E. The Meaning of the Iliad and Odyssey 2 page

The action taken by Athena in influencing Pandarus to shoot Menelaus and so ensure the resumption of hostilities (Il . 4.86-103) is the subject of a discussion close in spirit and method to that dealing with the deceitful dream of book 2.^[175] The divine cannot be guilty either of deception or of bringing evils upon men, and Proclus's reasoning allows him to believe that neither charge is valid here. The passage is occasionally reminiscent of Gorgias's Encomium of Helen in its inversion of the most obvious values of an epic myth, but the project of freeing Athena from responsibility for Pandarus's action seems, if anything, yet farther from Homer's intentions than freeing Helen of responsibility for the war.^[176]

The final section of this analysis is interesting in that it refers to Plotinus^[177] to explain the paradox that Athena, whose special province is "thought"

should be a cause, in whatever sense, of "mindless folly"

in Pandarus. The passage referred to is from the essay bearing the title Are the Stars Causes? (Enn . 2.3). Plotinus is speaking of the necessary debasement of the pure qualities radiating from above, first when they leave their appropriate places and secondly when they become mixed with matter and with one another. He does, in fact, say that "that which flows from

becomes deviousness"

,
Enn . 2.3.11.8-9), but Proclus expands this observation on the debasement of astral influences and makes it appear that the pro-

[173] Cf. Il . 14.291 and 20.74. The discussion takes place at In Rep . 1.169-70.

[174] Cf. Shorey, Unity of Plato's Thought , p. 75, for a typical reaction.

[175] In Rep . 1.101-6.

[176] Gorgias, at least, could point to Priam's assertion of Helen's innocence (Il . 3.164), a passage that might itself have troubled Proclus, in that the guilt is transferred to the gods. He does not mention it.

[177] Enn . 2.3.11.

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cessions of the divine tend to produce effects in the material world that are diametrically opposed to their true natures. If expanded (though Proclus does not choose to do so) this observation might provide a model to reinforce his doctrine of symbolism-by-opposites, and even as it stands it is a partial indication of his reasons for believing that truths about the divine expressed in this world may take the form of obscenities and apparent breaches of morality.

There is a gap of nearly ten books before the next passage that Proclus explains—the deception of Zeus (Il . 14.153-351). A casual reference to the gulf of Tartarus in Zeus's threats to the other gods at Il . 8.14 finds its way into the discussion of the geography of Hades,^[178] and several citations from the embassy in book 9 enter the discussion of Achilles' alleged greed.^[179] The gap is easily explained, of course, by the structure imposed on Proclus by the specific Socratic charges to be answered.

The deception of Zeus on the other hand receives exhaustive treatment.^[180] It is specifically mentioned by Socrates (Rep . 3.390b-c), along with the song of Ares and Aphrodite, as an example of a myth utterly "inappropriate"

to the young, and was apparently the subject of an extensive discussion by Syrianus.^[181] Proclus informs us that he will follow his master closely, excerpting the appropriate parts of his discussion of the passage. ^[182] It is striking that Syrianus is said to have interpreted the myth "in a very inspired manner"

.

It is rather surprising that Proclus virtually ignores the aspect of the passage that gave it its ancient title: if he felt that Zeus was "deceived" in this passage,^[183] he gives little indication of it, though the possibility of

[178] In Rep . 1.169.

[179] In Rep . 1.143-46.

[180] In Rep . 1.132-40. See Sheppard, Studies , pp. 62-74, with references (p. 62, n. 59).

^[181]

[182] In Rep . 1.133.5-10.

^[183]

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Homer's attributing deviousness to the gods is one he finds quite upsetting elsewhere.^[184]

One is constantly reminded by instances such as this of Proclus's enormous distance from the text itself. Here, for instance, he is repeating the ideas expressed perhaps 30 years earlier by Syrianus in response to a critique written some 800 years before that, dealing in turn with a text whose origins went back at least another 300 years. It would be a mistake to expect of him a fresh, vital, and complete response based on personal experience of whole passages. He has inherited from a long tradition of exegetical scholarship the habit of conceiving the interpretation of Homer in terms of response not to texts but to specific "questions." The titles of critical works containing the words

or

, including Syrianus's own,^[185] set the tone. Bearing this in mind, it is somewhat less surprising that the total experience of the Iliad is something Proclus mentions only casually.

The treatment of the present passage is fragmented into five separate problems,^[186] the first of which is the meaning of the divine copulation. Here, as in several other passages of the essay, a strong Pythagorean element is apparent in the thought that comes to Proclus by way of Syrianus, specifically an impulse to analyze and explain phenomena in terms of polarities and columns of opposites.^[187] It is this polarity, which is fundamental to the structure of the universe, that Proclus takes to lie behind the mythoplasts' motives in talking about copulation and mating among gods.^[188]

^[184]

[185] See n. 140 above.

[186] Proclus In Rep . 1.133.10-15.

^[187]

[188] Neoplatonic allegory is not invariably puritanical. This essay itself sometimes responds to the passages it paraphrases in an intensely sensual manner. Moreover, Hermias (In Phdr ., 54.28-31) discusses Odysseus's relations with Calypso and Circe (and even Athena) in terms of man's successive encounters with, and participation in, various divine powers in the course of his life. There is a world of difference between sex as a metaphor for communion with a higher power—the literature of Christian mysticism is rich in examples— and sex as a metaphor for the creative act of the monad and dyad.

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In discussing this particular copulation myth, he begins with two principles, "finite"

and "infinite"

, which are clearly in some sense Pythagorean, but which Proclus cites as Platonic and Socratic on the evidence of Philebus 23c.^[189] The Olympians are not the primary gods in Proclus's pantheon—space is left previous to them, in more perfect realms, for the earlier generations of gods. Nonetheless, for Proclus, as for Homer, the Olympians are the highest divinities that have any manifest relationship to our own lives. In Proclus's ontology, they occupy the level of

and are sometimes collectively called "demiurges," although, properly speaking, Hephaestus is the demiurge and the other Olympians participate in his creation only to the extent that they are providential deities concerned with the fate of souls in this world.

Each level of divinity (or of reality) reproduces those above it,^[190] and so (in a system of meaning that approaches the complexity of a hall of mirrors) the story of the copulation of Zeus and Hera represents in a fragmented, mythic form an event on the level of

which in turn reflects fundamental facts about reality that come yet closer to first principles. Zeus is (or represents) the primal, self-sufficient, finite monad, resembling the "noetic finitude"

: he therefore generates reality "in the order of the monad"

. Hera is (or represents) the generative dyad, infinite (and therefore less perfect than Zeus) but containing in herself the generative principle of plurality, without which the perfection of the One would be sterile and nothing could exist but it alone. Even the mention of their first sexual adventures, when their parents were not looking (Il . 14.295-96), is turned humorlessly into a further level of meaning.^[191] There are two "different" copulations in-

[189] Both here and in the later discussion of the theomachy of books 20-21, Sheppard (Studies , pp. 53, 65) shows Syrianus to be responsible for Proclus's emphasis on these principles.

[190] Cf. Wallis, Neoplatonism , p. 137.

^[191]

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volved here—the one that is actually narrated and the one existing only potentially in Hera's invitation to return home to the bed Hephaestus has made for them. Since time and space do not exist among the gods, they must, in fact, be the same and simultaneous, and yet they are somehow distinct. They emerge respectively as the transcendent and encosmic creative acts, in reality simultaneous but separated by the mythoplasts in their characteristic way.

The second problem that Proclus discusses regarding this episode is that of Zeus's going to sleep^[192] —the goal of the whole exercise, after all, in Hera's mind. The attribution of two successive states of consciousness to Zeus is not acceptable to Proclus, and the question is again resolved by the claim that both states are simultaneous, Zeus's sleep (somewhat in the manner of Homer's blindness) indicating his transcendence and self-sufficient existence in the realm of

, his waking his providential concern for events in this world. The two states are somewhat awkwardly identified respectively with the transcendent copulation and the encosmic one.^[193]

A suggestive analogy for this interpretation is found in Philo's references to the "rest" of Jahweh on the seventh day (Gen. 2.2).^[194] Like Proclus confronting the Homeric account of Zeus's sleep, Philo is dissatisfied with the apparent meaning. Insisting on the voice of the active (and therefore causative) verb

in his Septuagint text (represented in the King James version by "rested"), he goes on to claim that "God never stops

creating, but as it is the property of fire to burn and of snow to be cold, so it is the property of God to create."^[195] Here

[192] In Rep . 1.135.17-136.14.

[193] In Rep . 1.136.8-9. Festugière in his translation ad loc . notes the resemblance of the passage to the very beautiful fr. 2 of Numenius. An analogy certainly exists, but fr. 12, where the god's attention to the cosmos is equated with the creative act and contrasted with the withering away accompanying his withdrawal, seems an even clearer parallel.

[194] Philo Leg. alleg . 1.2.5-3.1; 1.6.16; 1.7.18.

^[195]

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again a sequence of states in the mythic account is found to represent what are in fact two modes of creation. The mythic account, Philo tells us, is distinguishing between the creation of "mortal things"

, accomplished before the seventh day, and the subsequent creation of transcendent realities: "God stops fashioning the mortal classes when he begins to create those that are divine and fit the number seven."^[196] Though Philo does not insist upon the simultaneity of the modes of creation and the mythic distortion that introduces time into the eternal, he does consider it "foolish"

to think the world was created in six days, "or any other period of time"

, because time is a function of the existence of the world (the sequence of days and nights) and therefore the world must have existed before time could exist.^[197]

Philo's exegesis of the Old Testament may have been known to pagan Platonists as early as Numenius, and it seems quite likely that by the time of Porphyry, who declared open war on the Christians and studied his enemy with care,^[198] this monument of exegesis had been carefully examined and its lessons learned, however distasteful their content. Nevertheless, there is no certainty that Philo's exegesis influenced Porphyry's,^[199] and the similarities between the passages of Philo and Proclus mentioned here may well be the products merely of the common heritage of allegorical interpretation extending back far before Philo's time.

The first two interpretations relating to the episode of the deception of Zeus are in many ways the most interesting. The third is another etymological fantasy with a certain charm, but little power to convince. The scene of the copulation, Mount Ida

is identified with the realm of ideas

and contrasted with the bedroom made by Hephaestus (which Hera proposes as an alternative to the less socially acceptable proposition of her consort, which, she squawks, "would be shocking"

). The bedroom is taken to be the physical universe, hence the location of the encosmic copulation, to which the representative of the generative dyad (Hera) invites the representative of the finite monad (Zeus). The final choice of the realm of ideas as the scene of the encounter is an expression of the overriding

^[196]

[197] Philo Leg. alleg . 1.2.2. Philo's discussion of the relationship of time to the creation of the world recalls Plato's in the Timaeus 37c-39e.

[198] Cf. Bidez, Vie de Porphyre , pp. 65-79, and esp. pp. 73-74.

[199] See Pépin, "Porphyre, exégéte d'Homére," and esp. the discussion of his paper, p. 270.

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truth that (however many copulations, real or potential, there may be) the union is best expressed as transcendent, for the monad is more perfect, hence dominant, and draws the dyad up to it. In spite of the fact that the moral slur on the gods implied in the "deception" of Zeus by Hera is virtually ignored, Proclus makes it explicit that this open-air copulation does not decrease Zeus's dignity, because of its "true meaning" hinted at through the toponym

.

The fourth question,^[200] involving the adornments of Hera, and at least by implication the deception itself, is not in any meaningful sense resolved. We are told that Hera, through her adornment of herself, is assuming the role of her mother Rhea, for, as mentioned above, this particular copulation mimics on the level of the demiurgic Olympians the "previous" event at a further remove from our sublunary world. The symbolism of the clothing is said to be complex, and Proclus draws on the Chaldaean Oracles and the Orphica to provide keys for its interpretation.^[201] Briefly stated, the elements are these: (1) her hair, with the help of an oracle,^[202] is identified with Rhea's hair; (2) the fringed girdle (Il . 14.181) represents a similar object "there,"^[203] the tassles symbolizing the great number of souls dependent on this particular divine procession; (3) her earrings and sandals (II . 14.182) "are images of"

^[204] the fragmented powers radiating down from her, the highest and lowest having their sources at her extremities; (4) ambrosia and oil (Il . 14.171-72) are symbolic of her "pure powers"

, or, more specifically, the ambrosia symbolizes transcendent purity, and the oil, strength (by association with athletics). The discussion of the

(Il . 14.214)^[205] and the assistance of Aphrodite are likewise made to contribute to the identification of Hera with Rhea. The

[200] Proclus In Rep . 1.137.2-139.19.

[201] In Rep . 1.137.21-22 and 138.14-15, respectively.

[202] On the fragment, cf. Festugière's note ad loc . in his translation (p. 156, n. 4) and Des Places's more recent comment in his Budé edition of the Chaldaean Oracles (fr. 55, n. 1, pp. 133-34).

^[203][204]

[205] In Rep . 1.338.31-139.19.

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attributes of this

of the goddess are analyzed in a manner reminiscent of Porphyry's work on statues.

The fifth question announced at the beginning of the discussion, that of the special power of the "exceptional" love Zeus is said to feel for Hera at this moment, is quickly dismissed. The discussion returns to the first sexual encounters of Zeus and Hera, obliquely mentioned earlier, which were, we are told, inferior to this one in that now, rather than acting without their parents' knowledge, they are in fact drawn up to them and identified with them.^[206] The analysis closes on general reflections concerning myth's procedure of fragmenting the simultaneous and eternal, and with the assertion that all of the passage just considered was written "in the theological mode."^[207] This presumably means that it belongs (as already stated) to the first class of poetry. The support of Socrates for this assertion is claimed by virtue of the derivation of Hera's name from "lovely"

in the Cratylus (404b). Proclus, with a characteristic attention to specifics at the expense of the larger context, takes the etymologies with deadly seriousness.

Proclus asserts finally that "according to the secret doctrine"

,
no accusations are to be made against Homer arising from his treatment of the deception of Zeus. This is, presumably, a reference to the exegetical process just demonstrated in action, and it will be worthwhile to stop for a moment and examine its actual procedures, having established some of its basic theoretical principles.

If inspired poetry is symbolic and not mimetic, we would expect its symbols to indicate that to which they refer, not by resemblance, but by some more subtle form of reference. This class of representation, these "symbols," clearly include etymological hints

, and there are several instances of symbolism by "opposites" (Zeus's sleep = transcendent awareness; "disgraceful" open-air copulation = a transcendentally pure creative act). Some elements of the interpretation, however, are not even presented as symbols,^[208] and it is quite clear that the neat categories and models Proclus has built in his introduction are not reflected in practice in this exegesis

. The problem is largely resolved by Sheppard, who makes it clear that there is a further mode of "theological" representation, through

, though this non-mimetic mode is not clearly defined in the theoretical

[206] Cf. n. 191 above.

^[207][208]

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section of the essay.^[209] In practice, the highest poetry may proceed by pure

, commonly antithetical to their referents, or it may proceed by employing

to refer to transcendent

.^[210]

Here, then, what appears to be a "symbolic" utterance is found to contain images, and a clear distinction is not maintained among the various kinds of meaning.^[211] Proclus's elegant systematization of literary phenomena sacrifices something of its purity when applied to actual texts—as indeed it should. His interpetive practice is largely determined by tradition and may be as chaotic and varied as that of his predecessors.

Books 15 through 19 receive only incidental references and quotations. Some of these are striking because Proclus builds his defense on the principle of literary realism.^[212] If souls are depicted groaning as they abandon strong young bodies, Proclus is able to stand back from Socrates' claim that this will have a deleterious effect on the bravery of the young guardians (Rep . 3.386c-387a) and to claim that the description is acceptable simply because such things do, in fact, happen. It may be true that, in the ideal state Plato projects, such descriptions could be harmful, but in view of more immediate goals and ideals, this accurately mimetic

poetry is acceptable.^[213] Realism likewise justifies the Homeric description of the exaggerated mourning of Achilles and Priam^[214] —they were no philosophers, and acted as one would expect heroes, men of action, to act in such circumstances. The principle of justification by realism is extended even to the defense of Achilles' mutilation of Hector's corpse, where Proclus calls on a "traditional" explanation, citing a

[209] Sheppard, Studies , p. 197.

[210] E.g., Hera uses oil; athletes use oil; therefore, Hera's oil is emblematic of her strength. Ambrosia = transcendent purity. Numerous tassles of the fringe = numerous dependent souls.

[211] Moreover, Coulter's attempt to associate Proclus's interpretation of "symbolic" poetry with symbolism in the modern sense and that of "eiconic" poetry with allegory, criticized by Anne Raphael (Sheppard) (Classical Review , n.s., 28 [1978]: 173-74, and Studies , p. 197, n. 97) does, as she claims, prove to have little bearing on Proclus's practice.

[212] An example, discussed below, is found in the passage on the wailing of souls on their way to Hades (In Rep . 1.118.9-10: 121.10-23) where the apparent reference is to the groaning of Patroclus's soul (Il . 16.857).

[213] Cf. In Rep . 1.162.5-163.9.

^[214]

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Thessalian custom.^[215] Achilles, then, was simply doing what might be expected of him and is depicted acting "according to the rule appropriate to him."^[216] The description is defended as accurate, and therefore justifiable, historical (and cultural) realism.

The main focus of Proclus's attention in the later books of the Iliad is the battle of the gods in books 20 and 21. Socrates had listed the "theomachies" of Homer (

, Rep . 2.378d) among the passages unacceptable "with or without secondary meanings."^[217] Proclus clearly understands the reference to be to these books and to the part of the poem that bore the ancient title

.^[218] Socrates and Proclus would agree that these myths are lies: the gods are correctly described by Homer in numerous passages as living eternally at ease on Olympus, which is to say, beyond our changeable sphere.^[219] Strife has no place in that existence. Socrates might also agree that there are hidden meanings behind the screen of the apparent meaning of Homer's description, but for his purposes in the Republic those hidden meanings might as well not be there, since the young cannot distinguish them. Here again, Proclus makes no attempt to counter Socrates' central point. He merely argues that, for those capable of understanding them, these hidden meanings contain important insights.

Proclus's approach to this problem is characteristic. He does not go directly to the text, but rather begins by asking himself just what known properties of the gods the mythoplasts could be aiming at in attributing strife to them. He concludes that there are two possible referents (or, to use his expression, the image could be used according to two "modes," or

), one of which fits the Homeric theomachies better than the other.

The first goes back to the Pythagorean model of the universe brought into the discussion of the deception of Zeus. The interpretation is dependent on the idea that, at the level immediately below the One, all realities

^[215][216]

[217] For the text, see Preface, n. 4, above. Cf. Proclus In Rep . 1.87.4-15.

[218] That is, he sees here a reference not to the myths of warfare among the gods quite apart from mankind (developed in Hesiod's Theogony ), but to books 20 and 21. The stories in Hesiod are the ones usually now designated by the term "theomachy."

[219] Cf. Od . 6.42-46.

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are generated by a pair of principles called respectively the unifying monad and the generative dyad. The fundamental schism dividing all reality is traced from this level down through the phenomena experienced by the soul. The mythoplasts observed this and "hint at it"^[220] in the theomachies, representing at once the oneness of the gods (in that they are all called gods) and their division into two separate classes (since they are seen fighting with one another). Certain unspecified traditional accounts of battles of the gods are said to have this sort of meaning.

Date: 2015-12-17; view: 612