Deleuze and Guattari employ the term ‘schizophrenia’ in this context to refer not to a clinical condition but rather to a semiotic process inherent in the nature of desire. See Holland 1999:2–3, 26–33.
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Gatens and Lloyd point out that, for Spinoza, ‘Desires arising from joy will, by definition, be increased by affects of joy; while desires of sadness will be diminished by affects of sadness. There is in this contrast an inherent orientation of joy towards engagement with what lies beyond the self, and hence towards sociability; and there is a corresponding orientation of sadness towards disengagement and isolation. The force of desire arising from joy will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by the power of external causes. The mind’s increase of activity, which is joy, will be strengthened by its understanding of the external causes of its joy’ (Gatens and Lloyd 1999:53).
See the passage from Daybreak, bk 1, para. 23, cited in Chapter 3, p. 53. Mark Warren draws attention to the importance of the ‘feeling of power’ in Nietzsche’s account of human agency. He argues that Nietzsche’s theory of the will to power must be understood primarily as an account of the conditions of the human experience of agency and that, for Nietzsche, it is the self-reflective dimension of agency as expressed in the feeling of power which is paramount: ‘In being conscious and self-conscious, humans increasingly strive less for external goals than for the self-reflective goal of experiencing the self as agent’ (Warren 1988:138).
Cited in Allison 1977:107; also Klossowski 1997:55.
‘By affect I understand affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained’ (Ethics, III, def. 3). See Deleuze’s discussion in 1988c:48–51.
See Charles Stivale’s discussion of a contemporary politics of becoming in cyberpunk science fiction (Stivale 1998:124–42).
At one point they suggest that ‘becoming and multiplicity are the same thing’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:249).
These are the affects which Nietzsche associates with actors, women and others who had to survive under conditions of dependency. See Nietzsche 1974: bk 5, para. 361, ‘On the problem of the actor’.
See Jardine 1985; Braidotti 1991, 1994; Grosz 1994a, 1994b; Battersby 1998. Grosz provides a useful summary of previous feminist criticisms of Deleuze and Guattari in Grosz 1994a:163–4, 173–9. Olkowski 1999:32–58 and Goulimari 1999 undertake critical readings of earlier feminist responses to Deleuze and Guattari: both offer a more positive assessment of the prospects for a ‘minoritarian feminism’. Lorraine 1999 explores common ground between Irigaray and Deleuze.
Grosz reads Deleuze and Guattari in this manner, taking them to be suggesting that ‘the liberation of women’ is a necessary phase in the larger process of human liberation. See Grosz 1994a:179; 1994b:208.
Diana Coole (1993:84–7) points out the extent to which Berlin relies upon a series of spatial metaphors in order to define negative liberty.
Deleuze’s concept of critical freedom has affinities with Bergson, especially in Time and free Will, where free acts are regarded as rare exceptions to the habitual actions of everyday life (Bergson 1913:168). Later, he argues that ‘freedom must be sought in a certain shade or quality of the action itself and not in the relation of this act to what it is not or to what it might have been—it really consists in a dynamic progress in which the self and its motives, like real living beings, are in a constant state of becoming’ (Bergson 1913:182–3). See also Cohen 1997:153–4.
