US v. Lopez(1995): Commerce Clause, Guns in school zone

t Lopez, a senior in high school brought a gun into a school zone, violating the Gun-Free school zone Act of 1990. The court, 5-4 rejects the Gun-Free act is authorized by commerce clause

n Majority: RHENQUIST: Commerce clause “must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote to embrace them…” Rehnquistset up the three broad categories of activities Congress could regulate under the commerce clause. 1) Use of channels of interstate commerce (Darby, Heart of Atlanta) 2) regulate and protect instrumentalities of interstate commerce, even though the threat is from intrastate activities (Shreveport Rate) 3) Those activities with a “substantial relation” to interstate commerce (Jones & Laughlin). "Guns in school zones" does not have this affect.

n Concurring: KENNEDY, O’CONNOR: This is a criminal statute, and the conduct of the actors is not commercial. Also, stresses the importance of Federal v. State interests as a fundamental concept to framers of Constitution.

n Concurring: THOMAS: Thomasargues for a strict definition of “commerce” as the was intended at writing. He talks of the problems of giving “commerce” a definition to accommodate modern advances. Thomaswould not apply commerce to manufacturing or agriculture.

n Dissent: BREYER, STEVENS, SOUTER, GINSBURG: when determining a “significant” (“substantial” not broad enough) affect on interstate, do not consider single act, consider all similar acts. Also, Congress should determine if commerce clause is reasonably applied, and should be given lead way. The opinion claims that the majority opinion runs contrary to previous Supreme Court decisions (Perez, McClung). Also, the opinion points out the legal uncertainty of the hundreds of (criminal) statutes Congress has passed relying on the commerce clause.

Date: 2015-01-02; view: 888