EARLY JET AND TURBOPROP AIRLINERS

THE BASIS OF THE AIRLINE BUSINESS is not technical innovation or elegance of design, but the economic equation of passenger numbers against operating costs. Jet engine technology did not at first seem an attractive proposition to airlines because of high fuel and maintenance costs and low passenger payload. Turbojets were developed in the postwar period to provide some of the comfort and speed advantages of jets, but with more economical operating costs. The Boeing 707 was the breakthrough jet that could carry enough passengers fast enough to make it profitable on long-distance routes. Its success in the 1960s left plenty of room at the bottom for less powerful airliners that could use smaller airports or operate on shorter routes where it was important to perform economically at slower speeds. The BAC 111, one of the few commercially successful British aircraft, catered for this market, as did Douglas’s DC-9, but once again it was Boeing that tailored airliners most precisely to the needs of its customers with the 727 and 737.

In the 1960s everyone in the airline business assumed that supersonic commercial jets would be the next big thing. The history of airliners seemed to show that increase in speed was a constant factor. In the 1930s the DC-3 had flown at 290kph (180mph); in the 1940s the four-engined propliners flew at upwards of 480kph (300mph); the turboprops flew at around 640kph (400mph) in the 1950s; and the Boeing 707 was carrying passengers at 960kph (600mph) in the 1960s. Why should this acceleration of commercial flight cease?

It seemed a fair assumption that, given the choice, passengers would always opt for the shortest journey time, and thus the fastest aeroplane. As with turbojets, there were daunting problems to overcome, especially in the commercially crucial relationship between fuel consumption, payload, and range. But with the supersonic transport (SST) apparently the new holy grail for the aircraft industry, designers and engineers bent to the task.

Supersonic showdown Three SST projects developed through the 1960s: the Anglo-French Concorde; the Soviet Tupolev Tu-144; and, in the US, the Boeing 2707. They were so costly that only government money could cover the expense – even Boeing depended almost entirely on federal funding. In many ways the SST projects were close in spirit to their contemporary, the American Apollo moon-landing programme, driven by the same technological imperatives and heightened national pride, rather than by considerations of profit or practical advantage.

The Anglo-French and Soviet projects got under way more quickly, but the Americans were more ambitious, setting their sights on Mach 3 flight – around 3,200kph (2,000mph) – while their SHRINKING WORLD rivals settled for Mach 2. The Concorde and Tu-144 developed into such superficially similar, slender, delta-wing designs that in the West there were inevitable rumours of espionage. In fact, the number of possible solutions to the problem of designing an SST was very limited, and it is hardly surprising that two teams independently came up with a similar shape – no more surprising than that all three SSTs had a movable nose (to give better visibility on landing). Boeing pursued a radically different design, with a variable-geometry wing. It was not only intended to fly faster than its rivals, but also to carry more than twice as many passengers.

The Tu-144 made its first flight in December 1968, followed by Concorde in March 1969. Meanwhile the Boeing SST was in trouble: the variable-wing concept had had to be abandoned and the projected passenger payload scaled down.

Boeing 747 (“Jumbo Jet”)

Wide-bodied jets

The entry of the wide-bodied Boeing 747s into service in 1970 carried this process to a new level. The message of the 747’s success was that air travel was going to be mass travel. Airports had to reinforce runways and expand passenger and baggage handling facilities, initially swamped by 300 or 400 people disgorging at once from a single aircraft. In-flight caterers had to adjust to supplying their fare in previously undreamed of quantities. Hotels had to be built to cope with the rising tide of travellers.

The 747 represented no great technological breakthrough, just better engines and business daring. Other wide bodies inevitably came in its wake as rival manufacturers sought to break Boeing’s increasing domination of the market.

They could not challenge the giant 747 head-on, but sought out a market share among airlines for which the 747 was just too big. McDonnell Douglas came up with the DC-10, Lockheed produced the TriStar, and a new consortium of European manufacturers, Airbus Industrie, built the Airbus A300. The DC-10 and TriStar were three-engined airliners competing for the same market niche; they inevitably ran into commercial difficulties because there was not enough room for both of them. Lockheed, who came off worse in this contest, never made an airliner again. The Airbus A300, on the other hand, was a major success.

With only two engines and two crew members in the cockpit, it marked a significant step forwards in economy of operation. By the 1980s Airbus Industrie had established itself as Boeing’s most vigorous competitor on the world market.

From the 1970s jet flight became an experience open to everyone. As such it inevitably lost its connotations of glamour, romance, or excitement. The European consortium’s choice of the name “Airbus” for its product spoke volumes about the prosaic nature of air travel in the age of the wide-bodied jets. Most passengers on a 747 did not even have a window. Much effort was devoted to distracting passengers from the fact that they were flying at all, insulating them with in-flight entertainment and reducing them to passive consumers of duty-free goods, snacks, and drinks.

One jaundiced journalist referred to modern air travel as “the most constrained form of mass transport since the slave ships”.

FLYING CAR

Molt Taylor’s Aerocar, marketed in the 1950s, was one of the most ambitious efforts to create an aircraft for people to keep in their garage. It is shown here in both flight and automobile mode – the wings are folded up in the trailer.

The idea of flying an aircraft as an activity open to millions has remained one of the frustrated dreams of aviation. As early as 1924 American automobile manufacturer Henry Ford envisaged a future in which aircraft would be produced in similar numbers to cars. In the 1930s American air administrator Eugene Vidal was a prominent campaigner for a “poor man’s airplane”, a Model T Ford of the air, that would transform flying from “a rich man’s hobby to a daily utility or inexpensive pleasure for the average American citizen”. From the 1920s onwards, private aviation in light aircraft did become a popular sport open to the moderately affluent. But the notion of an aircraft parked in every driveway never came off.

There were several attempts to produce flying cars – vehicles that could be driven on roads as well as fly through the air. Perhaps the most promising was Molt Taylor’s Aerocar, produced in the 1950s. The flying surfaces folded up to turn the aeroplane into an automobile; the engine drove a propeller when in aircraft mode and the wheels when it was being driven on the ground. But the Aerocar’s dual function involved too many compromises to perform well enough in either genre.

There were also attempts at making aviation very cheap, of which perhaps the most memorable was Frenchman Henri Mignet’s Pou du Ciel, or Flying Flea. Brought out in 1933, this tiny aircraft was sold in kit form, to be assembled at home.

After some 30 days’ hard work, the purchaser would have a machine capable of reaching 130kph (80mph), but with a landing speed of only 30kph (19mph).

Date: 2016-04-22; view: 904