The storm clouds of war

By the end of the century it had become clear that Britain was no longer as powerful as it had been. In 1885 a book entitled England noted "we have come to occupy a position in which we are no longer progressing, but even falling back . . . We find other nations able to compete with us to an extent such as we have never before experienced." In Europe Germany was now united and had become very strong. Its economic prospects were clearly greater than Britain's. Like the USA it was producing more steel than Britain, and it used this to build strong industries and a strong navy.

Why did Britain lose the advantages it had over other countries at the time of the Great Exhibition of 1851? There seem to be a number of reasons. Other countries, Germany particularly, had greater natural wealth, including coal and iron, and wheat-producing lands. Most British people invested their money abroad rather than in building up home industry. British workers produced less than those in other countries, and Britain was behind other countries in science and technology, as well as in management skills, and did little to change this. Public schools, the private system of education for the richer middle class, did not encourage business or scientific studies. Britain had nothing to compare with the scientific and technical education of Germany. Finally, the working class, used to low pay for long hours, did not feel they were partners in manufacture.

The balance of power in Europe that had worked so well since Waterloo was beginning to collapse. The British believed that the long period of peace had been the result of Britain's authority in world affairs. This authority came from Britain's imperial and economic power. By 1880 the British merchant fleet was four times larger than it had been in 1847, when it was already the world leader. More than two out of every three tons of shipping passing through the Suez Canal was British. By 1880, too, Britain led the world in telegraphic communications, with lines to almost every part of the world. London was beyond doubt the centre of the growing international financial system. But in spite of such things, Britain found that Germany, France and the USA were increasingly competing with her. Britain was not used to being so strongly challenged.

Suddenly Britain realised that it no longer ruled the seas quite so assuredly, and that others had more powerful armies and more powerful industries. As a result of the growth of international trade Britain was less self-sufficient, and as a result of growing US and German competition started to trade more with the less developed and less competitive world. This experience increased its sense of political uncertainty. Britain had been surprised and shocked by the way in which almost the whole of Europe had taken the part of the Boers against Britain during the South African war, 1899-1902. It was a sharp reminder that friendship in Europe did matter, and that Britain was no longer able to persuade other countries how to behave in quite the same way that it had fifty years earlier. It had to reach agreement with them. Between 1902 and 1907 Britain made treaties or understandings of friendship with France, Japan and Russia. It failed to reach agreement with the Ottoman Empire, and with the country it feared most, Germany.

The danger of war with Germany had been clear from the beginning of the century, and it was this which had brought France and Britain together. Britain was particularly frightened of Germany's modern navy, which seemed a good deal stronger than its own. The government started a programme of building battleships to make sure of its strength at sea. The reason was simple. Britain could not possibly survive for long without food and other essential goods reaching it by sea. From 1908 onwards Britain spent large sums of money to make sure that it possessed a stronger fleet than Germany. Britain's army was small, but its size seemed less important than its quality. In any case, no one believed that war in Europe, if it happened, would last more than six months.

By 1914 an extremely dangerous situation had developed. Germany and Austria-Hungary had made a military alliance. Russia and France, frightened of German ambitions, had made one also. Although Britain had no treaty with France, in practice it had no choice but to stand by France if it was attacked by Germany.

A dreadful chain of events took place. In July 1914 Austria-Hungary declared war on its neighbour Serbia following the murder of a senior Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo. Because Russia had promised to defend Serbia, it declared war on Austria-Hungary. Because of Germany's promise to stand by Austria-Hungary, Russia also found itself at war with Germany. France, Russia's ally, immediately made its troops ready, recognising that the events in Serbia would lead inevitably to war with Germany. Britain still hoped that it woukLijot be dragged into war, but realised only a miracle could prevent it. No miracle occurred.

In August 1914 Germany's attack on France took its army through Belgium. Britain immediately declared war because it had promised to guarantee Belgium's neutrality by the treaty of 1838. But Britain went to war also because it feared that Germany's ambitions, like Napoleon's over a century earlier, would completely change the map of Europe. In particular Britain could not allow a major enemy power to control the Low Countries. Gazing sadly across St James's Park from his room in the Foreign Office, Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, remarked, "The lamps are going out all over Europe. We shall not see them lit again in our lifetime." In a sense the "lamps" went out for ever. For what neither Britain, nor Germany, nor anyone else realised was that after the war no one, not even the winners, would be able to return to life as it had been before.

The twentieth century (two lectures)

Lecture twenty-two. Britain at war.

The First World War. The rise of the Labour Party. The rights of women. Ireland. Disappointment and depression. The Second World War.

At the start of the twentieth century Britain was still the greatest world power. By the middle of the century, although still one of the "Big Three", Britain was clearly weaker than either the United States or the Soviet Union. By the end of the seventies Britain was no longer a world power at all, and was not even among the richest European powers. Its power had ended as quickly as Spain's had done in the seventeenth century.

One reason for this sudden decline was the cost and effort of two world wars. Another reason was the cost of keeping up the empire, followed by the economic problems involved in losing it. But the most important reason was the basic weaknesses in Britain's industrial power, and particularly its failure to spend as much as other industrial nations in developing its industry.

Now, near the end of the century, Britain has lost much of its earlier self-confidence, but no one is sure what the reasons for this are. Some argue that the workforce is lazy, or that the trade unions are too powerful, or that there are not enough good managers. Others blame the immigrants who have settled in Britain from the old colonies since the Second World War. No one doubts that Britain is living in an age of uncertainty.

Britain still has some valuable advantages. The discovery of oil in the North Sea has rescued the nation from a situation that might have been far worse. And in electronics and technology Britain is still a world competitor.

A nation's story is not, or should not be, solely about wealth or power, but about the quality of the community's existence. Britain's loss of power need not damage that quality, unless this is measured only in material terms.

Date: 2015-01-02; view: 1272