Critical observations

The views of Sennett and Lasch have been applauded by some, criticised by others (Lasch is also critical of Sennett). I do not intend to trace out these debates here, but will concentrate only on certain aspects of them relating directly to the themes developed thus far in this study. I have already expressed disagreement with the idea that a public sphere, distinguishable in the early phases of modernity, subsequently became eradicated, leaving the individual exposed to a complex and overwhelming social world. On the whole one can say that, although fraught with difficulties and reversals, the expansion of the public realm, together with the possibilities which individuals have for effectively participating in it, have advanced with the maturation of modern institutions. This is not a unilinear process of development. Privatism is undoubtedly characteristic of large areas of modern urban life, consequent on the dissolution of place and increased mobility. On the other hand, modern urban areas permit the development of a public, cosmopolitan life in ways that were not available in more traditional communities. ²⁹ For modern urban settings provide a diversity of opportunities for individuals to search out others of like interests and form associations with them, as well as offering more chance for the cultivation of a diversity of interests or pursuits in general.

So far as `public' life in a broader sense is concerned, we should remember that the mass of the population in the early modern period had few participatory rights in either the political or economic spheres. In the classical capitalistic labour contract, the worker sacrificed all control over his labour power on entering the factory gates; the right to unionise, and the substantial range of capacities made possible by the labour movement, only developed

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over a very extended period of time. Similarly, rights of effective political participation in local and central government took many years of struggle to achieve. Collective mobilisation in other spheres -- in respect, for example, of the multifarious self-help organisations which now exist in most modern societies -- were also formed over a lengthy time-period, by means of active struggle. Of course, there is another side to all this, which is the one Sennett and Lasch concentrate on: the growth of large bureaucratic organisations that develop arbitrary powers, and the influence of commodity production, which drains away individual control over daily life. Yet these trends do not go unresisted, and `bureaucratic capitalism' is internally more fluid and contradictory than these authors assume.

In the work of Lasch, and many others who have produced rather similar cultural diagnoses, one can discern an inadequate account of the human agent. The individual appears essentially passive in relation to overwhelming external social forces, and a misleading or false view is adopted of the connections between micro-settings of action and more encompassing social influences. An adequate account of action in relation to modernity must accomplish three tasks. It must recognise that (1) on a very general level, human agents never passively accept external conditions of action, but more or less continuously reflect upon them and reconstitute them in the light of their particular circumstances; (2) on a collective as well as an individual plane, above all in conditions of modernity, there are massive areas of collective appropriation consequent on the increased reflexivity of social life; (3) it is not valid to argue that, while the micro-settings of action are malleable, larger social systems form an uncontrolled background environment. Let us look at these points in a little more detail.

If we do not see that all human agents stand in a position of appropriation in relation to the social world, which they constitute and reconstitute in their actions, we fail on an empirical level to grasp the nature of human empowerment. Modern social life impoverishes individual action, yet furthers the appropriation of new possibilities; it is alienating, yet at the same time, characteristically, human beings react against social circumstances which they find oppressive. Late modern institutions create a world of mixed opportunity and high-consequence risk. But this world

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does not form an impermeable environment which resists intervention. While abstract systems penetrate deeply into day-to-day life, responses to such systems connect the activities of the individual to social relations of indefinite extension.

Various forms of dependency -- or, to put the matter less provocatively, trust -- are fostered by the reconstruction of day-to-day life via abstract systems. Some such systems, in their global extensions, have created social influences which no one wholly controls and whose outcomes are in some part specifically unpredictable. Yet in many respects the expansion of expert systems provides possibilities of reappropriation well beyond those available in traditional cultures.

As an illustration, take the changes now occurring in modes of family life, associated with the emergence of pure relationships. Judith Stacey's work provides a source of evidence here. ³⁰ As she demonstrates, in experiencing the unravelling of traditional family patterns, with all the threats and risks which these changes entail, individuals are actively pioneering new social territory and constructing innovative forms of familial relation. Stacey's research was set against the background of a disturbing and rapidly changing social setting: Silicon Valley in California. Her study itself is highly reflexive: the individuals concerned entered into a continuing dialogue with the author, and their views on their own interview material, and on the text itself, form a key part of the research report.

Stacey's work concerns two extended kinship networks of working-class people who, as she puts it, `live, love, work and worry' in the Valley. Modern marriage, she points out, unlike its traditional predecessor, depends on enduring voluntary commitment. There are fewer children to be cared for than once was the case, and the division of labour between men and women inside and outside the home has become less clear-cut. The social environment in which marital relationships are formed and sustained has become disturbing and unsettling. The result is certainly that many individuals feel beleaguered and embattled. A concern with day-to-day `survival', such as that described by Lasch, emerges clearly enough from the lives of the individuals described in Stacey's work. Yet, at the same time, it is strikingly evident that such an outlook does not necessarily, or perhaps even characteristically, promote a withdrawal into a bounded world of the self.

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On the contrary, Stacey shows how individuals are actively restructuring new forms of gender and kinship relation out of the detritus of pre-established forms of family life. Such restructurings are not merely local and they are certainly not trivial: what is involved is essentially a massive process of institutional reconstitution, led by those concerned. `Recombinant families', no longer organised in terms of pre-established gender divisions, are being created; rather than forming a chasm between a previous and a future mode of existence, divorce is being mobilised as a resource to create networks drawing together new partners and former ones, biological children and stepchildren, friends and other relatives. Narcissism is not a trait which emerges with any clarity from studies such as Stacey's where individuals appear not as withdrawing from the outer social world but engaging boldly with it.

Let us look a little more closely at Lasch's characterisation of the `narcissistic personality of our times'. The features of `pathological narcissism', he says, in its acute guise appear `in profusion in the everyday life of our age'. <sup>31</sup> Narcissism is `the incorporation of grandiose object images as a defence against anxiety and guilt'. ³² It is a reaction formation developed as a means of defending against fears of abandonment. The narcissist is not dominated by a rigid, internalised conscience, or by guilt; she or he is more of a `chaotic and impulse-ridden character' who needs the admiration of others yet resists intimacy. The narcissist suffers from `pervasive feelings of emptiness and a deep disturbance of self-esteem'. Narcissism is a defensive strategy which, in Lasch's view, is adaptive in respect of the threatening nature of the modern world. A narcissist forecloses a relation to both past and future, `destroying' them psychically as a response to dangers the world now presents and to the fear that `everything may come to an end'.

Surprisingly, Lasch has little to say about one of the main elements of narcissism as ordinarily understood: the relation between self and body. The story of Narcissus concerns his worship of his own appearance, and in most discussions of narcissism as a feature or type of personality the individual's relation to bodily appearance has properly been regarded as fundamental. The cultivation of the body, through consideration of diet, dress, facial appearance and other factors, is a common quality of lifestyle activities in contemporary social life. How far do these

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concerns represent a form of narcissism? The analysis set out in this and preceding chapters provides the basis of an answer. The body cannot be any longer merely `accepted', fed and adorned according to traditional ritual; it becomes a core part of the reflexive project of self-identity. A continuing concern with bodily development in relation to a risk culture is thus an intrinsic part of modern social behaviour. As was stressed earlier, although modes of deployment of the body have to be developed from a diversity of lifestyle options, deciding between alternatives is not itself an option but an inherent element of the construction of self-identity. Life-planning in respect of the body is hence not necessarily narcissistic, but a normal part of post-traditional social environments. Like other aspects of the reflexivity of self-identity, body-planning is more often an engagement with the outside world than a defensive withdrawal from it.

Narcissism, in clinical terms, should be regarded as one among several other pathologies of the body which modern social life tends in some part to promote. As a personality deformation, narcissism has its origins in a failure to achieve basic trust. This is particularly true where the child fails satisfactorily to acknowledge the autonomy of the prime caretaker; and is unable clearly to separate out its own psychic boundaries. In these circumstances, omnipotent feelings of self-worth are likely to alternate with their opposite, a sense of emptiness and despair. Carried over into adulthood, these traits create a type of individual who is prone to be neurotically dependent on others, especially for the maintenance of self-esteem, yet possesses insufficient autonomy to be able to communicate effectively with them. Such a person is unlikely to be able to come to terms with the contemplation of risk which modern life circumstances entail. Thus she or he is likely to depend on the cultivation of bodily attractiveness, and perhaps personal charm, as a means of seeking to control life's hazards. The central dynamic of narcissism, to pursue the discussion initiated above, can be seen as shame rather than guilt. The alternating feelings of grandiosity and worthlessness with which the narcissist has to cope are essentially responses to a fragile self-identity liable to be overwhelmed by shame.

In assessing the prevalence of narcissism in late modernity, we have to be careful to separate the world of commodified images, to which Lasch frequently refers, from the actual responses of

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individuals. In Lasch's account, as we have observed, people appear as largely passive in their reactions -- in this case to a world of glossy advertising imagery. Passivity and dependency in the face of the institutions of consumer capitalism, indeed, are among Lasch's main emphases. Yet powerful though commodifying influences no doubt are, they are scarcely received in an uncritical way by the populations they affect.

Date: 2016-04-22; view: 605