B. Dialogue Mechanisms

There has also been a rise in the creation and use of dialogue mechanisms to deal with potential sources of tension and conflict in the region. On the economic front, the increasing relevance of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as a forum for regional economic cooperation and for averting the rise of tension and conflict over economic issues is widely acknowledged. Its three past heads of state summits have moved economic cooperation forward, with the Osaka Summit marking the beginning of the second stage of APEC, in which the principal task is the advancement of the Seattle vision and the implementation of the Bogor goals of free trade. APEC also serves as a rare venue for China and Taiwan to get together beyond their narrow, though important, cross-straits relations.

On the political and security side, the informal Indonesian-initiated workshop of the South China Sea has provided, since 1990, claimant states with a useful arena for discussing ways by which cooperation and joint scientific and economic activities might be promoted in the area even as they temporarily shelve the contentious issue of ownership. Brokering of the discussions by third parties like Indonesia and Canada can be useful in moderating tension that arises from conflicting territorial claims. This has also enabled the smaller claimant states to meet with China in an informal multilateral setting, an avenue which China has avoided on the formal level. Clearly, concern over China's rising power is paramount in the minds of the workshop participants, in whose neighbourhood any armed conflict arising from the disputes will take place.

On the bilateral level, regional responses to China's rising power have been for the most part accommodating, characterized by one of appeasement out of a lack of inclination or power to antagonize China, and constructive engagement in order to draw it out of its isolation and become part of the emerging regional dialogue processes. China's occupation of Mischief Reef, although met with statements of concern among regional states, including ASEAN, Australia and the US, was a fait accompli that can only be reversed with China's agreement. This is a case which shows that talking to China in order to better understand and influence it towards becoming more tractable and neighbourly is an important imperative for the maintenance of regional security.

The creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993 was intended for the purpose of bringing "unlike-minded" states into a process of dialogue already engaging ASEAN and its partners (Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the US) since the 1970s. It was a response to the absence of a regional security framework in the post-Cold War era that could provide regional peace and stability. Now the ARF includes both Russia and China, which are also ASEAN dialogue partners as of July 1996, and Viet Nam, which became ASEAN's seventh member in 1995. India is an observer, as are the three South-East Asian states (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) in ASEAN. India and Myanmar became new participants in the ARF during its third meeting held in Jakarta in July 1996. While ARF has not solved any political and security issues in its three years of existence, it serves the purpose of signalling to one another concerns regarding peace and security and discussing how these can be ameliorated. For instance, the concern over the security implications of the South China Sea disputes has been articulated even as China has effectively blocked the ARF from adopting any measure towards the management of the disputes.

Date: 2015-01-11; view: 689