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Appendix A

Notes on Reciprocity and Kinship Distance

 

A. 1.0 Hunters and Gatherers— Generally, sectoral breaks in reci­procity not always as definite as for neolithic peoples, but variation in reciprocity by interpersonal kinship distance apparent. Generalized reciprocity often consists of specific obligations to render goods to certain kinsmen (kinship dues) rather than altruistic assistance. Notable differences between the handling of foods and durables.

A. 1.1 Bushmen —The/Kung term lack of generosity or failure to reciprocate "far-hearted"—a felicitious choice of words, from our perspective.

Three social-material breaking points in reciprocity are apparent in Marshall's (1961) paper on /Kung exchange: (1) a range of close kin in the camp with whom meat is shared, often as customary obligation; (2) more distant kin within the camp and other Bushmen, with whom economic rela­tions are characterized by "gift-giving" of durables in a more balanced fashion and transactions in meat that approximate "gift-giving"; (3) "trade" with Bantu. Marshall's materials are rich and indicate the play of various social considerations and sanctions determining specific transactions. Large game moves through a camp in several waves. Initially it is pooled in the hunting party by the taker, with shares going also to the arrow. "In the second distribution [here we move into reciprocity proper] close kinship is the factor which sets the pattern of the giving. Certain obligations are compulsory. A man's first obligation at this point, we were told, is to give to his wife's parents. He must give to them the best he has in as generous portions as he can, while still fulfilling other primary obligations, which are to his own parents, his spouse, and offspring [note, these cook and eat meat sep­arately]. He keeps a portion for himself at this time and from it would give to his siblings, to his wife's siblings, if they are present, and to other kin, affines, and friends who are there, possibly only in small quantities by then. Everyone who receives meat gives again, in another wave of sharing, to his or her parents, parents-in-law, spouses, offspring, siblings, and others. The meat may be cooked and the quantities small. Visitors, even though they are not close kin or affines, are given meat by the people whom they are visiting" (Mar­shall, 1961, p. 238). Beyond the range of close kin, giving meat is a matter of individual inclination in which friend­ship, obligation to return past favors, and other considera­tions come into account. But this giving is definitely more balanced: "In the later waves of sharing when the primary distribution and the primary kinship obligations have been fulfilled, the giving of meat from one's own portion has the quality of gift-giving. /Kung society requires at this point only that a person should give with reasonable generosity in proportion to what he has received and not keep more than an equitable amount for himself in the end, and that the person who receives a gift of meat must give a reciprocal gift some time in the future" (p. 239). Marshall reserves "gift-giving" to the exchange of durables; this occurs also, and importantly, between /Kung of different bands. One should neither refuse such gifts nor fail to make a return. Much of the gift-giving is instrumental, having principally social ef­fects. Even asking for a thing, claimed one man, "formed a love" between people. It means "he still loves me, that is why he is asking." And Marshall adds laconically, "At least it forms a something between people, I thought" (p. 245). "Gift-giving" is distinguishable from "trade" both in form of reciprocity and social sector. "In reciprocating [a gift] one does not give the same object back again but something of comparable value. The interval of time between receiving and reciprocating varied from a few weeks to a few years. Propriety requires that there be no unseemly haste. The giving must not look like trading" (p. 244). The mechanics of trading are not specified. "Negotiation" however is men­tioned; the implication is of haggle. The social sphere is in any case clear: "The /Kung do not trade among themselves. They consider the procedure undignified and avoid it be­cause it is too likely to stir up bad feelings. They trade with Bantu, however, in the settlements along the B.P. border. . . . The odds are with the Bantu in the trading. Big, aggres­sive, and determined to have what they want, they easily intimidate the Bushmen. Several/Kung informants said that they tried not to trade with Herero if it was possible to avoid it because, although the Tswana were hard bargainers, the Herero were worse" (p. 242).



Intense generalized reciprocity within Bushmen camps and bands—especially food-sharing—is also indicated by Thomas (1959, pp. 22, 50, 214-215) and Schapera (1930, pp. 98-101, 148). Interband exchange, however, is characterized as "barter" by Schapera (1930, p. 146; cf. Thomas's amusing anecdote of the trouble that developed between a man and woman of different groups over an unrequited gift presented to the father of the former by the woman's father [1959, pp. 240-242].)

Theft reported unknown to them (Marshall, 1961, pp. 245-246; Thomas, 1959, pp. 206). However, Schapera im­plies it exists (1930, p. 148).

A.1.2 Congo Pygmies — Ingeneral, the scheme of reciprocity looks very much like the Bushmen's, including a rather impersonal exchange with "Negroes" (Putnam, 1953, p. 322; Schebesta 1933, p. 42; Turnbull, 1962). Hunting spoils, large game especially, are shared out in the camp, on a kinship-distance basis it appears—Putnam implies that first the family shares, then the "family group" gets shares (1953, p. 332; cf. Schebesta, 1933, pp. 68, 124,244).

A. 1.3 Washo— "Sharing obtained at every level of Washo social organization. Sharing also decreased as kinship and res­idence distances increased" (Price, 1962, 37). It is difficult to say where "trade" leaves off and "gift-giving" begins, but "In trade there tended to be immediate reciprocation while gift exchange often involved a time lapse. Trade also tended to be competitive and to increase with less intense social ties. Trade involved explicit negotiation and social status was secondary as a factor in the transaction" (p. 49).

A. 1.4 Semang — Sharp sectoral break in reciprocity at the "family group" (band) border: "Each family contributes from its own food, already cooked and prepared, to every other fam­ily. If one family on any particular day is unusually well supplied, they give generously to all kindred families, even if it leaves them with too little. If other families not belonging to the group are in the camp, they do not share, or only to a very small extent, in the distribution" (Schebesta, n.d., p. 84).

A. 1,5 Andamans— Radcliffe-Brown's (1948) account suggests a higher level of generalized reciprocity within the local group, particularly in food dealings and in transactions between junior and senior generations (cf. pp. 42-43), and more bal­anced forms of reciprocity between people of different bands, particularly in durables. The exchange of presents is charac­teristic of interband meetings, an exchange that could amount to swapping local specialties. In this sector, "It re­quires a good deal of tact to avoid the unpleasantness that may arise if a man thinks he has not received things as valuable as he has given" (p. 43; cf. pp. 83-84; Man, n.d., p. 120).

A. 1.6 Australian Aboriginals — A number of formal, compulsory kin dues and also formal precedence orders for sharing food and other goods with relatives of the camp (see Elkin, 1954, 110-1 ll;Meggitt, 1962, pp. 118, 120, 131, 139, etc.; Warner, 1937, pp. 63, 70, 92-95; Spencer and Gillen, 1927, p. 490).

A strong obligation to share out food in the horde (Rad-cliffe-Brown, 1930-31, p. 438; Spencer and Gillen, 1927, pp. 37-39).

Yir-Yiront exchange seems to parallel the Bushman scheme (above). Sharp notes that reciprocity varies on both sides of the set of customary kin dues, toward balance be­yond and toward generalized reciprocity in the narrowest sphere of closest kin. Giving to persons outside the range of those entitled dues "amounts to compulsory exchange. . . . But there is also irregular giving, though within a relatively narrow social range, for which the incentives seem to be chiefly sentimental, and which may be considered altruistic; this may lead to a desire to acquire property in order to give it away" (Sharp, 1934-35, pp. 37-38).

On the connection between assistance and close kinship: Meggitt observes of the Walbiri that "... a man who has several spears parts with them willingly; but, should he have only one, his son or father should not ask for it. If he is asked, the man usually gives the single article to an actual or close father or son, but he refuses distant 'fathers' and 'sons' " (Meggitt, 1962, p. 120).

Balanced reciprocity, in various specific guises, is charac­teristic of the well-known interband and intertribal trade exchange, which is often effected by trade partners who are classificatory kin (see, for example, Sharp, 1952, pp. 76-77; Warner, 1937, pp. 95, 145).

A. 1.7 Eskimo — High level of generalized reciprocity in the camp, associated by Birket-Smith with "the fellowship of the settle­ment." This concerns food in the main, particularly large animals, and especially during the winter season (Birket-Smith, 1959, p. 146; Spencer, 1959, pp. 150, 153, 170; Boas, 1884-85, p. 562; Rink, 1875, p. 27).

Taken all in all, Spencer's study of the North Alaskan Eskimo suggests significant differences between the reci­procity appropriate among kinsmen, among trade partners, and among nonkin who are also not trade partners. These variations concern durables, especially trade goods. Nonkin within the camp would presumably be given some food if they are short, but trade goods are exchanged with them, as well as with outsiders (who are not trade partners), in an impersonal "bidding" transaction (reminiscent of Brazilian Indians' "trade game"). Trade partnerships are formed—on quasi-kin or institutional-friendship lines—between coastal and inland men; the exchange is of local specialties. Partners deal without haggle, indeed try to extend themselves, yet without balance (or near balance) in exchange the partner­ship would dissolve. Trade relations are specifically distin­guished by Spencer from kinship-generalized reciprocity. Thus kinsmen do not need to enter into partnership, he says, for "A relative would always be of assistance, an arrange­ment which pointed primarily to the sharing of food and granting of shelter" (Spencer, 1959, pp. 65-66). Again: "One would not form a partnership with a brother, the theory being that one secured assistance and aid from one's close relatives in any case" (p. 170).

A. 1.8 Shoshoni— When a family did not have a great deal to share out, as when only seeds or small animals had been taken, that given out was to close relatives and neighbors (Steward, 1938, pp. 74, 231, 240, 253). There seems to have been a fairly high level of generalized reciprocity in the village, which Steward links to the "high degree of [kin] relationship between village members" (p. 239).

A. 1.9 Northern Tungus (mounted hunters)— Much sharing with­in the clan, but food sharing most intense within the few families of a clan that nomadized together (Shirokogoroff, 1929, pp. 195, 200/307). According to Shirokogoroff, gift-giving among Tungus was not reciprocal, and Tungus re­sented Manchu expectations on his head (p. 99); however, he also wrote that gifts were given to guests (over and above ordinary hospitality) and these items should be reciprocated (p. 333). Reindeer sold only outside the clan; inside, pass as gifts and assistance (pp. 35-36).

A.2.0 Oceania — The sectoral system of reciprocities is often more clear and more definite, especially in Melanesia. In Polynesia it is overriden by centralization of reciprocities in chiefly hands or by redistribution.

A.2.1 'Gawa (Busama)— Hogbin contrasts maritime intertribal trade through partnerships and inland trade with unrelated peoples, saying of the latter exchange: "The parties seem slightly ashamed, however, and conclude their arrangements outside the village. [Note the literal exclusion of impersonal exchange from the 'Gawa village:] Commerce it is consid­ered, should be carried on away from where people live, preferably alongside the road or the beach (the native-owned store at Busama is located fifty yards from the nearest dwelling). The Busama sum up the situation by saying that the maritime people give one another presents but insist on a proper return from the bushmen. The basis of the distinction is that on the coast activities are confined to relatives, but so few of the beach folk have kinsmen in the hill country that most transactions take place of necessity between compara­tive strangers. [Hogbin mentions elsewhere that the bush trade is often recent.] A certain amount of migration and intermarriage has taken place around the seaboard, and ev­ery coastal native has kinsmen in some of the other shore villages, especially those close at hand. When trading by sea it is with these, and these only, that he makes exchanges. Kinship ties and bargaining are considered to be incompat­ible, and all goods are handed over as free gifts offered from motives of sentiment. Discussion of values is avoided, and the donor does the best he can to convey the impression that no thought of a counter gift has entered his head. Yet at a later stage, when a convenient opportunity arises, hints are dropped of what is expected, whether pots, mats, baskets, or food. , . . Most of the visitors go home with items at least as valuable as those with which they came. Indeed, the closer the kinship bond the greater the host's generosity is, and some of them return a good deal richer. A careful count is kept, however, and the score is afterwards made even. , . . [The account goes on to give examples and to note that failure to balance will cause termination of the partnership. Now, contrast the foregoing with reciprocity in the intravil-lage sector:] It is significant that when a Busama acquired a string bag from a fellow villager, as has recently become possible, he always gives twice what he would pay to a more distant relative [i.e., trading partner] on the north coast. 'One is ashamed,' the people explain, 'to treat those with whom one is familiar like a tradesman'" (Hogbin, 1951, pp. 83-86). The variation in reciprocity by linear-kinship dis­tance is also worth noting: "A presentation [of a pig] from a close relative imposes the usual obligation to return an animal of equivalent size on some future occasion, but no money changes hands either when the original gift is made or later. A similar obligation exists between distant kinsmen, but in this case each pig has also to be paid for at its full market price. The transaction is in line with earlier practice, except that dog's teeth then served as payment. The mem­bers of the purchasers' group help him nowadays with a few shillings, just as formerly they would have given him a string or two of teeth" (p. 124).

A.2.2 Kuma— Generalized reciprocity is prevalent within such small-scale descent groups as the "sub-subclan"—"a bank and a labour force for its members" (Reay, 1959, p. 29)—and the subclan (p. 70). The interclan sector is characterized by balanced exchange, by "the general emphasis on exact reci­procity between groups" (p. 47; see also pp. 55, 86-89, 126). In the external sector, balance is appropriate between trade-partners, but without a partnership the transaction inclines toward negative reciprocity. "In Kuma trading, there are two distinct forms:' institutionalized transactions through trading partners, and casual encounters along the trade routes. In the former, a man is content to conform to the ruling scale of values . . . but in the latter he haggles for a bargain, trying to gain a material advantage. The term for 'trading partner' is, most significantly, a verb form, 'I togeth­er I-eat.' ... He is, as it were, drawn into the 'in-group* of clansmen and affines, the people who should not be exploited for private ends" (pp. 106-107, 110). Hospitality runs along­side the balanced exchange of trade goods between partners, and "to exploit a partner for material gain is to lose him" (p. 109). Nonpartnership exchange is mostly a recent develop­ment.

A.2.3 Buin Plain, Bougainville — Sectoral distinctions in reciproc­ity among the Siuai have been indicated in previous textual citations. A few further aspects can be mentioned here. First, on the extremely generalized reciprocity appropriate among very close kinship: "Gift-giving among close relatives over and beyond the normal expectations of sharing ["sharing" as Oliver defines it is the "pooling" of the present essay] cannot entirely be reduced to conscious expectation of reciprocity.

A father might rationalize the giving of tidbits to his son by explaining that he expected to be cared for by the latter in his old age, but I am convinced that some giving between, say, father and son does not involve any desire or expectation for reciprocation" (Oliver, 1955, p. 230). Loans of prod­uctive goods normally brought over-and-above returns ("in­terest"), but not from close relatives (p. 229). Exchange between distant relatives and trade partners is ootu: it is characterized by approximate equivalence but is distin­guished from "sales" involving shell money (as the sale of craft goods) by the possibility of deferring payments in ootu (pp. 230-231). In trade-partner transactions, also, giving above going rates is creditable, so that balance is achieved perhaps only over the long term (see pp. 297, 299, 307, 350-351, 367-368).

Sectoral variations in the economy of the Buin neighbors of the Siuai (the Terei, apparently) so impressed Thurnwald that he suggested the existence of three "kinds of economics: (1) the husbandry [pooling] within the family . . . ; (2) the inter-individual and inter-familial help among near relatives and members of a settlement united under a chief; (3) the inter-communal relations manifested by barter between indi­viduals belonging to different communities or strata of socie­ty" (Thurnwald, 1934-35, p. 124).

A.2.4 Kapauku—The difference in reciprocity between interre­gional and intraregional sectors of the Kapauku economy has been noted in textual citation (above). Also notable is the fact that kinship and friendship ties lower customary rates of exchange in Kapauku shell-money dealings (Pospisil, 1958, p. 122). The Kapauku data are rendered obscure by an inappropriate economic terminology. So-called "loans," for example, are generalized transactions— " 'take it without repayment in the immediate future'" (p. 78; see also p. 130)—but the social context and extent of these "loans" is not clear.

A.2.5 Mafulu — Excepting pig-exchange, which the ethnographer discounts as a ceremonial affair, "Exchange and barter is generally only engaged in between members of different communities and not between those of the same communi­ty" (Williamson, 1912, p. 232).

A.2.6 Manus— Affinal exchanges, ordinarily between Manus of the same or different villages, are distinguished by long-term credit, compared with the short-term credit of trade friend­ship or market exchange (Mead, 1937, p. 218). Trade-friend­ship exchange, while more or less balanced, is in turn to be differentiated from the more impersonal "market" exchange with Usiai bushfellows. The trade friendships are developed with people of distant tribes, sometimes on long-standing kinship ties. Some credit is extended trade friends, as well as hospitality, but market exchange is direct: the Usiai are viewed as furtive and hostile, "whose eye is ever on driving a sharp bargain, whose trade manners are atrocious" (Mead, 1930, p. 118; see also Mead, 1934, pp. 307-308).

A.2.7 Chimbu — "Mutual help and sharing characterize relations among subclan members. A man may call upon a fellow subclansman for help whenever he needs it; he may ask any wife or daughter of a member of his subclan to give him food when she has some. . . . However, it is only the most promi­nent men who can count on such services from persons outside their own subclan" (Brown and Brookfield, 1959-60, p. 59; on the exception of "prominent men," compare Ap­pendix B, "Reciprocity and Kinship Rank"). The pig-ex­changes and other exchanges between clans argue balance in the external sector here, as elsewhere in the New Guinea Highlands (compare, for example, Bulmer, 1960, pp. 9-10).

A.2.8 Buka Passage— The total of internal reciprocity seems lim­ited by comparison with external trade, but there are some indications of generalized exchange in internal sectors as contrasted with balanced, though not haggled, external ex­change. In Kurtatchi village, requests from own sibmates of the same sex for areca or coconuts are honored without repayment though the recipients are open to counter request; otherwise, no giving of something for nothing—save that near relatives may take a man's coconuts (Blackwood, 1935, pp. 452, 454; compare p. 439 f on trade).

A.2.9 Lesu — "Free gifts" (generalized reciprocity) are especially rendered relatives and friends, most especially certain types of kinsmen. These gifts are food and betel. Between villages and moieties there are various balanced transactions (Pow-dermaker, 1933, pp. 195-203).

A.2.10 Dobu — As is well known, a very narrow sector of economic trust and generosity, including only susu and household. Outside of this, theft a possibility. Intervillage affinal ex­changes more or less balanced, with village mates helping the sponsoring susu meet its obligations (Fortune, 1932).

A.2.11 Trobriands— The sociology of the reciprocity continuum described by Malinowski is only partly sectoral; rank consid­erations (compare below) and affinal obligations notably in­trude. "Pure gift," however, is characteristic of family relations (Malinowski, 1922, pp. 177-178); "customary pay­ments, re-paid irregularly, and without strict equivalence" include urigubu and contributions to a kinsman's mortuary-ceremony fund (p. 180); "gifts returned in economically equivalent form" (or almost equivalent form) include inter­village presentations at visits, exchanges between "friends" (apparently these are especially or exclusively outside the village), and, it seems, the "secondary" trade in strategic goods between kula partners (pp. 184—185); "ceremonial barter with deferred payment" (not haggled) is characteristic between kula partners and between partners in the inland-coastal, vegetables versus fish exchange (wasi) (pp. 187-189; cf. p. 42); "trade, pure and simple," involving haggling, mainly in nonpartner exchange between members of "indus­trial" and other villages within Kiriwina (pp. 189-190). The last type is gimwali, it is characteristic also of vegetable-fish exchange in the absence of partnership and overseas ex­change accompanying kula, again in the absence of partner­ship (cf. pp. 361 0-

A.2.12 Tikopia— Near kinsmen and neighbors are privileged eco­nomically (e.g. Firth, 1936, p. 399; 1950, p. 203) and are expected to render economic assistance in various ways (e.g. Firth, 1936, p. 116; 1950, p. 292). The necessity of a quid pro quo seems to increase with kinship distance—thus "forced exchange" (also known ethnographically as "coercive gift") is a transaction of the more distant sector: "The importance of the social category comes out ... in cases such as when a man wants a coconut-grating stool. If he knows of a close kinsman who has an extra one, he goes and asks for it and should get it without ceremony. 'You give me a stool for myself; your stools are two.' It is said that the kinsman 'rejoices' to give it because of the tie between them. Sooner or later he in turn comes and asks for something he fancies and this too will be handed over freely. Such freedom of approach obtains only between members of a small kinship group and depends upon the recognition of a principle of reciprocity. If a man is going to apply to someone not of his own kin, a 'different man' as the Tikopia say, then he cooks food, fills a large basket, and tops it off with an ordinary piece of bark-cloth 'or even a blanket. Armed with this he goes to the owner and asks for the article. He is usually not refused" (Firth, 1950, p. 316).

A.2.13 Maori— A large part of the internal circulation, here of the village especially, was centralized in chiefly hands—it was generalized enough but run on the principles of chiefly due and noblesse oblige (cf. Firth, 1959). The external exchanges (intervillage, intertribal) involved more direct and equivalent reciprocation, although prestige of course accrued to liberal­ity (cf. Firth, 1959, pp. 335-337, 403^09, 422-423). Maori proverb: "In winter a relation, in autumn a son; "signifying 'he is only a distant relative at the time of cultivation when there is heavy work to be tackled, but in the time after harvest when all is finished, and there is plenty of food to be eaten, he calls himself my son' " (Firth, 1926, p. 251).

A.3.0 Notes from here and there.

A.3.1 Pilaga— Henry's well-known study (1951) of food-sharing in a Pilaga village is here cited with caution. We have to deal with a disrupted and resettled population. Also, during the period of Henry's observations a great portion of the men were away working on sugar plantations. It was, moreover, the "hungry time" of the Pilaga year. "Thus we are dealing with an economic system from which a considerable number of productive persons had been withdrawn, and during a period of scarcity, with the society functioning at low ebb" (Henry, 1951, p. 193). (The intense food-sharing under these miserable conditions is consistent with propositions devel­oped below on the relation between reciprocity and need.) I assume that most if not all the instances of sharing were of the generalized reciprocal sort, the giving out of larger stocks that had come to hand, rendering assistance and the like. The assumption is consistent with examples offered by Hen­ry and with the lack of balance he records in individuals' outgo and income. Trade with other groups, reported by Henry to have occurred, is not considered in the study in question. The principal value of this study for the present discussion is its specification of the incidence of food-sharing by social distance. The obligation to share food is highest among those closest in kinship-residential terms. "Member­ship in the same household [a multifamily and multidwelling group making up a section of the village] constitutes a very close tie; but membership in the same household plus a close kinship tie is the closest of bonds. This is objectified in food-sharing, those having the closest bond sharing food most often" (p. 188). The conclusion is supported by analysis of particular cases. (In one of these, the association between sharing and close relations was working the other way around—a woman was sharing food heavily with a man whom she wanted to, and eventually did, marry.) "The cases reviewed so far concerning distribution within the household [section of the village] may be summarized as follows: the answer to the question, to which individual or family did each individual or family give most often? can be answered only through quantitative analysis of the behavior of individuals and families. When this is done four points emerge: (1) The Pilaga distributes most of his product to members of his own household. (2) He does not distribute equally to all. (3) A variety of factors enter to prevent his distributing equally to all; (a) differences in genealogical ties, (b) differences of obligations among the people of the household with respect to their obligations outside it, (c) stability of residence, (d) dependency needs, (e) marital expectations, (f) fear of sha­mans, and (g) special food taboos. (4) When common res­idence and close genealogical ties combine, the highest rate of interchange of products between families so related is present" (p. 207). The sectoral incidence of food-sharing is shown in the following chart (adapted from Henry's Table IV, p. 210).The other section of the village, for which Henry did not have as numerous records—because they were wan--dering about the forest a good deal—does not show the same trend (also Table IV): The second column is in three of four instances larger than the first—more sharing across the vil­lage than within the "household" section. But this section of the village is not comparable to the other (tabulated above) because in the formet people were "more closely integrated [i.e. closely related] than those at the other end, thus much of what takes the form of distribution, the transfer of produce from the producer to another person, in No. 28's part of the village [tabulated below], takes the form of commensality at No. 14's end of the village. Hence the percentage of product distributed by No. 14's people to persons within the section . . . appears low, while that distributed to other classes [sectors] seems high" (p. 211; Henry's emphases). Since Henry does not consider commensality among different fam­ilies of the same "household" as food-sharing, the seeming exception may be in fairness disregarded,

 

 

Family Per cent of Times Sharing Food with Families in
Own household section of village The other household section of the village Outsiders, of other villages
I
II
III
IV

 

A 3.2 Nuer— Intensive food-sharing, hospitality, and other gener­alized reciprocities in Nuer smaller local groups (hamlet sections of the village) and cattle camps (Evans-Pritchard, 1940, pp. 21, 84-85, 91, 183; 1951, pp. 2, 131-132; Howell, 1954, p. 201). Not much exchange in the intratribal (extra-village) sector except the instrumental transactions of bride-wealth and feud settlement (as compensations, of their nature balanced). Nuer specifically distinguish internal reciprocity from trade with Arabs by the directness (tem­porally) of the latter exchange (Evans-Pritchard, 1956, p. 223 f). Relations with neighboring tribes, especially Dinka, notoriously appropriative, amounting in the main to seizure of loot and territory through violence.

A.3.3 Bantu of North Kavirondo— Intensive informal hospitality among neighbors. Exchanges of balanced sort are principally in durables, with craftsmen, but the rates most favor neigh­bor-clansmen, are higher for the clansman who is not a neighbor, most dear for strangers (Wagner, 1956, pp. 161— 162).

A.3.4 Chukchee— Certain amount of generosity and assistance within Chukchee camps (see citations in Sahlins, 1960). Theft from the herds of other camps common (Bogoras, 1904-09, p. 49). Aboriginal trade between maritime and reindeer Chukchee, and some trade across the Bering Straits: apparently the trade more or less balanced; some of it was silent and all of it conducted with considerable mistrust (Bogoras, 1904-09, pp. 53, 95-96).

A.3.5 Tiv— Clear differentiation at least between external ("mar­ket") and internal spheres. A "market" distinguishable from the several varieties of gift: the last imply "a relationship between the two parties concerned which is of a permanence and warmth not known in a 'market,' and hence—though gifts should be reciprocal over a long period of time—it is bad form overtly to count and compete and haggle over gifts" (Bohannan, 1955, p. 60). A "market" is competitive and exploitative: "In fact, the presence of a previous relation­ship makes a 'good market' impossible: people do not like to sell to kinsmen since it is bad form to demand as high a price from kinsmen as one might from a stranger" (p. 60).

A.3.6 Bemba— A centralized system of reciprocities (chiefly re­distribution) is, analogously to Polynesia, the main part of the larger economy; a very limited inter-tribal exchange sec­tor (Richards, 1939, p. 221 0- Various dues to close relatives by kin type (pp. 188 0- Apart from hospitality to visiting kinsmen, chiefs and, nowadays, strangers, food-sharing is ordinarily characteristic in a narrow circle of close kin—but apparently in a wider circle during scarcities (pp. 108-109, 136 f, 178-182, 186, 202-203). The money that has been introduced is not much used in internal exchange, but when it is, "People buying from relatives pay less than the normal rate, and usually add some service to the transaction" (p. 220). "... I have often seen women take a pot of beer and conceal it in a friend's granary on the reported arrival of some elderly relative. To refuse hospitality with a pot of beer sitting on the hearth would be an impossible insult, but a bland assertion that 'Alas, Sir, we poor wretches. . . . We have nothing to eat here' is sometimes necessary. This would not be done in the case of a near relative, but only with a more distant kinsman of a classificatory type, or one of the well-known 'cadgers' of a family" (p. 202).

 

 

Appendix B


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