The Regional Basis for Action

When addressing the case for regional action, it helps to begin with an understanding of the term region. What is a region? In practice it is a very loosely defined term, often used in an ad hoc fashion. It is typically defined with some geographical reference, often to a continent or part of a continent. But such geographic references may be very imprecise, and laden with economic, cultural or political distinctions. Whereas a decade or so ago people readily spoke of Eastern Europe or Western Europe as distinct entities, it is now much more common to refer implicitly or explicitly to the cultural and other unities of a single Europe. Some people, to identify (still quite imperfectly) the area of industrial states refer to the North Atlantic area, or to a Europe from Vladivostok to Ireland. Mexico is physically located on the continent generally referred to as North America, but when Mexicans speak of norteamericanos they do not mean themselves. Is Taiwan a part of East Asia, or not? It depends on the circumstances and purposes of those who use the term. Physical, political, economic and cultural definitions of regions rarely delineate the same boundaries.6

Furthermore, all regions are hardly equal in their potential for institutional formation and success. Not only do they vary in their homogeneity by the above criteria, they vary immensely in the resources they can bring to bear on the problems of their member states. The potential of African institutions is sharply limited by the small size and general poverty of that continent's states. Economic development in Africa requires vast external resources; the peacekeeping potential of the OAU is limited by the military forces available to its members. By most assessments, the European model of regional organization has been the most successful. Europe is the locus of an extremely dense network of IGOs. Many European states share membership in over 100 IGOs with their neighbours. Many of those IGOs are global or functional and not limited to the region, but many are region specific. It is probably also true that Europe is now the most homogeneous region by various prominent criteria: by economic development and integration, culture and democratic state political institutions. It is hard to separate chicken and egg with regard to institutions and homogeneity in Europe. Partly the institutions took root because of existing homogeneity, but indubitably that homogeneity has in turn been enhanced by the institutions.

Latin America is the region with the second most dense network of institutions. Others, such as Africa, all of Asia, or parts of Asia, are less rich with institutions and probably more diverse. Asia overall exhibits much diversity, whether along dimensions of development, political system or even culture. It is arguably nearly as diverse as the globe itself. Allegations about an "Asian way" of governing, or of development, obscure many differences and exaggerate the likelihood of substantial agreement on regional IGOs' policies.

Diversity may make the success of regional organizations problematic. The European model cannot necessarily be exported as appropriate to other regions. In many circumstances it will be essential to create regional institutions in the face of issues that give an opportunity to produce collective goods or threaten to produce major collective bads, like pollution. But the regional "solution" is not privileged just because it is regional.

States also must be concerned about the dangers of regional hegemony. Sometimes a regional hegemon can make institutions work by being willing to pay the lion's share of the costs to supply a collective good. In the absence of strong institutions able to collect taxes from all members, this contribution of a big state can be important. For example, the success of NATO is sometimes credited to the American willingness to devote a higher share of its GNP to military expenditures than most of its allies would do. Even some coercive pressure by a hegemon, requiring others to pay what is judged a fair share, may actually be welcome. Yet the dangers of a big power becoming a less-than-benevolent hegemon are not trivial. Other states may therefore be unwilling to form IGOs that include a potential hegemon; rather they may form their own IGOs that deliberately exclude a potentially hegemonic state, perhaps trying to create a balance against the hegemon. (There is something to this with ASEAN, which has formed without any of the very large states - China, India and Japan). In other circumstances - for instance, Europe with Germany - they may deliberately include the hegemon in an effort to tie it down and integrate its behaviour with the common interest. Citizens of the potential hegemon may actually understand such motives as in their interest too. Germans accept this.

Date: 2015-01-11; view: 851