The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (10 April 1972).

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction entered into force on 26 March 1975, after its ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the three depository Governments, pursuant to its article XIV. The preparatory work on the Convention took place within the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and its successor, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (“CCD”). Draft conventions were submitted at the 1969 session of the CCD and the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly in the same year. After further consultation in the CCD and the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Convention was adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and was annexed to that resolution. The Convention was opened for signature on 10 April 1972. The convention consists of fifteen articles, by which States Parties undertake, inter alia: never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents, toxins of types that have no prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, as well as weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes of in armed conflict (article I); to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, such agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery in their possession (article II); and not to transfer to any recipient and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire such agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery. The Convention establishes mechanisms of consultation, cooperation, enforcement and assistance to achieve the Convention’s objectives (articles III, V, VI and VII). The Convention additionally guarantees the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes (article X).

22. Protocol Obligations:The Geneva Protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. (17 June 1925 France)

Verification and Compliance:The Protocol recognizes the significance of bringing together controls on chemical and biological weapons. While it prohibits the use of such weapons, it does not prohibit their production, development, and stockpiling, gaps covered by later treaties such as the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). There is no verification mechanism contained within the Geneva Protocol and compliance is voluntary.

The Geneva Protocol, implicitly, does not cover internal or civil conflicts. Moreover, a sizeable fraction of its parties have reserved a right to retaliate in kind if chemical and/or biological weapons should ever be used against them by enemies or allies of enemies. This, and the contractual character of the Protocol, has rendered it a no-first-use agreement.

Background: The Geneva Protocol of 1925 was drawn up and signed at the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition, which was held in Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations from 4 May to 17 June 1925. The conference adopted a Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms, Munitions and Implements of War, which has not entered into force and, as a separate document, a Protocol on the use of gases. The earlier treaties prohibiting the use of gases to which the Protocol refers are in particular the Hague Declaration concerning asphyxiating gases of 1899 and the Treaty of Versailles of 1919. Responding to the extensive use of chemical weapons between belligerents in the Iran-Iraq War and the increasing number of chemical weapon-capable states, a Conference on Chemical Weapons Use was held in Paris in January 1989. At the conference the States recognized the importance of the Geneva Protocol, reaffirmed the prohibitions as established in it, and called upon all States which had not yet done so to accede to the Protocol. The Protocol provided the basis for the BTWC and the 1993 CWC as well as some regional arms control agreements.

Reservations: Upon ratification or accession to the Protocol, some States declared that the provisions of the Protocol would cease to be binding on them if their enemies, or the allies of their enemies, failed to respect the prohibitions of the Protocol. In recent years, however, many of the reservations have been withdrawn, especially following the entry into force of the BTWC and the CWC.

Date: 2015-12-24; view: 754