Lujan v. Defenders of the Wildlife – Endangered Species Act

t Scalia1992. SCt denied standing to a public interest group that sought to question an interpretation of the Endangered Species Act.

t Must be “actual or imminent.” The “injury in fact” must be “actual or imminent.” Thus, if the threatened harm is far in the future, or too speculative, the “actual or imminent” element will not be satisfied, and standing will not be found.

t Facts. Ps challenge certain federal agency action that will have the effect of endangering certain species abroad. D (U.S. government) argues that the Ps do not have standing. Ps retort that they have in the past, and will again, travel to the habitats of the potentially affected species, in order to observe/study those species.

t Holding:

n Scaliaheld that Ps cannot sue because they are not the objects of the government action. Ps have not shown the requisite actual or imminent harm. “Such ‘someday’ intentions – without any description of concrete plans, or indeed any specification of when the someday will be – do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.”

n Scalia’s language seemed to imply an absolute constitutional barrier, but it is easily crossed: Ps could have brought plane tickets, or Congress could have created a $1 bounty for anyone who successfully sued. The latter suggests that “injury in fact” isn’t an Article III requirement at all.

t Concurrences.

n Kennedy. Concurring in part, Kennedy concluded that the Ps haven’t demonstrated a concrete injury. He suggested that SCt needed to be sensitive to new rights of action that are not analogous to common law rights of action.

n Stevens. Concurring in judgment, Stevens thought that the Ps have standing, but that they lose on the merits.

t Dissent - Blackmun. Argued that the plurality opinion invited executive lawlessness and made unfounded assumptions about causation.

Date: 2015-01-02; view: 786