Printz v. United States– Brady Bill – Don’t No commandeer state executive

t Scalia1997. SCt held that Congress may not compel a state or local government’s executive branch to perform functions.

t Brady Bill’s provision. In 1993, Congress enacted the “Brady Bill,” aimed at controlling the flow of guns. As a temporary 5-year measure, the law ordered local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks on prospective purchasers, until a national computerized system for doing these checks could be phased in. Printz and Mack, country sheriffs in Montana and Arizona respectively, objected to the background-check requirement and sued. They argued that under New York v. U.S., Congress could not force them to conduct background checks on the federal government’s behalf.

t Decision. By 5-4 margin, SCt agreed with Ps. Majority noted that in NY v. U.S., SCt had said that the federal government “may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” Scaliathen concluded that the background-check portion of the Brady bill violated this prohibition; also violates separation of powersby reducing powers of President.

n Rationale. Scaliarejected the dissent’s distinction between compelling a state to make policy (such as the compelled enactment of a regulatory scheme, like the “take title” scheme at issue in NY v. U.S.) and compelling state executive-branch officers to perform ministerial tasks (such as the background checks at issue here). Even if no policy-making was involved here, this did not prevent Congress’ action from being an intolerable incursion into state sovereignty: “It is an essential attribute of the States’ retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority. It is no more compatible with this independence and autonomy that their officers be ‘dragooned’ into administering federal law, than it would be compatible with the independence and autonomy of the U.S. that is officers be impressed into service for the execution of state laws.”

n Basis unclear. It’s not clear whether Scaliabelieved that any particular constitutional provision had been violated. He seemed to be relying on general, non-textual, principle of state sovereignty, rather than on any specific clause (e.g. the 10th Amendment, which he referred to only occasionally and in passing). But two concurring opinions specifically said that the background-check requirement violated the 10^th Amendment.

t Concurrence - Thomas. Brady Act may constitute 2^nd Amendmentviolation.

t Dissent - Stevens.

n First pointed out that the federal commerce power gave Congress the authority to regulate handguns. He then concluded that this being so, the “necessary and proper” clause gave Congress the right to implement its regulation by temporarily requiring local police officers to perform the ministerial step of identifying persons who should not be entrusted with handguns. This was especially true since Congress could have required private citizens to help with such indemnification: “The 10^th Amendmentprovides no support for a rule that immunizes local officials form obligations that might be imposed on ordinary citizens.”

n SCt holding here will accomplish opposite of what it intends by creating incentives for aggrandizement of federal power.

t Dissent - Souter. Distinguished New York because state legislators are entitled to discretion in a way that state law enforcement officials are not.

t Dissent - Breyer. Comparative law shows that conscription of local officials is not necessarily oppressive. [Scalia’s C/A: comparative law analysis is inappropriate once USC is already ratified.] Koppelman: who is right here? Breyer: viewed SC as attempting to solve problem of reconciling national authority with local autonomy.

n USC does not specifically prohibit Congress from doing what it did in New York and Printz.

n Thus, every rule here is necessarily judge-made and based on prudential concerns.

n Thus, Breyerrejected Scalia’s bright-line distinction between drafting/interpreting USC. If there have to be limitations on federal power, and such limitations are unclear, SC must imply a limit that makes most practical sense. Thus, question becomes: is bad thing going to happen that USC was intended to prevent? Given fear of tyranny, Breyersuggested we look at other countries’ experiences to see if tyranny really does arise.

n Scaliawas concerned about letting Congress do whatever it wants.

Possible McCullochtheory underlying New York and Printz

t McCulloch says that if MD can single out Bank for special taxes not borne by MD citizens generally, it can unduly pressure federal government to have policy that it likes. But generally applicable taxes were okay.

t Possibly, there is a corresponding nondiscrimination limit on ability of Congress to single out states for special burdens that federal government need not bear. This theory may underlie New York and Printz.

t NY and Printz distinguished from Garcia. Garcia seems to apply mainly to generally applicable federal lawmaking; that case holds that where Congress passes a generally applicable law (e.g. minimum wage law that applies to all or nearly all businesses), the 10^th Amendmentdoes not entitle a state’s own operations to an exemption, merely because it is a state that is being regulated along with all the other private entities. But where the federal government tries to force a state or local government to enact legislation or regulation, or tries to force state or local officials to perform particular governmental functions, this is not part of a generally-applicable federal scheme, and is instead directed specifically at the state’s basic exercise of sovereignty: the state’s right to carry out the business of government. NY and Printz say the federal government may not use such coercion.

Date: 2015-01-02; view: 774