Background, research and analysis

The Rowland Company was appointed by DML in February 1992. Initial research, including contact with politicians, officials and journalists, showed that DML was behind its competitor Rosyth in the fight for Trident. The company was viewed as closed and uncommunicative. The local media were denied access to information and the national media were largely unaware of the Trident contract.

After April 1992, the election brought new local MPs unversed in the issues or in the use of Parliamentary devices. Furthermore, the then new Defence Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, was Scottish; the South West region had no ‘voice’ in Cabinet, unlike Rosyth, of which then Scottish Secretary, Ian Lang, was a public and vociferous supporter.

In short, Rosyth had an established campaign which was gaining ascendancy. To stand a chance, DML required a series of key messages, and a clear idea of how, when and to whom to convey them.

Objectives

1. Help DML win the Trident submarine refitting contract against Scotland’s Rosyth Royal Dockyard.

2. Raise the profile of DML to equal footing with Rosyth, traditionally seen as the ‘home’ of submarine refitting.

3. Change perceptions of DML from ‘surface fleet experts’ with anonymous, faceless management, to an open, innovative organization with strong leadership and the experience to tackle Trident.

Strategy

The programme needed to register three key messages.

· Devenport was the right strategic location for Trident.

· The DML bid offered the best value to the Royal Navy and the taxpayer.

· Trident in Plymouth was essential to the region’s economic and the government’s political health.

It was decided to undertake a combined aggressive lobbying and media campaign which would:

· mobilize latent support from the community, the workforce, MPs, the business community and the media;

· demonstrate to the Ministry of Defence, specialists and political advisers, Cabinet ministers and Parliamentarians, the strategic, economic and political case for Trident in Devonport;

· project DML as ‘winners’ with major advantages over Rosyth.

Programme

At the outset, DML lacked lobbying literature, had poor political and media contacts, and had no coordinated campaign. Activities included:

· producing new briefing materials for all contact with priority audiences throughout the campaign period;

· conducting a detailed media audit to establish ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’;

· scheduling a programme of personal briefings with relevant ministers, MPs, civil servants and political advisers throughout the summer of 1992;

· lobbying at party political conferences, Autumn 1992;

· organizing a 20,000 signature petition handed into Number 10 Downing Street;

· DML maximized its innovative, alternative proposals for the future of Rosyth; briefing all audiences;

· personal briefings and regular contact with defence, industry and lobby correspondents from national media throughout the campaign period;

· using media training and local media opportunities as ‘warm up’ for later national broadcast media activity;

· increasing local media awareness and encouraging ‘Save Devonport Dockyard’ campaign in Plymouth;

· exploiting all special and political events to gain maximum media exposure throughout the campaign period;

· briefing the media pre-Chrismas to keep the issue hot over the holiday period, following another delay;

· creating a strong advertising campaign in The Times and The House magazine from April – June 1993;

· securing a political and media profile of DML as ‘race-favourites’, causing a last minute move from Rosyth to cut ₤70 million off its bid. Advising DML to hold firm and dismiss the bid as unrealistic;

· throughout, the work was completed to tight deadlines, maximizing political impact and news value alike, and minimizing the opportunity for spoiling tactics from the opponents.

Measurements

Progress was regularly evaluated. For example, by the summer of 1992 it was evident that the main lobbying document, ‘The Devonport Case’, had been received and greeted well by South West MPs and a range of other key target audiences. The main arguments had also been well made in private meetings and by Parliamentary supporters through speeches and questions in the House of Commons.

DML had improved its image, befriended national and local media, and established a reputation as a serious contender. Media now came to DML for news and intelligence.

Measurement suggested, however, that more activity was required – privately to brief key officials and publicly to demonstrate the strength of employee support and concern. Hence diverse events were arranged in the second part of 1992, ranging from a presentation to the key Downing Street defence adviser to a mass lobby of Parliament.

Outcome

DML won the Trident – value ₤5 billion.

Local/regional MPs were brought together across party lines to influence the lobbying process. Local MPs attended events, spoke on DML platforms, bombarded the Cabinet with letters, organized Early Day Motions and adjournment debates on Devonport’s behalf.

Local media ran strong, sustained, support campaigns throughout and a sustained national media campaign ensured that the DML case was always aired.

Special events kept DML in the public eye throughout the protracted campaign.

Both of these examples have been voted best affairs campaign in recent IPR Sword of Excellence Awards.

Key points

The scope for effective public affairs is widespread in today’s communications-led society.

Achieving consensus and that all-important third party support in a transparent atmosphere will be a major plank in the strategy of any organization concerned with gaining respect in its appropriate marketplace.

But sometimes confrontation is inevitable. The strength of the cause will be measured in difficult circumstances and the organization’s value called into question. Is it up to it? The public affairs strategy must be sufficiently robust to withstand such scrutiny and the organization’s core philosophy and its personnel will be tested.

It is under those circumstances when the investment in time and effort will be rewarded, or will fail, in the eyes of the organization’s publics.

To summarize this article, here are some key points.

· Be clear about the campaign objectives.

· Identify key targets.

· Decide how they will be contacted.

· Get in touch as early as possible without causing political harm; start at or near the top.

· Consider your timing (especially in political environments).

· Be honest about the reason for your approach.

· Agree on the most effective senior representative to ‘front’ the campaign.

· Refine your message, according to your target.

· Make sure your message is consistent and that it is understood within all of the organizations concerned.

· Outline your case before you meet your target, repeat it afterwards in a short letter or note of thanks.

· Discuss the issues and find the key areas for consensus.

· Be clear of the opposing views; be prepared to counter them with valid, well-researched answers.

· Maintain contact; keep our targets abreast of events.

· Encourage collaboration between other supportive parties.

· Apply pressure preferably through third parties.

· Decide on media tactics, if appropriate.

· Identify the most effective person to lead the media campaign.

· Be accessible to others wishing to contact you.

· Keep reviewing your strategy.

· Evaluate the concluding result.

· Let the outcomes influence future policy.

(Anne Gregory. Public Relations in Practice. – Kogan Page, 2001. – P. 87-108)

Exercises

Date: 2015-12-18; view: 631