The Issue of Sakhalin in Russo-Japanese Relations

William C. Amidonpp. 60-99

Page 60 THE ISSUE OF SAKHALIN IN RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS William C. Amidon Introduction Throughout the modern period of contacts between Japan and the West, Sakhalin has been an important and controversial part of Japan's northern boundary. Although it has figured prominently in most of the boundary agreements signed between Japan and Russia, no well defined and lasting settlement has ever been reached. Ownership of the island has passed back and forth between these two powers whenever one has been able to assert sufficient pressure on the other. At times, when both have been equally strong or well prepared, the island has been held jointly or divided between them. These successive transfers of title have drastically altered the national and racial composition of the population 'nd have confused and distorted the economic growth of Sakhalin. When viewed in connection with the expansionist desires of both Russia and Japan, the national and economic problems which these transfers brought about have served to make Sakhalin a central point of controversy whenever a Russo-Japanese boundary is discussed. The most recent change in title came after World War II. Prior to the war Sakhalin was divided between Russia and Japan at the fiftieth parallel. The U.S.S.R. held the northern half while Japan held South Sakhalin or Karafuto. As a result of agreements signed between the Allies at Yalta, Russian forces occupied South Sakhalin at the end of the war in the Pacific. The Yalta agreements had promised South Sakhalin along with other concessions, such as the Kuriles, to the Soviet Union in exchange for Russia's agreement to enter the war against Japan. 1 Acting on the basis of this agreement, the Soviet Union set about assimilating South Sakhalin; as early as November, 1946 it was proclaimed a voting district within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The process of assimilation proceeded in the post-war years, but no further agreements were signed to legalize these Russian moves. Instead, as time went on, opposition from the Western nations led by the United States and from Japan became more pronounced. The United States viewed the acquisition of South Sakhalin by Russia at the conclusion of World War II as a step toward further communist expansion in the Pacific area, and this action was therefore condemned widely in the United States. The Senate specifically claimed that its approval of the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not "diminish or prejudice, in favor of the Soviet Union, the right, title and interest of Japan or the Allied powers, as defined in such treaty, in and to Sakhalin and its adjacent islands.... TT2 Although American opposition to the transfer of South Sakhalin has not progressed farther than public criticism, it has probably been significant in encouraging the Japanese government's persistence in discussing the Sakhalin question prior to reaching a general agreement with the Soviet Union. In raising the question of Russia's right to South Sakhalin, the Japanese have focused their attention on two main arguments. 3 The first of these states that Japan has an historical right to Sakhalin, based on prior exploration and settlement of the island. Secondly they contend that it was Japan who was most responsible for building Sakhalin economically and that any settlement which would take South Sakhalin out of the Japanese economy permanently would do great harm to Japan. Following these arguments the Japanese have pressed Russian negotiators to make a favorable settlement on the Sakhalin question. In all probability such arguments will have little effect on negotiations between Russia and Japan, for the soundness of the logic or the honesty of such claims would seem to weigh lightly in the power-conscious world of the twentieth century. 60

Page 61 SAKHALIN 61 To understand the nature of the disagreement one must study the historical process which has brought about the present controversy and evaluate the importance of Sakhalin to both powers. Then, if Sakhalin can be placed in its true perspective within the framework of Russian and Japanese national aspirations, it may be possible to find in the claims and counterclaims of the two countries some meaning that will help to explain the nature of the present settlement. The island is located north of Japan between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan, 4 extending north and south for more than six hundred miles. It has a total area of approximately 29,700 square miles; the southern half, Karafuto, is 13,934 square miles in area. In the south it is separated from Japan by only twenty-five miles at the La Perouse Strait. The distance between Sakhalin and the Amur delta region in the northwest is even less, measuring only eight miles at one point. Thus the closeness of Sakhalin to both Russian Eastern Asia and Japan has made it a natural corridor between the two nations. The value of this corridor to the two countries has been enhanced and the conflict for control sharpened by Japan's early refusal to carry on direct intercourse with the Russians and the latters' insistence on forging ahead in their attempts to bring it about. The population of Sakhalin has changed erratically several times during the past one hundred years. This has been due primarily to the colonization policies of Japan and Russia, both of which have tried with varying success to move large groups of their nationals into the island. By 1900 the colonization efforts which Russia had begun about the middle of the previous century had increased the population from 7,000 to approximately 30,000. Of these over half were convicted criminals who had been deported from European Russia or Siberia. In 1907, the population had again decreased to only 7,000. The huge outflow of people had resulted from the repatriation of the convicts from the southern half of Sakhalin which had passed into Japanese hands as a result of the peace treaty of 1905. By 1930 there had been another huge increase in the island's population. The northern or Russian half of the island was reported to have in excess of 50,000 inhabitants while the southern half boasted a population of nearly 340,000. In the 1940's the Russian government reported that the population in North Sakhalin had doubled, bringing the total in their area up to 100,000. The Japanese published no figures for that period. Recent figures claim that the population has grown to 500,000 since World War II; however the lack of a reliable census for the island, coupled with the problems created by Soviet immigration and Japanese repatriation, has made it difficult to establish more than a rough approximation of the present population. Agriculture on Sakhalin has been limited by the severe climate. In North Sakhalin there has been a recent emphasis on dairy farming and the growing of fodder grasses. A few vegetables and some grain crops are raised in the area, but they are of minor importance. In the milder climate of South Sakhalin sugar beets, leguminous crops, oats, barley, wheat, and rice make up the bulk of the agricultural production. The major industries on Sakhalin include lumbering, herring fishing, oil production and coal mining. There has been some shipbuilding in recent years and a considerable increase in the amount of small industry on the island. However the major portion of the industrial effort is still directed toward the exploitation of Sakhalin's natural resources: the forests, fishing grounds, and coal and petroleum deposits. The Historical Development of Sakhalin as an Issue in Russo-Japanese Relations It was not until the seventeenth century that the Japanese and Russian exploration and settlement of the Sakhalin area began. The first contact of these two nations in the north came as a result of the great eastward movement of Russian explorers and adventurers in

Page 62 62 WILLIAM C. AMIDON that century. In 1638 the first of these men arrived, having traveled an overland route from Russia. The second adventurer to make his way into the northern Pacific region was the Cossack Dejneff, who came instead by a sea route. He sailed from the Kolyma River through the Behring Strait and on to Anadyr. 5 Although this voyage proved the possibility of sailing the northern route to the Far East, it was not until modern times that the Russians again used it. These early explorers had opened the way to further Russian expansion into the Far East, but neither appears to have actually brought Russia into direct contact with Japan. It was not until 1697 that a genuine contact was established. In that year the Russian explorer Atlassov met a Japanese fisherman named Debune, whose boat had been blown off course, forcing him to land on Kamchatka. 6 Debune's fabulous stories of the great wealth of Japan so impressed Atlassov that he began preparing operations directed at Japan even though the conquest of Kamchatka had not yet been completed. He first dispatched a subordinate to pillage the Kurile Islands. He then sent a petition to Tsar Peter the Great, asking for permission to launch an immediate attack upon Japan. The tsar however withheld permission for such a venture; instead his reply ordered that Debune be transported to Moscow. In 1702 Debune was given an audience with the tsar and was questioned at length about his country. Impressed with the need for learning more about Japan, Peter ficers. Although he was only a common seaman and hardly qualified to teach Japanese, Debune was retained in a post at the Academy of Science until his death in 1736. Apparently the tsar installed Debune at the Academy of Science preparatory to the dispatch of a major expedition to the East, for soon after he sent a party, headed by Ivan Petrovitch Kosirewski, to survey the area north of Japan. Kosirewski was instructed to find out to what government the inhabitants owed allegiance. In case they had no sovereign, he was to claim the land for Russia and collect tribute. With reference to Japan he was to try to discover what sort of weapons the Japanese used and how they waged war. If the Japanese appeared willing to conduct commercial relations with Russia, he was also to find out what items they would be willing to trade.8 Kosirewski's expedition was only able to proceed against against a few of the smaller Kurile Islands. He spent three summers in exploring the region, but could collect only scant information about the area. This failure appears to have been caused mainly by dissensions which arose within the party and by the duplicity of Kosirewski, who was later discharged from government service because of the secret plundering he had carried on during this assignment. The only material gain which the government received from these journeys appears to have been a chart which Kosirewski was able to make with the aid of some Kurile islanders. The chart showed Hokkaido and thirty-two of the northern islands. The natives also pointed out the location of the city of Matsumae, but they warned that it was heavily guarded and advised against a Russian attempt to proceed against it. The chart and a report were passed on to the governor of Yakutsk. They apparently were never used, however, for Peter the Great died in 1725, before he could perfect his plans for expansion into the Far East. The years following his death were marked by internal turmoil, and the government displayed little interest in activities in the East. The Japanese also were late arriving in the Sakhalin area. An extensive trade had been carried on between the Yezo (Hokkaido) Ainu and the natives of Sakhalin since the latter part of the fifteenth century; however no effort to establish a systematic government of the island appears to have been attempted prior to the seventeenth century.9 The Kakizaki clan had been enfeoffed in Yezo in 1582 or 1590 in a grant from Toyotomi Hideyoshi, but little was done to develop Sakhalin until late in the following century. On the contrary, every effort was made to limit migration to the island. The Kakizaki, who changed their name to Matsumae in 1603, at first had attempted to foster the growth of their new domain by throwing it open to immigration from Japan. Later, however, they established a policy of limiting this immigration as much as possible and restricting new settlers to

Page 63 SAKHALIN 63 an area in southwest Hokkaido. Their purpose in curtailing the amount of movement into the frontier area seems to have been twofold. First they hoped to curb the growing contact between the native Ainu people and the Japanese. To develop the fisheries and fur trade, which constituted the real wealth of the area, it was necessary only to allow a number of traders and merchants to travel in the northern regions. Further troublesome encroachment upon the Ainu territory seemed unnecessary. A second and perhaps more significant reason for limiting immigration was the scarcity of food in the area. The staple food, rice, had to be imported from Japan and paid for by the trading income of the Matsumae retainers. It was thought that an increase in the population would bring with it an increase in the price of rice; consequently the Matsumae took steps to limit immigration and thereby protect the interests of their retainers. 10 In 1672 the Matsumae established the first permanent Japanese settlement on Sakhalin at Kushnukotan. 11 From this point onward it seems fairly safe to say that the Japanese were carrying on a systematic effort through local Matsumae lords to establish control of Sakhalin. Parties under the direction of Shirobei Atsuya and Seizayemon Takahashi were dispatched to establish fishing stations and settlements for the Matsumae, and in 1700 the island was listed in the clan register of the Matsumae as Karafuto Island with a reported twenty-two villages or stations. However even these repeated efforts to build a Japanese community on Sakhalin had only a small degree of success. The fishing stations established by Shirobei Atsuya in 1679 had to be abolished in 1684, and by 1806 it appears that the garrison which the Matsumae had placed on the island had been withdrawn to Soya. 12 Although the Japanese have listed these efforts to colonize and administer Sakhalin as definite evidence of their long-established rights to the island, it appears that until the end of the seventeenth century these efforts did not reach a stage that would provide a substantial basis for possession. One Japanese historian has admitted that prior ownership was not "very distinct.,13 The same period that saw these Japanese claims to Sakhalin and the adjoining areas becoming firmly established also witnessed Russia's growing interest in the Far East, even though after the death of Peter the Great in 1725, the Russian government displayed no official interest. Desires for empire gave way to desires for profit, and the leadership of Russian expansion passed from commissioned government agents into the hands of merchants and traders. The islands to the north of Japan were rich in beavers and sea otters, providing a highly lucrative and appealing trade to the merchants and adventurers who had traveled to the East. The yearly migrations of these animals to the south furnished a primary impetus for Russian expansion into the area off Japan's northern coast.14 Thus the eighteenth century saw Russia and Japan brought into closer contact through the efforts of Russian traders. It was during the same period that the first official Russian landing was made on Japanese soil. Martin Spanberg, a member of Vitus Behring's scientific expedition, was commissioned to explore the area south of Kamchatka to Japan. After preparing three boats he set out in 1738 to explore the area. He spent the remainder of the favorable months of that year sailing throughout the Kurile Islands. In 1739 he returned with a fleet of four ships and sailed south to the Japanese coast somewhere in the vicinity of Mutsu province. 15 Although Spanberg is said to have been the first Russian to look upon Japanese soil, the credit for the first landing belongs to another member of his party, Captain William Walton. Captain Walton's ship, the St. Gabriel, became separated from the others during a storm, and he was forced to land at a Japanese city to replenish his supplies. From the description given, the landing seems to have been made at Kochi on Tosa Bay. 16 Captain Walton was well received by the Japanese and was able to procure the needed supplies; however he feared that the Japanese would try to capture the ship so he set sail as quickly as possible. By the end of the eighteenth century, many of the merchants engaged in the Far Eastern trade were becoming discouraged. The trade, although it had initially been quite

Page 64 64 WILLIAM C. AMIDON promising, had really proved increasingly precarious. So great were the losses of some merchants such as Lebedev Lastochin that it became virtually impossible toward the end of the century to interest private individuals in undertaking any trading ventures in the Far East. From this time on it was necessary for the government itself to sponsor further trade and expansion in that area. The government's efforts took the form of a series of semi-official attempts by merchants and provincial governors to open direct communications with Japan. Although the government at St. Petersburg still did not display any overt interest in Japan, it is quite probable that these efforts made by the governors and merchants in the Far East represented the official Russian policy to the extent that one existed. The Manchu government had been quite effective in opposing further Russian expansion and exploration into China. As a consequence, in the second half of the eighteenth century, Russian undertakings in the Far East had to be concentrated upon Japan. 17 In September, 1792 Russia made its first attempt to open direct communications with Japan. Captain Adam Laxman sailed from the Russian post at Okhotsk, carrying as a pretext two Japanese seamen who had been shipwrecked in Russian waters. On October 9, 1792 he docked his ship, the Ekaterina, in the harbor of Nemuro on the northeast coast of Hokkaido. The real reason for the voyage was contained in a request for trade which he presented to the local official. Unable to act upon Laxman's request, the official passed the news of his arrival on to the government at Edo. On June 4, 1793 Laxman's ship was allowed to proceed to Hakodate where he was to meet with the shogun's officials. Two envoys, Ishikawa and Murakami, were sent to Matsumae and there received Laxman's petition. The Russian state paper was returned without a specific reply; instead Laxman was informed that Nagasaki was the only place where foreigners could conduct business in Japan; neither trade nor negotiation could be allowed in the north. With this they gave Laxman a permit for one vessel to visit Nagasaki. Feeling that nothing more could be accomplished, Laxman withdrew and sailed back to Okhotsk. Although Laxman had received permission to send a ship to Nagasaki, Russia made no effort to do so until 1804. There were several possible reasons why the Russians were slow to take advantage of the Japanese permit. First of all it appears that the government still did not share the views of some of the more enthusiastic traders. Excerpts from the correspondence of Catherine II indicate that she shared little interest in ventures in the Far East. 18 Secondly the feeling of insecurity which attended the French Revolution made it necessary for the European monarchs to concentrate on their internal affairs. In Russia this appears to have stifled the growing interest evidenced by Laxman's mission. This was also a period in which the clashes between the Indians and Russians in North America tended to restrict operations all along the Russian frontier. These became so violent at times that they even stopped transactions of the Russian-American Company, the foremost protagonist of Russian expansion in the North Pacific. While the emphasis in Russian activity had switched from the Northern Islands to Japan proper in this period, there seems to have been little slackening in the efforts of the Russian traders to gain control of Sakhalin and the Kuriles. In 1780 two Russian ships were reported to have entered Karafuto, and in 1789 another party landed in order to survey the island and make presents to the natives. 19 The traders were slowly gaining a familiarity with the area and were expanding their trade with the natives. In 1804 Nicolai Rezanov was appointed Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Japan. As a director of the Russian-American Company, Rezanov had a personal interest in the success of the mission.20 His company needed Japanese ports for winter anchorage. Also, if it were possible to procure food in Japan, much of the difficulty of establishing colonies in North America could be overcome. The tremendous cost of transporting food overland from Irkutsk to Okhotsk and then transferring it to vessels for further shipment had been a

Page 65 SAKHALIN 65 deciding factor in the poor condition of the colonies in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. Besides, his instructions ordered him to determine whether Sakhalin belonged to China or Japan, and some sources state that he was to annex Sakhalin for the Russian-American Company. 21 The Nadezhda, carrying Rezanov and Captain Krusenstern, dropped anchor off Nagasaki on September 6, 1804. The permit which had been given to Captain Laxman a decade earlier was presented to the Japanese officials along with Rezanov's credentials. The credentials were accepted, but Rezanov was told that he must wait outside the harbor for a reply from Edo. Only after seventy-six days was the ship allowed to enter the harbor, and it was.not until Rezanov became ill that the Japanese allowed him -to come ashore. Even then they prepared only a small shack and restricted the Russians' movement around it. 22 The negotiations between Rezanov and the shogun's officials were carried on for six months, but without result. During these negotiations Rezanov was opposed by the Dutch in Nagasaki and a number of the shogun's advisors. The main objections were that the opening of the country would mean an "influx of Christianity and an outflow of gold. "23 The Dutch were undoubtedly jealous of the monopoly of Japanese trade which they had held throughout the Tokugawa period, and were encouraging opposition to the Russian mission in order to protect their own position. In March, 1805, having had no luck in his efforts to negotiate a trade agreement with the Japanese, Rezanov left Nagasaki to carry out the second part of his instructions, the investigation of the Sakhalin area. He sailed north along the coast of Honshu and Hokkaido to the La Perouse Strait. When he reached Sakhalin, he investigated Aniwa Bay and the eastern side of the island up to the forty-eighth parallel. Following this survey Rezanov reported that the occupation of Sakhalin could and should be undertaken in the near future. This was seconded by Krusenstern who noted that "control over Aniwa can be gained without any resistance and the bay can be easily held since there are no troops either in the northern part of Ezo or on Sakhalin. "24 In consequence of his failure to reach an agreement with the government at Nagasaki, Rezanov became more and more interested in projects directed at the Northern Islands. In his report he stated that the failure at Nagasaki should be followed by a more gradual approach to the opening of trade, starting first with Sakhalin and Hokkaido and then working south. Rezanov himself set out to initiate this plan the following year when he ordered two of his captains, Nicholas Kvostov and Gavrilo Davidov to sail to the Kuriles and Sakhalin. He explained his plan in a report to Tsar Alexander I: I do not suppose that Your Highness would charge me with a crime when with my worthy coworkers, such as Khvostoff and Davidoff...., I should next year go down to the shores of Japan to destroy their settlement of Matsuma (sic), to drive them out from Sakhalin, and to spread terror on the shores so that by taking away, in the meantime, their fishing areas, and thereby depriving 200,000 of their men of subsistence, the sooner to compel them to open up trade with us.... 25 Rezanov, receiving no reply from the tsar, decided to go on his own. He instructed the two young naval officers, Kvostov and Davidov, first to reconnoiter the Kurile Islands to the south. They were then to proceed to Sakhalin, wipe out the Japanese installations there and place the natives under the "protection" of the tsar. It was further ordered that they should make prisoner a number of Japanese, and should take them to Okhotsk where they were to be maintained with the best care possible. After one year they were to be returned to Japan to spread the news of the good treatment one might expect from the Russians. Rezanov's subsequent actions seem to indicate that he did not feel quite safe in initiating a venture of this importance without further authority. Prior to the beginning of the expedition he issued a set of conflicting orders and then left Okhotsk before Kvostov

Page 66 66 WILLIAM C. AMIDON and Davidov could question him as to his real intentions. 26 Apparently this second set of instructions was no more than a form of protection for himself, for in a letter to the Minister of Commerce, Rumiantsev, he outlined his plan and described in detail the capabilities of Lieutenant Kvostov. 27 Though not quite sure of what Rezanov's real intentions were, Kvostov and Davidov decided to follow the original instructions. In September, 1806 they sailed to Aniwa Bay. The village and fishing station at Kushnukotan were looted and burned. On a copper plate which he left nailed to a nearby torii, Kvostov warned the Japanese that further refusal to trade with Russia would bring about similar devastation of northern Japan. After declaring Sakhalin a possession of the tsar, the two naval officers sailed off to carry out similar raids along the coast and on Etorofu. The result of these persistent Russian efforts was the awakening of the bakufu to the need for improving the defenses in the north. The first step toward strengthening the frontier region was taken in 1780 when the Tokugawa government sent a mission to the Kuriles to investigate the reports of Russian activity in that area. A second mission was sent to Sakhalin in 1785 for a similar purpose.28 As a result of these investigations, in 1797 the Matsumae were made to entrust the northern part of Yezo and the adjacent islands to the bakufu for a period of seven years. The administration of this area was placed in the hands of a commission appointed by the shogun. In 1805 another mission, led by Kinshiro Toyama and Sadayu Muragaki, was sent to investigate the state of affairs in Sakhalin. 29 On the return of the mission it was decided that the northern area could best be defended if the whole of the Matsumae territory were to be absorbed by the bakufu. In March, 1805 the Matsumae were dispossessed, receiving in compensation an eighteen thousand koku grant on Honshu. (Land holdings during this period were measured in terms of the yearly rice production. 1 koku = 5.1 American bushels.) The areas on Sakhalin that had been directly controlled by the Matsumae were then placed under the supervision of bakufu agents, and the remainder of the island was leased to contractors. 30 Two Hakodate bugyo, Toda and Habuto, were placed in charge of the administration of Sakhalin; however the work of these two men was cut short by the Russian raids of 1806. Holding themselves responsible for the ease with which the Russians entered Etorofu and Sakhalin, they resigned, thus setting back the progress which had been made in the north. These first few steps which the bakufu took to protect their interests in the Northern Islands were mostly ineffectual and seem to indicate that they had only a very slight understanding of the purpose or the resolve of these merchants and explorers to the north. Not all Japanese, however, were unaware of the threat which this Russian activity presented. Typical of the small group of men who were strongly opposed to Russian designs in the north was Toshiaki Honda (1774-1821). To him Japan's future lay in its ability to stop the Russian advance and to assert its own power over the sNorth Pacific area. One of his schemes to bring this about called for moving the capital from central Japan to the south ern part of Kamchatka. A strongly fortified city would be built near the fortysixth or forty-seventh parallel on Sakhalin as well. This would place Kamchatka and Sakhalin in the very center of Japan's military and political control, thereby providing an excellent base for defense and expansion in the north. 31 Though Honda had come to grips with a problem which most of his contemporaries could not even see, the solution he devised shows how clouded was the Japanese understanding of the outside world. Honda was considered an acute thinker for his time, but even he could fall into the grave error of assuming that because his two projected cities in the north would be at the same latitudes as London and Paris, they could be expected to have the same advantages and prosperity as these two European capitals. The foremost difficulty which the Japanese faced in erecting a defense in the north was their own inadequate understanding of what the land in that area was really like. The Russian raids of 1806 moved the Tokugawa government to action. The severity of the winter that year had slowed communications so that it was not until March, 1807,

Page 67 SAKHALIN 67 that the news was carried to Matsumae. 32 The bakufu did not hear of the attacks until April. They immediately set out to implement the defense preparations which had been begun under the direction of Toda and Habuto, but the delays of the preceding winter and spring had already made it too late to prevent another raid on Etorofu. 33 In the face of these continuing raids and the hopeless condition of the defenses in the north, the bakufu overruled an attempt by the Matsumae to take a force to Sakhalin. Instead they ordered that all men who were stationed there should be brought back to defend Soya on the north coast of Hokkaido. Having rejected the Matsumae's appeal to meet the Russians squarely, the Edo government decided instead to build a stronger foundation for Japan's defense by learning more about the area to the north. As a first step toward gaining a better knowledge of the extent and nature of their northern possessions, the bakufu commissioned Mamiya Rinso to explore and report on Sakhalin and the adjoining area. Rinso, who had been greatly influenced by another geographer of this region, Ino Tadataka-he had been the first to map Hokkaido scientifically-set out in the spring of 1808 to map Sakhalin. That summer while mapping the east coast of the island, he discovered that Sakhalin was not part of the Asiatic continent, as had been believed earlier. He spent the winter of 1808 alone on Sakhaln, and then in the spring of 1809 he crossed the narrow straits to the continent where he explored the Amur delta and traveled up the river as far as the Chinese settlement of Delen. Later that year he returned to Japan and there dictated his findings in a report to the government. The discovery that Sakhalin was actually an island and not part of the continent was a milestone in the exploration of the island. However the Tokugawa government made little use of this knowledge. The information was not passed on to Europe, and not until 1849 was Sakhalin generally known to be an island. 34 As soon as negotiations were begun between Russia and Japan, however, the work of Rinso began to assume an important place in the Japanese arguments that it was they who were first in Sakhalin and had first explored it. The distrust and fear of Russia which had been growing in Japan was increased a hundredfold by the raids of 1806 and 1807. The whole country was placed in readiness for another attack. Couriers were kept traveling continuously from Edo to Yezo and the roads were reported to be filled with troops. 35 This excitement and preparation continued until May, 1811 when Captain Golovnin, who was surveying the Kuriles, was captured and sent to prison at Hakodate. The captain was held responsible for what had occurred in 1806 and 1807. Captain Rikord who had accompanied Golovnin to the Kuriles, but who had not been captured, returned to Japan in 1812 to negotiate Golovnin's release. The result of preliminary talks was a Japanese agreement to release Golovnin if Rikord could obtain a disavowal by the Russian government of the Kvostov and Davidov raids. Rikord was able to get a declaration from the governor of Kamchatka explaining that the government had no knowledge of these actions and expressing the deep regret of the Russian government. In October, 1813 Golovnin was released after two years of imprisonment. The Japanese took advantage of Golovnin's release to send a note to the Russian government, expressing in the strongest terms their opposition to further intercourse between the two nations. 36 The letter said in part: In our country the Christian religion is strictly prohibited, and European vessels are not suffered to enter any Japanese harbor except Nagasaki. This law does not extend to Russian vessels only. This year it has not been enforced, because we wished to communicate with your countrymen; but all that may henceforth present themselves will be driven back by cannon balls. Bear in mind this declaration, and you should experience a misfortune in consequence of your disregard of it. And in reply to Rikord's request for trade, the letter continued, "From the repeated solicitations which you have hitherto made to us, you evidently imagine that the customs of

Page 68 68 WILLIAM C. AMIDON our country resemble those of your own; but you are very wrong in thinking so. In the future, therefore, it will be better to say no more about a commercial connection. " With this the Japanese hoped they had settled the issue of Russian contacts in the north. For the next thirty years their hopes seemed justified, for no consistent efforts were made to renew intercourse with Japan. Prior to 1825 the Russian motives in trying to open relations with Japan had been primarily economic. 37 In the main these efforts had been carried out by merchants and traders in the hope of facilitating the growth of commerce in the North Pacific. The Russian government had granted some financial assistance for these ventures and had even appointed an official envoy, but the government had never shown a particular interest in Japan itself. During the reign of Tsar Nicholas I (1825-1855), however, the central government began to display a desire to take an active part in these relations. The reasons behind the change in Russian attitude seem to have been both personal and national. Probably the most important factor in this growing interest was a fear of other Western powers. It was not until the United States, France, and England had begun to firmly establish their interest in China, that Russia became interested in Japan. 38 Japan was considered to be strategically important if Russia were to stem the advance of other European powers-especially Great Britain-and were to continue her own expansion to the East. A second reason for this new interest in Japan was the growing need for a yearround supply point in the Far East. Russia's growing involvement in the maritime trade in the Pacific area made it necessary to acquire coaling and supply stations for the increased shipping. This need was greatly accentuated by the outbreak of the Crimean War in Europe. Without such stations it was feared that the Russian fleet in the Far East would be at the mercy of British marauders. Another factor in Russia's newly begun efforts to force a quick opening of Japan seems to have been the aggressive character of Tsar Nicholas I himself and his agent in the Far East, Nicholas Muraviev. Both the tsar and Muraviev were greatly opposed to the activities of Great Britain in China, and both felt that steps should be taken to further the interests of Russia at the expense of the British. To them the purpose of Russian expansion was to enhance the grandeur of the Russian Empire. They embodied what has been described as the "official philosophy" of the nineteenth century which "made the Russian autocrat an instrument of divine power leading Russia toward victories and greatness. "39 The extension of the central government's interest to the Far East brought with it a desire to acquire Sakhalin. In 1849 Captain Nevelskoy, an assistant to Nicholas Muraviev, circumnavigated Sakhalin, and for the first time Russia learned that it was an island. During his exploration of Sakhalin, Nevelskoy became convinced that it would be a valuable addition to the Russian Empire. He noted that its position opposite the mouth of the Amur and its ice-free approaches from the south made it strategically important to any further expansion. It was at this time that Muraviev too was calling for the occupation of Sakhalin. Muraviev, who was violently opposed to Great Britain, was fearful of British interest in Sakhalin and the Amur. In 1848 he reported to the tsar that he felt there might be an effort by British ships to occupy Sakhalin the following spring. A second report of this nature was again made in 1849. In order to curb British advances in the North Pacific area, Muraviev would have brought about a close alliance between Russia and the North American states, and as part of the same plan he felt they "must gain control of Sakhalin and the estuary of the Amur River.,,40 Consequently in 1852 and 1853 Nevelskoy and his aides renewed exploration and embarked on a plan for the colonization of Sakhalin. In April, 1853 the tsar ordered the Russian-American Company to take over the island and "not to tolerate any alien settlements of Sakhalin." On August 31, 1853 this order was carried out when a force of sixty men was landed at Kushnukotan. Forts were built there, and big guns were emplaced to provide for coastal defense.41

Page 69 SAKHA LIN 69 At the same time that these efforts were being made to establish Russian control over the Northern Islands, the Russian government was also attempting to open direct negotiations with the Japanese. As early as 1843 Tsar Nicholas I had planned to send a mission to Japan.42 However financial and diplomatic difficulties delayed its sailing. In June, 1851 a similar mission, under the supervision of Commodore Aulich, was announced by the United States. This moved the Russian government to action. Fearing to wait any longer the tsar decided to organize a Russian mission and precede the Americans. In the spring of 1852, the directors of the Russian-American Company ordered Captain Lindenberg to prepare the armed merchant ship, Prince Menchikoff, and then to proceed to Japan.43 After making rapid preparations, Lindenberg left New Archangel in May and sailed to Japan, arriving at Shimoda in July. In organizing his mission Lindenberg decided to take along several shipwrecked Japanese as a partial pretext for the trip. Upon meeting with the Japanese at Shimoda, he found them strongly opposed to the opening of trade relations. They even refused to accept the shipwrecked sailors which he had brought along as a goodwill gesture. Unable to evoke any favorable response from the Japanese, Lindenberg was forced to quit Shimoda without gaining any results from his negotiations. The failure of Lindenberg did not end Russian efforts to force the Japanese to open formal relations. On August 21, 1853 Admiral Efimii Vasilevich Putiatin arrived at Nagasaki with a fleet of four Russian men-of-war. 44 Putiatin carried a dispatch from the Russian foreign minister, Count Nesselrode, which called for the delimitation of the Japanese border in the north and the opening of one or two ports to Russian vessels and trade. The Japanese officials at Nagasaki received the letter and sent it on to Edo with a request for instructions. The bakufu replied by sending two commissioners to Nagasaki to negotiate with Putiatin. The two men, Mananori Tsutsui, a high official in the shogun's court, and Seibo Kawaji, the minister of finance, were instructed to use the recent death of the shogun as a pretext for not taking any immediate action. With respect to the opening of ports, they were to refuse any Russian offers, using ancestral law as their reason. Some negotiation did take place concerning the delimitation of the border in Sakhalin however. The letter from Count Nesselrode had noted that there were only a few Japanese living in Sakhalin, but that there were a number of natives on the island. He therefore requested the Japanese to transfer the sole ruling power over Sakhalin to Russia, so that the inhabitants, both Japanese and native, could enjoy the privileges of Russian subjects. 45 In reply to this request Tsutsui and Kawaji stated that the Japanese government would dispatch a commission to the north to investigate the border question. In a counter proposal, the Japanese did suggest that the island might be divided between Russia and Japan at the fiftieth degree parallel. 46 Putiatin however insisted that all of Sakhalin should belong to the tsar. The negotiations remained stalemated at this point, for Putiatin, hearing of the outbreak of the Crimean War, decided that he should proceed to Shanghai. On November 23, 1853 the Russian fleet sailed from Nagasaki, having first warned the Japanese that they would soon return, and in the event that they were not met by the Japanese plenipotentiaries or a definite reply to Count Nesselrode's letter, they would sail on to Edo. The Russian demand for a definite border settlement stirred a controversy within Japan about what should be done. In the government itself there was no solid agreement. Some of the most zealous patriots insisted that Sakhalin had been the possession of Japan since the days of the first emperor, Jimmu Tenno, and could not be given up. A group of academicians who studied the Dutch maps at the Asakura observatory decided that the island should be divided at the fiftieth parallel-or approximately in half. Higher government officials who reviewed this decision felt that the Dutch maps were in error, and they set the line at the fifty-fifth parallel. In order to settle the controversy over the border issue a meeting of daimyo was called. Within this group there was also a disagreement as to the border formula which should be presented to Russia. One group felt that Sakhalin should be yielded to the Russians in order to avoid a conflict. The majority of the support for this plan came from the Sendai clan who were hoping to gain large profits

Page 70 70 WILLIAM C. AMIDON from trade with Russia.47 Their strongest opponents were the Mito branch of the Tokugawa family, who were opposed to giving up any claims to the Northern Islands. Fortunately there was no need for this council to reach an immediate decision, for the outbreak of the Crimean War temporarily relieved the pressure which Russia had been applying. Putiatin, who had sailed for the Chinese coast in November of 1853, returned to Nagasaki in January of 1854. Neither that trip nor a second in April, 1854 yielded any new results. In June he sailed to Sakhalin where he instructed a subordinate, Lieutenant Possiet, to write to Tsutsui and Kawaji and inform them that after removing the garrison from Aniwa Bay he would sail for Osaka. The letter also stated that since negotiations had been conducted with the United States, it was now felt that Japan and Russia would be able to settle their border problems with no difficulty. In the meantime Russian forces would be temporarily removed from South Sakhalin. On November 8, 1854 after an eight-day stopover at Hakodate, Putiatin sailed into Osaka Bay to resume negotiations. Word was sent to Edo that the Russians had arrived to meet with the plenipotentiaries. The shogunate replied that a conference could not be allowed at Osaka since the port was not open to foreigners; instead the Russians should go to Shimoda, one of the ports that had been opened to the United States. They would be preceded by Tsutsui, Kawaji and other Japanese officials. Putiatin, deciding that it would be best to comply with the request, proceeded to Shimoda on December 4, 1854.48 The negotiations now took a more serious turn, owing largely to a more favorable attitude on the part of the Japanese. There seem to have been several reasons behind this Japanese change. Perhaps the most important was the recognition by the Japanese that it would be necessary for them to open formal relations with the Russians, a fact attested to by the treaties which had already been signed with the United States and Great Britain. Another reason seems to have been the threatening tone which Admiral Putiatin had assumed during the course of the negotiations. And finally it was feared that a refusal to come to agreement might bring about an extension of Russian attacks on Japanese possessions in the north. The result of the negotiations was the Treaty of Shimoda (February 7, 1855). The treaty pledged "continuous peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan" and opened three Japanese ports to Russian vessels. The Russian desire to open the door of Japan had been fulfilled, but the status of Sakhalin and the northern boundary still remained in doubt. Article II of the treaty stipulated that "the boundaries between Russia and Japan will pass between the islands of Iturup (Etorofu) and Urup (Uruppu)," thus giving Russia title to the northern Kuriles.49 However, the article further stated, "As regards the island Krafto (Kurafuto-Sakhalin), it remains unpartitioned between Russia and Japan, as has been (the case) to this time. " Though the establishment of a firm and agreeable boundary had been one of the most important points in Count Nesselrode's instructions, the year-long negotiations had failed to bring it about. The Japanese, who were divided on the issue of Sakhalin, had proposed a partition of the island at the fiftieth parallel, but Putiatin had had to refuse, for both the tsar and Muraviev had remained adamant in their desire to control Sakhalin. Thus Sakhalin continued to remain a point of contention between Russia and Japan, with both sides continuing their policies of colonization as before. Determined to secure the cession of Sakhalin, Count Muraviev sailed to Japan himself. 50 In August, 1859 he arrived at Yokohama with a fleet of seven ships. Caught in the growing tide of anti-foreignism that was sweeping Japan in the last days of the shogunate, his mission was ruined on the opening day of the negotiations when three of his men were attacked by a group of ronin in a Kanagawa market place and literally cut to pieces. Though there was a public apology, the murderers were not punished. Instead, the governor, who was presumably disgraced by this attack, was later appointed-but refused-as an envoy to St. Petersburg. Under the circumstances Muraviev saw little hope

Page 71 SAKHA LIN 71 for his plan of gaining clear title to Sakhalin. After waiting for the Japanese to carry out the light demands which had been made for the murder of his men, he sailed from Yokohama without continuing the negotiations. The period between 1862 and 1875 saw a series of attempts by the Japanese and Russian governments to solve the problem which Sakhalin had raised. The first came in 1862 when Shimotsuke Takenouchi and Iwami Matsudaira went to St. Petersburg to ask for a postponement of the opening of the treaty ports at Niigata and Hyogo. While in St. Petersburg they extended their negotiations to the question of the boundary in Sakhalin. A series of talks between the two Japanese envoys and Lieutenant General Ignatiev, chief of the Asiatic Bureau, continued throughout the summer. Both sides claimed the island as their own. During the negotiations Ignatiev offered to divide Sakhalin at the forty-seventh or fortyeighth parallel where there were rivers and mountains that would make a clear line of demarcation. 51 The Japanese envoys however had specific instructions to cede nothing south of the fiftieth parallel. 52 Before the mission left St. Petersburg it was decided that field teams would be sent to Sakhalin to study the terrain and arrive at a decision. The meeting in Sakhalin never came about, for the bakufu, which was bending under the weight of the Shimonoseki indemnity and the opposition of the other clans, was unable to meet its obligation. In 1864 Yamato Koide made a new attempt to reach an agreement over Sakhalin. Arriving in St. Petersburg he tried to reopen the discussion of 1862, but Prince Gorchakov, who was currently in charge of foreign affairs, refused to negotiate, claiming that the bakufu had not lived up to its obligations. Koide was forced to return home empty-handed. Again, in 1866, Koide returned to St. Petersburg to settle the problem. This time Koide and Kawachi Ishikawa called upon Stremonkhov of the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry. Referring to the provisional agreement of 1862, they asked for a division of Sakhalin. At this point Stremonkhov countered by offering Japan the northern Kuriles and fishing rights off Sakhalin for cession of the whole island. When the Japanese proved unwilling or unable to accept this offer, he proposed as a final alternative the joint possession and colonization of Sakhalin. Soon, after further discussion, it became evident that little could be accomplished in the form of a permanent boundary settlement, and on March 18, 1867 the Russian and Japanese representatives signed a group of "Temporary Regulations Relative to the Island of Sakhalin. "53 The provisions of this convention stated that the island would be "common possession" of both, each having the right to found colonies and trading posts. The condominium which the convention of 1867 established was of the weakest sort and appeared doomed to failure from the beginning. In order to gain as much land as possible under the agreement, Russia soon inaugurated a policy of transferring convicts to the island. Early in 1870 the United States became apprehensive about the growing controversy, and offered the mediation of the President. Minister De Long of the United States requested a complete list of thie Japanese claims to Sakhalin in preparation for the possible mediation. The mediation offer was favorably received in Tokyo, and on March 1, 1870 the Japanese government presented a list of proposals to the United States for study. 54 This list included a request for the division of Sakhalin at the fiftieth parallel, the opening of Aniwa Bay as an "open port, " and the promise to respect property cultivated by nationals of either country beyond the boundary upon the payment of ground rent to the proper authorities. On March 26, 1870 this was augmented by a comprehensive written history of the controversy. Plans were brought to an abrupt end, however, when the Russian government informed the United States that it could not accept its offer of mediation. Direct RussoJapanese negotiations were resumed. Between 1870 and 1873 Count Taneomi Soyejima made several attempts to effect a settlement of the boundary. Soyejima was personally convinced that Sakhalin was quite

Page 72 72 WILLIAM C. AMIDON valuable, so after becoming minister of foreign affairs, he developed a plan for the purchase of South Sakhalin similar to the United States' purchase of Alaska. In a conference with the Russian charge d'affaires in Tokyo, he proposed that Japan purchase Sakhalin south of the fiftieth parallel for two million yen, but the offer was rejected. Thereupon Soyejima made an alternative offer of ceding the whole of Sakhalin in return for a Russian cession of the islands of Urup, Kunashiri, and Iturup. This was to be made conditional upon a Russian promise to allow the passage of Japanese troops through Sakhalin in the event of a war with a continental power. Before the negotiations could be completed, Soyejima had been replaced as foreign minister and a new government policy with respect to Sakhalin had been introduced. 55 The basis of the policy change was the "Kuroda Memorial" which maintained that Sakhalin was "worthless" because of the barrenness of its soil and the extreme cold. It was further felt that continued possession of part of Sakhalin by Japan would merely add to the troubles between that country and Russia. In 1874 Takeaki Enomoto was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to St. Petersburg, to arrange a final settlement of the Sakhalin question. He was instructed to find a natural boundary between Russian and Japanese territories in Sakhalin if that were possible. If Russia should claim the whole island, however, he might cede it in return for a Russian recognition of Japan's sovereignty over the Kuriles. After a relatively short period of negotiation a treaty of mutual cession was signed at St. Petersburg by Enomoto and Prince Alexander Gorchakov. 56 The treaty provided that Japan cede the whole of Sakhalin to Russia in exchange for which the Russian government was to cede the Kurile Islands to Japan. Each party also promised to pay the other for all non-movable property, such as public buildings, barracks, and fortifications, which it received as a consequence of the mutual cession. Besides, Russia agreed to let Japanese ships use the port of Korsakov (Kushnukotan), exempt from harbor dues and customs duties for ten years and also allowed Japanese vessels the right to trade along the Okhotsk and on the Kamchatka coast. Despite the "Kuroda Memorial" it appears that Russia got the better bargain; there was little comparison between the economic potentialities of the Kuriles and Sakhalin. Signing of the agreement at this time cannot be entirely explained by reference to Sakhalin's "worthless" nature. Japan's willingness to accept second best in these negotiations seems to be based on several other factors as well. One of the most important considerations was the defense of the home islands. The recent movement of a Russian force to South Sakhalin was feared to be a sign that Russia had designs on Hokkaido too. In order to forestall any Russian movement in this direction it was deemed necessary to improve Russo-Japanese relations as soon as possible. Besides, the Japanese were already involved with China over the Formosan problem and were unwilling to be confronted with two enemies at one time. A further factor may have been the feeling of doubt which the Japanese had about their own military capabilities. Japan had recently undergone a revolution and was still suffering from a degree of internal strife; it seemed foolhardy to risk defeat or embarrassment at the hands of so worthy an adversary as Russia. Along with these practical considerations, there was also a certain positive appeal which the treaty held for the Japanese. This was the period in which Japan's government was doing everything possible to free itself from the unequal treaties of the previous generation. The possibility of negotiating a treaty with Russia on equal terms made the agreement far more palatable to those Japanese who were so deeply concerned with the relative position of Japan in world relations 57 The period between 1875 and 1905 was one of comparatively friendly relations between Russia and Japan. The disagreements which did arise were restricted mostly to Korea and Manchuria and had little immediate effect upon the frontier to the north of Japan. Russia used this period to develop Sakhalin into a gigantic prison. The economy of the island, which consisted primarily of coal mining, lumbering, and road building, suffered greatly from the exclusive use of prison labor. The island saw little progress during these years;

Page 73 SAKHALIN 73 by 1900 the population was still under 30,000, and this consisted mainly of prisoners and their families. Though the question of Sakhalin had seemed to be a closed matter after the settlement of 1875, it once more became a major issue in Russo-Japanese relations with the outbretk3-of wir in 1904. The war had developed mainly from the conflicting desires of both Russia and Japan for a Far Eastern Empire. The weakness which beset China and Korea at the turn of the century made it seem urgent for both powers to move as quickly as possible if they were to fulfill their ambitions. Japan's victory over China in 1895 had established her on the continent and had opened the way for her Empire. The railroad agreement which Russia signed with China in 1896 set her directly in the path of the Japanese goal, a position which Russia was quick to reinforce during the Boxer Rebellion. Armed with an alliance with Great Britain, Japan in 1902 and 1903 set out to extend her influence in Korea and at the same time restrict Russian expansion through a series of agreements. The immediate pretexts for the war resulted from Russia's refusal to live up to these agreements and from "the aggressive and erratic policy carried out by the Russian officials and adventurers in both Manchuria and Korea. "58 The fighting was marked by a series of Japanese victories; however both sides were so worn down by the encounter that an offer of good offices by President Theodore Roosevelt was received with ae~ gree of' relief by both Russia and Japan. After the battle of Mukden, which was certainly-a Japanese victory, General Kodama went to Tokyo in March, 1905 to demand that the war be concluded. Later, he was joined in these demands by Admiral Yamamoto. Members -Of the general staff became so insistent in their claims that the war was becoming militarily impossible that it required some urging on the part of the Japanese government to persuade the army to occupy Sakhalin as a diplomatic advantage at the peace conference. 59 To effect the occupation of Sakhalin, a Japanese force was landed on the island on July 7, 1905. On the first of August the Russian army capitulated, and by the end of that month the whole island was in Japanese hands. Military operations on the island were much smaller in size and of less importance than those in Manchuria. Neither Japan nor Russia committed a major force to the battle in Sakhalin. The peace conference which was called by President Roosevelt convened at Portsmouth, New Hampshire on August 9, 1905. The Russian negotiators included Count Witte, Russia's foremost diplomat, and Baron Rosen, the former Ambassador to Tokyo. Representing Japan at the conference were Baron Komura, the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the war, and Takahira, the Japanese Minister to the United States. During the negotiations, the question of Sakhalin presented one of the most difficult issues to be settled. As part of their preliminary proposals, the Japanese demanded that Russia cede the whole island of Sakhalin. 60 Count Witte rejected en bloc the original conditions set forth by the Japanese. He said that the tsar would never agree to the cession of Sakhalin, the payment of a war indemnity, the surrender of Russian warships, or the limitation of Russian naval forces in the Far East. Faced with this strong Russian resistance, the Japanese were willing to yield somewhat from their original demands, and by August 21 agreement was reached on everything but the indemnity question and the cession of Sakhalin. On August 23 Witte received a communication from the tsar, instructing him to offer Japan South Sakhalin with the understanding that Russia would buy back the northern half. The Japanese then countered this offer by saying they would relinquish the indemnity if Russia were to cede all of Sakhalin to Japan. At this point the Russian attitude stiffened perceptibly. The tsar stated to Witte that his final offer would be to cede the southern half of Sakhalin if Russia could keep possession of the northern half. The Japanese finally

Page 74 74 WILLIAM C. AMIDON accepted the Russian offer to bisect the island at the fiftieth parallel, and the completed form of the treaty provided for the cession of the southern half of Sakhalin to Japan and included no provision for an indemnity. There was Ma great deal of bitterness in Japan over the terms of the agreement. 61 It had been hoped that the whole of Sakhalin would be given to Japan as a prize at the peace table. When it was learned that only half of the island was to be ceded by Russia, there was a widespread feeling of disappointment and dissatisfaction. The lack of any form of indemnity also provoked a loud protest, as did the failure to enforce a reduction of Russian naval strength in the Far East. On the surface it is difficult to understand how Russia could have won such a decided victory at the conference table. Even President Roosevelt admitted he was sure that Russia would have to back down on the question of Sakhalin and the indemnity and that after the agreement was made he stil felt that Japan had relinquished more than was necessary when she returned North Sakhalin without some form of compensation. However the Russian negotiators did have two distinct advantages in the discussions. First they were aware of the critical condition of Japan's economy, and they knew that this was exerting considerable pressure on the Japanese government. Secondly, the Russian armies in the Far East had never been completely defeated, and during the span of the peace negotiations the forces commanded by General Kuropatkin were constantly being strengthened. Thus they could afford to wait out the Japanese on each point, for every day of debate made their position more favorable in the Far East. The years 1907 to 1917 marked a reversal in the tendencies of the previous period and witnessed a growth of friendliness between Russia and Japan. The Russo-Japanese war settled Russia's designs to create a-monopoly in Korea and Manchuria. Following the Treaty of Portsmouth, the Russian government turned instead to strengthening its position in Mongolia, leaving the Japanese free to develop their interests in Korea and South Manchuria. 62 In the treaties of 1907, 1910, 1912 Russia and Japan guaranteed each other's rights with respect to Manchuria and Mongolia. These treaties were especially important to Russia. Chinese efforts to strengthen their position in Mongolia had made it imperative that Russia have a free hand in that area. To allow the Chinese to carry out their intentions would mean a stronger power would be placed on the Russian border and would limit Russia's chances to get closer to the great centers of Chinese life. Both of these possibilities were in direct conflict with Russian ideas of expansion in Asia. On July 3, 1916 the political rapprochement between Japan and Russia culminated in a treaty of alliance. The treaty was directed at a third party which was probably Germany and Austria. During the negotiations a German newspaper and the New York Times carried frequent rumors to the effect that Ru.sia would trade North Sakhalin.63 The island apparently was to be traded for Japanese arms which the Russians needed so badly. Although the treaty made no mention of any such deal, the possibility of a trade continued to be discussed. During January and February of 1917 a series of conferences was carried on between Russia and Japan in an effort to get more direct Japanese aid in Europe. The Russian negotiator, General Dessino, offered the cession of North Sakhalin to Japan in return for a Japanese agreement to send a force of 500,000 troops to Europe. The Japanese, however, felt they should get more. General Inagaki, who was representing Japan, suggested that control of the Chinese Eastern Railway as far as Harbin and the dismantlement of the fort and naval base at Vladivostok should also be conditions of such an agreement. 64 Faced with such harsh Japanese demands, Russia withdrew the offer. The spirit of friendliness which had pervaded Russo-Japanese relations in the years between 1905 and the first World War disappeared soon after the war. Russia, which had been defeated by Germany in the war and then wracked by a gigantic social revolution, was straining every effort to regain its balance and restore order within its borders. The

Page 75 SAKHALIN 75 difficulty of this task made it virtually impossible for Russia to provide an adequate defense against foreign incursions after the war. The Japanese were quick to take advantage of Russia's weakness to further their hopes for a Far Eastern Empire. Their movement was primarily in two directions. First, they used the Siberian intervention, a joint allied venture into Eastern Siberia, to expand to the north on the continent. T

Date: 2015-12-24; view: 1020