by giving him baskets of grain or offering him a share in their meals. But if the whole community has been visited by the same affliction, such as a locust swarm or a raider elephant, the householder will move himself and his family to live with other kinsmen in an area where food is less scarce. . . . Hospitality of this sort is commonly practised in the hunger season, when families go all over the country 'looking for porridge' ... or 'running from hunger' .... Hence the legal obligations of kinship result in a particular type of food distribution, both within the village and the surrounding neighbourhood, which is not found in those modern commu­nities in which a more individual domestic economy is prac­tised" (Richards, 1939, pp. 108-109). "The economic conditions under which [a Bemba woman] lives necessitate reciprocal sharing of foodstuffs, rather than their accumula­tion, and extend the individual's responsibility outside her own household. Plainly, therefore, it does not pay a Bemba woman to have very much more grain than her fellows. She would merely have to distribute it, and during the recent locust scourge the villagers whose gardens escaped destruc­tion complained that they were not really better off than their fellows for 'our people come and live with us or beg us for baskets of millet' " (pp. 201-202).

C.3.7 Pilagd— Henry's Table 7(1951, p. 194) indicates that all unproductive persons in the village studied—it was, recall, a period of very low supplies—received food from more people than they gave food to. The "negative" balance of these cases—old and blind, old women, etc.—varies from -3 to -15 and the eight persons listed as unproductive make up more than half of those showing such negative balance. This is contrary to the general Pilaga trend: "It will be at once clear from the tables that the Pilaga on the whole gives to more people than he receives from, but that, with the unproductive Pilaga the situation is reversed" (pp. 195-197), The negative balance of unproductive people shows as well in the number of transactions as in the number of people given to minus received-from (p. 196). In Table III, presenting the approxi­mate ratios of food quantity received to food quantity given away, ten persons are listed as unproductive and for eight of these income exceeded out-go; six persons are listed as very or exceptionally productive and four had out-go over in­come, one had income over out-go and one had income equal to out-go (p. 201). I take these figures to mean that those who had food shared it out to those who had none, in the main.

 


Date: 2014-12-21; view: 941


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