Response rule, 99 Blume, Larry, 22, 82, 93 Brown, G. W„ 31 Burke, Edmund, 4

change: forces driving, 142-43,14546; idiosyncratic and group, 142-43; rates of, 98-102,146-47 chicken game, 79-80 choice: of contract, 24,131-33; of convention, 71; correlated, 142; idiosyncratic, 55,132-3,142; imitative, 27, 29. See alsobest reply; error classes: in adaptive play, 30,42,132; heterogeneous, 22, 77-80, 126-30; mixing between, 129. See also communication class; recurrent classes; roles in a game communication class, 48 continuous-time processes, 34-36,44-46,

99-102,159-63 contracts: choice of, 24,131-33; conventional, 131; distributive bargaining, 23-24; efficient and strictly efficient, 24, 133; explicit and implicit, 131; in marriage game, 136-38; maximin, 133-34; payoffs, 132-33; selection by evolutionary processes, 134-41; standard, 3,131 conventions: arising from precedent, 116; choice of, 71; as coordination devices, 113; defined, 51,68,103; in distributive bargaining, 113-14; evolution of, 16-17, 23; relation to social welfare, 17,131-32; stability of, 18-19, 71. See also equilibrium; norms coordination games: acyclic, 107; contracting games as, 24,132; defined, 40; pure, 132; stochastically stable outcomes of, 68-73, 135-41; symmetric, 72-73,89,101-2,14041,159; two-by-two, 21,66-68 curb configuration, minimal, 111 curb sets: defined, 22-23; minimal, 23, 111;

Selection of. 111 currency game, 11-16, 72-73

Demands: disequilibrium, 103, 110; in Nash demand game, 118-24; in other noncooperative models, 124-26 differential inclusion, 174n2.8 disequilibrium, 103, 110 discrete-time process, 44 distribution: of actions in a population, 30; asymptotic frequency, 48; frequency, xii, 50; Gibbs, 22,96; long-run, 48; stationary, 49. See alsostationary distribution dynamical processes: asymptotic stability in, 44; best-reply, 83-88; continuous- time, 44; discrete-time, 11 46; Lyapunov stability in, 44; perturbed, 46-50; stochastic, 46-50. See alsocontinuous- time processes; stability, stochastic

Ellison, Glenn, 22,99,100 endogenous interactions, 147 equilibrium: convergence to, 68,88; in neighborhood segregation model, 6-10; in neoclassical versusevolutionary economics, 4-5; punctuated, 20; relation to norms and institutions, 8-9; risk-dominant, 66-68, 98, 104-5; spatial, 93-94; stochastic stability of, xii, 10-11, 68, 98. See alsoconventions; Nash equilibrium; norms ergodic process, 10,21,173nl.3 errors: in adaptive play, 42-43; aggregated, 76; correlated, 142; in fictitious play, 84-87; global, 123-24; local, 120, 125; modeling of, 80-83; payoff dependent, 81-83; state dependent, 81; uniform, 80-81 etiquette game, 21, 25-26, 34-35, 70 evolution: contracts, 23-24,131-38, 142-43; forms of money, 11-13, 72-73; language, 145-46; residential patterns, 6-10, 62-65; rules of etiquette, 3, 25-27, 145; rules of the game, 71-72; rules of the road, 16-17,98; technological standards, 13-15; work norms, 17-19 evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), xii, 11 expectations: as foundation of

Institutions, 146; shaped by precedent, 6,23-24, 27, 72, 116-17,133-34, 142, 144

fashion game, 38-39,109 fictitious play: convergence of, 32-33,38; defined, 30-32; nonconvergence of,

Perturbed, 84-88; process, 32; property, 32. See alsoadaptive play; best-reply finite improvement path, 38 focal points, 113-18, 130 Foster, Dean P., 10,21,40 Freidlin, Mark, 60, 151 Fudenberg, Drew, 36, 88

Games: acyclic, 107-8; generic, 109-12, 164-67; as models of interaction, 5; n-person, 30; played on graphs, 92-98; recurrent, 30; repeated, 30; spatial, 93; weakly acyclic, 106-9,163-64; zero-sum, 32. See alsochicken game; coordination games; currency game; etiquette game; fashion game; marriage game; Nash demand game; proposal game; typewriter game; work-shirk game

Gibbs distribution, 22,96

Harsanyi, John, 18, 66, 68,104, 128 Hayek, Friedrich A. von, 4 heterogeneity: in information, 77-80; in payoffs, 80; in populations, 22, 80, 126-30 Hofbauer, Josef, xii Holland, John H., 28 Hume, David, 4 Hurkens, Sjaak, 23, 111

Individuals: idiosyncratic behavior of, 42, 142; micro-level behavior of, xii, 5, 27-30; role in shaping institutions, 3-5, 142-43,145. See alsoagents inertia of a process: conditions for bounded, 101-2; defined, 15, 22,100; factors influencing, 19 information: in adaptive play, 42; advantages and disadvantages of, 21-22, 77-80; in evolutionary economics, 6, 23; in fictitious play, 31; in game of chicken, 79; heterogeneity in, 77-80; incomplete, 128-29; local, 91-93; in Nash demand game, 120; partial, 6, 14,27,42,91-92; in proposal game, 79

Date: 2016-04-22; view: 520