Dangerous articles

Attachment B to Appendix on DANGEROUS GOODS

Class 1 — Explosives

1.1 — Mass explosion hazard.

1.2 — Projection hazard, no mass explosion hazard.

1.3 — Fire hazard with either a minor blast hazard, minor projection hazard or both, no mass

explosion hazard.

1.4 — Small hazard, explosion effects confined to package.

1.5 — Mass explosion hazard, very insensitive.

1.6 — Extremely insensitive article, no mass explosion hazard.

Class 2 — Gases

2.1 — Flammable gases.

2.2 — Non-flammable, non-toxic gases.

2.3 — Toxic gases.

Class 3 — Flammable liquids

Closed-cup flash point of not greater than 60.5°C.

Class 4 — Flammable solids, substances liable to spontaneous combustion; substances that on

contact with water emit flammable gases (water reactive substances)

4.1 — Flammable solids.

4.2 — Substances liable to spontaneous combustion.

4.3 — Substances which on contact with water emit flammable gases.

Class 5 — Oxidizing substances and organic peroxides

5.1 — Substance not necessarily combustible, but may generally, by yielding oxygen, cause or

contribute to combustion of other material.

5.2 — Thermally unstable substances which may undergo exothermic, self-accelerating

decomposition. May also have one or more of the following properties: liable to explosive

decomposition; burn rapidly; sensitive to impact or friction; react dangerously with other

substances; may cause damage to the eyes.

Class 6 — Toxic and infectious substances

6.1 — Toxic through inhalation, absorption or ingestion.

6.2 — Substances containing viable micro-organisms, infectious or reasonably believed to be

infectious to humans or animals.

Class 7 — Radioactive materials

Any material with a specific activity greater than 70 kBg/kg.

Class 8 — Corrosives

A substance that causes visible necrosis of skin or corrodes steel or non-clad aluminium.

Class 9 — Miscellaneous Dangerous Goods

Miscellaneous Dangerous Goods; a substance or product presenting dangers sufficient to warrant

regulation in transport but which cannot be ascribed to any other class.

HANDLING LABELS

Cargo only aircraft Package Magnetized material

orientation

39. Explosives

An explosive material, also called an explosive, is a reactive substance that contains a great amount of potential energy that can produce an explosion if released suddenly, usually accompanied by the production of light, heat, sound, and pressure. An explosive charge is a measured quantity of explosive material.

This potential energy stored in an explosive material may be

· chemical energy, such as nitroglycerin or grain dust

· pressurized gas, such as a gas cylinder or aerosol can.

· nuclear energy, such as in the fissile isotopes uranium-235 and plutonium-239

Explosive materials may be categorized by the speed at which they expand. Materials that detonate (explode faster than the speed of sound) are said to be "high explosives" and materials that deflagrate are said to be "low explosives". Explosives may also be categorized by their sensitivity. Sensitive materials that can be initiated by a relatively small amount of heat or pressure are primary explosives and materials that are relatively insensitive are secondary or Tertiary explosives.

Explosives safety originated as a formal program in the United States in the aftermath of World War I when several ammunition storage areas were destroyed in a series of mishaps. The most serious occurred at Lake Denmark Naval Ammunition Storage Depot, New Jersey, in July, 1926 when an electrical storm led to fires that caused explosions and widespread destruction.^{[citation needed]} The severe property damage and 19 fatalities led Congress to empower a board of Army and Naval officers to investigate the Lake Denmark disaster and determine if similar conditions existed at other ammunition depots. The board reported in its findings that this mishap could recur, prompting Congress to establish a permanent board of colonels to develop explosives safety standards and ensure compliance beginning in 1928. This organization evolved into the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) and is chartered in Title 10 of the US Code. Today, the DDESB authors DOD Manual 6055.9, Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards. It also evaluates scientific data which may adjust those standards, reviews and approves all explosives site plans for new construction, and conducts worldwide visits to locations containing US title munitions.

40. Aircraft security search

A thorough inspection of the interior and exterior of the aircraft for the purpose of discovering suspicious objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or substances.

41. Definition of the hazard

Hazard- condition, object or activity with the potential of causing injuries to personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of material or reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function.

42.Risk Mitigation

- steps taken to control or prevent a hazard from causing harm and to reduce risk to a tolerable or acceptable level.

Objective

To establish and implement appropriate strategies and effective measures in order to reduce risk associated with the provided services to a level that is as low as reasonably practical.

Description

Several Annexes to the Chicago Convention have been amended in order to introduce harmonised requirements for the implementation of Safety Management Systems (SMS) by aviation service providers. Aircraft operators and other aviation service provider organisations should establish and apply a formal risk management process within the framework of the organisational SMS. Risk management must ensure that risks are systematically analysed (in terms of probability of occurrence and severity of hazard effects), assessed (in terms of tolerability) and controlled to an acceptable level (by implementation of risk reduction measures). Aircraft operators and aviation service providers must also define those levels of management with authority to make decisions regarding safety risks tolerability.

Risk mitigation is the third step in the risk management process. The first step - hazard identification - is carried out in order to identify the hazards in the organisational systems and operational environment, and to determine their effects. In the second step - risk assessment - the probability of occurrence and the severity of the hazard effects are analysed and assessed, the magnitude of the risk and its acceptability are determined. The purpose of the third step - risk mitigation - is to identify measures which when implemented will minimise the risk or even remove it from the system.

When a risk has been found to be unacceptable, control measures need to be introduced. The level of risk can be lowered by:

§ Reducing the severity of potential consequences;

§ Reducing the probability of occurrence harmful effects;

§ Reducing the exposure to that risk.

The optimum solution may vary depending on the operational environment, local circumstances and urgency of the situation. In order to identify meaningful and effective risk reduction actions, an understanding of the adequacy of available system defences is required.

43. Main characteristics of risks

Risk – The chance of a loss or injury, measured in terms of severity and probability. The chance that something is going to happen, and the consequences if it does.

Probability – The feasibility that a situation of danger might occur.

Severity – The possible consequences of a situation of danger, taking as reference the worst foreseeable situation.

Consequence – The impact or result of the situation of danger.

44. Vulnerability

These characteristics of the target, which can be exploited in acts of unlawful interference.

Analysis of structural and functional characteristics of the object to identify vulnerabilities that can be used to commit acts of unlawful interference.

The threat of terrorist or other acts against aircraft have led to numerous calls for improvements that address the vulnerabilities in the aviation system. During the last decade, two presidential commissions have reviewed and reported on problems with various aspects of aviation security, and two major laws have been enacted that required actions to improve security measures.

45.Risk matrix

A Risk Matrix is a matrix that is used during Risk Assessment to define the various levels of risk as the product of the harm probability categories and harm severity categories. This is a simple mechanism to increase visibility of risks and assist management decision making.

Although many standard risk matrices exist in different contexts (US DoD, NASA, ISO) individual projects and organizations may need to create their own or tailor an existing risk matrix.

For example, the harm severity can be categorized as:

· Catastrophic - Multiple Deaths

· Critical - One Death or Multiple Severe Injuries

· Marginal - One Severe Injury or Multiple Minor Injuries

· Negligible - One Minor Injury

The probability of harm occurring might be categorized as 'Certain', 'Likely', 'Possible', 'Unlikely' and 'Rare'. However it must be considered that very low probabilities may not be very reliable.

46. ICAO new strategy in aviation safety

The ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) was launched on 1 January 1999, pursuant to a resolution by the ICAO Assembly. The objective of the USOAP is to promote global aviation safety by regularly auditing ICAO Member States to determine their capability for effective safety oversight. The USOAP is managed by the Continuous Monitoring and Oversight Section of the Air Navigation Bureau.

The current cycle of USOAP Comprehensive Systems Approach (CSA) audits, which assess the level of effective implementation by States of the critical elements of a safety oversight system, began in 2005 and will be completed at the end of 2010.

ICAO is now looking ahead to the implementation of a USOAP Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA) which was adopted by the Council of ICAO as a more proactive approach which will incorporate the analysis of safety risk factors. The USOAP will embark on two-year

transition period to the CMA beginning in 2011, with the launch of this new approach now planned for 2013.

CMA Highlights The CMA is designed to be long-term, cost-effective, flexible and sustainable, generating valuable data and contributing to the improvement of global aviation safety. This will be accomplished by using a harmonized and consistent approach to monitoring the safety oversight capabilities of Member States on an ongoing basis. The CMA will identify safety deficiencies, assess associated safety risks, develop assistance strategies, and enable the prioritization of assistance. CSA audits will continue to be carried

out by ICAO and will be tailored to the level and complexity of aviation activities in the State and could be either full scale or of limited scope additional activities are envisaged; which will include, but not limited to, safety audits (CSA audits carried out at the request of States and on a cost recovery basis) and ICAO Coordinated Validation Missions (ICVMs).

47. Give Definition of Aviation Safety

Safety – is a state, in which the possibility of harm to person or property damage is reduce to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process or hazard identification and risk management

The definition of safety needs to be explored in order to put a Safety Culture into

some context within the aviation environment. Safe appears to be one of those terms

that everyone has a sense of but no one can quite define. Most definitions appear to

fail to take into account future states e.g. by measuring what has happened; the

supposition being that because you had no accidents or incidents you must be have

been safe. This supposes that Safety is the absence of accident or incident. It would

however, be ludicrous to advocate that Valuejet operations were safe before the

accident into the everglades and then unsafe afterwards. The colloquial term often

used to describe this phenomenon is ‘an accident waiting to happen’. After discussing

several dimensions of ‘Safety’ the term will be framed for the purposes of this

position paper.

48.Safety Culture

Safety Culture is the set of enduring values and attitudes regarding safety issues, shared by every member of every level of an organisation. Safety Culture refers to the extent to which every individual and every group of the organisation is aware of the risks and unknown hazards induced by its activities; is continuously behaving so as to preserve and enhance safety; is willing and able to adapt itself when facing safety issues; is willing to communicate safety issues; and consistently evaluates safety related behaviour.

To support the assessment and management of Safety Culture, the six main components (called Characteristics) of Safety Culture are described:

1. Commitment

2. Behaviour

3. Awareness

4. Adaptability

5. Information

6. Justness

The various types of aviation organisations (airlines, ATC, airports, MROs, CAA’s, etc.) each have their own specific organisational structure, processes and operational environment. These domain-specific circumstances necessitate a domain-specific approach to Safety Culture. For this reason, the paper provides guidance on how the Characteristics may be assessed though the use of domain-specific questions. This approach allows for a domain-specific assessment and management of Safety Culture based on a framework that is common to all organisations bearing a responsibility for aviation safety.

Culture has been defined as the values, beliefs, rituals, symbols and behaviours that

we share with others that help define us a group, especially in relation to other

groups and organisational culture as a system of

shared values, assumptions, belief and norms that join organisational members

49. Causation of aircraft incidents

An aviation accident is defined by the Convention on International Civil Aviation Annex 13 as an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which a person is fatally or seriously injured, the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure or the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.

The Probable Cause summation at the end of an aircraft accident investigation report is the official determination of why an accident occurred, but there is one factor which is seldom mentioned or considered in the reports. It is the vulnerability of the command structure, as we know it. That vulnerability is often overlooked when an accident is charged off to pilot error when the true cause of the accident might well have roots in a strident and inflexible command structure. Being so well hidden within the catch-all phrase of pilot error, it becomes a challenging study. In general terms it could be described as a failure of the command system, a situation that does not allow for the full utilization of all the occupants in the cockpit for whatever reasons.

Date: 2015-01-02; view: 984