Plessy v. Ferguson – Separate but equal – Railroad cars

t Brown1896. Established “separate but equal” doctrine.

t Initially, SCt’s view was that “separate but equal” treatment did not violate equal protection. SCt upheld a Louisiana law requiring segregation of railroad passenger cars; a law calling for separate-but-equal accommodations for white and black railroad passengers.

t Rationale. Majority reasoned that laws such as this one related only to “social” equality, not to political or civil equality. Brown concluded that the 14^th Amendmentmandates “political,” not “social,” equality. “The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality.” SCt held that social equality was not a goal of the Equal ProtectionClause, and could be attained only through voluntary action by individuals, not by statutes.

n Not badge of inferiority. Moreover, the law itself did not “stamp . . . the colored race with a badge of inferiority.” If African Americans felt inferior under the law, “it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”

t Dissent - Harlan.

n The distinction between social and political equality, and the exclusion of the former from antidiscrimination concerns, is taken for granted by the sole dissenter as well: “Every true man has pride of race, and under appropriate circumstances when the rights of others, his equals before the law, are not to be affected, it is his privilege to express such pride and to take such action based upon it as to him seems proper.”

n However, the first Justice Harlanargued that the law here did indeed violate equal protection. Although it appeared facially neutral, “every one knows that it had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.” The statute therefore interfered with the personal freedom of African Americans.

n Harlan’s dissent has become a canonical source of contemporary antidiscrimination doctrine, though the overt racism of his discussion of the Chinese suggests that this source ought to be relied on with caution. He looks both to formal equality and to the political reality that these statutes were enacted to oppress blacks, leaving some doubt as to the fundamental constitutional ground for his dissent.

n Is Harlan’s essential claim that

(1) “Our USC is color-blind,” so that the government is centrally prohibited from classifying on the basis of race, or

(2) is it his claim that “There is no caste here,” so that the problem is the underlying political reality.

(3) These two different readings may have very different implications for, for example, affirmative action. Some have argued that Harlanmeant his “color-blind” remark to include “benign” or “reverse” discrimination based on race.

t How does the majority distinguish Strauder?

n On the one hand, we can argue that Plessywas rightly decided because the 14th Amendmentprotects political, not social, equality. In accordance with the Lochermethod of evaluating laws, the law at issue in Plessy was constitutionally valid because it did not deny anyone the right to use, control, or dispose of his property. The law requiring segregated railroad cars imposed a badge of inferiority on blacks only to the extent that blacks believed this to be the case; thus, the law did not violate Strouder.

n On the other hand, it is more sensible to conclude that Plessy was wrongly decided because the law was clearly intended to discriminate against blacks; it legally codified society's hostility toward blacks. This violates Strouder's notion that blacks are exempt from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored -- exemptions from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society . . ." By legally permitting social inequality, the Plessy court inevitably permits legal inequality as well.

February 29, 2000

Date: 2015-01-02; view: 675