Systems of International Security

A distinct, although related, debate concerns the characterization of "systems of international security". There are also very different perspectives and proposals on this topic. For instance, while Muthiah Alagappa (1998: 54-56) described three types of security systems he considers "pure" -competitive security, collective security, and security community -, Raymo Vayren (1999) listed three different "perspectives" on international security: common, cooperative, and collective. Patrick Morgan (1997), however, identifies five "ideal types" of systems, or multilateral forms of conflict management: power restraining power; alignment agreement of major powers; collective security, pluralist community of security, and integration. In turn, Brian Job (1997) goes further to subdivide the first into balance of power and collective defence, while Gareth Evans (1993) maintains that common security, collective security, and comprehensive security are different forms of cooperative security. Particular relevance is, then, placed on concepts centred on competitive security, common security, cooperative security, collective security, and security community.

In the traditional perspective, clearly inspired by realism, the international security system is competitive by nature, rooted in self-defence/security of States in an environment of conflict. In the perceived anarchical international structure, without any superior authority to guarantee survival and mistrusting and fearing the ambition of others, each State faces its own security as its main concern and assumes responsibility for self-defence and self-security, in a traditional Hobbesian challenge of order and competitive security. Even so, there are differences between the so-called "offensive realism" and "defensive realism". John Mearsheimer, one of the most distinguished authors of the "offensive" position, argues that «States are always prepared to think offensively toward other States» (2001: 34). Kenneth Waltz (2001) stresses a different viewpoint: States are not simply driven by “maximization of power”, but also by maintaining their positions in the system and consolidating the balance of power which, in the logic of “relative gains”, may be a source of international stability.

The competitive nature of the system, however, does not erase the possibility of cooperation among States on security and defence, or even the feasibility of a relative "international order". It is within this framework that realism finds comfort in the theories of collective defence (several States, confronted with a common threat from another State or coalition, unite to consolidate their respective capabilities and better defend themselves as a group, dissuade, or defeat the enemy/adversary), ofbalance of power (stressing the permanent play of weight, counter-weight, and/or compensation, primarily among the great powers), and of hegemony (stressing not only the ambitions and attitudes of the great powers constantly seeking maximization of power, but also the capabilities and potentialities/vulnerabilities of hegemonic power, which may be the determining factor in achieving greater or lesser stability in the inherent system of competitive security).

The common security approach gained some emphasis following the report "Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament” by the Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues), in 1982, amidstthe tense Cold War context. Emphasizing the risks of escalation and the risks and limitations of unilateral initiatives, the Commission called for a common compromise for survival and security that would accommodate the legitimate interests of "others" as well as "ours". The argument is that security must be reached with others, not against them: hence such recommendations, like the creation of nuclear weapon free zones, mutual control of strategic defence of space, disarmament of superpowers and their respective 'blocks" of collective defence, and the strengthening of the United Nations and regional organizations. For Gareth Evans (1993), the positive aspect of this idea, as defined by the Palme Commission, is that it emphasizes common survival through security with "the other side". However, he points out that a great deal of the debates over common security has focused on aspects of military security and that is only one of many fronts in a more inclusive cooperative security.

The cooperative security became very popular in Europe as a result of the 1975 Helsinki Accords and, primarily, since the end of the Cold War. Cooperative security, however, has been defined and applied in different ways, although always based on the premise that, in order to be respected, security cannot be imposed or reached by one group on another and must be based on common institutions and norms. As a rule, cooperative security is perceived as a regimen which prevents and manages conflicts in a certain established framework of norms and procedures which imply accommodating rival (or potentially rival) interests and politics to maintain a stable international order under the leadership of the great powers (Vayryen, 1999: 57-58).

Muthiah Alagappa (1998: 53-54) further ascertains that relational identity in cooperative security is not a negative thing or, if it is, it is only to a very small degree and may, actually, be positive: States may be sceptic and distrustful of one another, but there is not a perception of immediate threat. Gareth Evans (1993) presents a rather broad concept of cooperative security that includes several forms of common security, collective security, and comprehensive security. In this author's view, the main virtue of cooperative security is that it provides a broad range of responses to questions of security: the essence of cooperative security is based on the fact it emphasizes cooperation over competition (3). David Dewitt (1994) shares an equally broad concept of cooperative security, and includes in it the idea of comprehensive security, competitive security, as well as the balance of powers and alliances.

Regarding collective security, G. Evans defines it as being inherently focused on military issues, incorporating the idea that all members renounce the use of force among them and agree to promptly assist any other member that may come under attack. Collective security is, in this light, the corollary of common security, «the last guarantee that the process will not stray from the course as the result of individual aggressive behaviour by any State - or that if it does, the reaction will alter it» (Evans, 1993: 15-16). Likewise, in Vayryen's view, the purpose of collective security is to create a virtual international coalition that will deter potential aggressors and, if necessary, punish them through the use of force, but without prior definition of the aggressor or the victim. It is anchored, primarily, on the premise of maintaining the status quo by representing and mobilizing the international society, and calling for a vast legitimate and representative measure of collective action. Therefore, a system of this type requires «an established framework of institutions, norms, and procedures that are helpful in mobilizing international response when necessary» (Vayryen, 1999: 59).

Brian Job, on the other hand, stresses the difference between collective security and pluralist security society. The former refers to a compromise of the type "all-for-one" among members in order to act, automatically and in synchrony, to assist a member State under threat or attack by another State. According to this author, collective security mechanisms, unlike collective defence, are not motivated by the need to plan or act against a perceived external threat, that is, a State excluded from the group. In this context the dilemma of security among members is attenuated, as there is not an immediate, or clearly identified, threat. Thus, collective security frameworks have a tendency to have a large range of participants, as they are designed to accommodate a large common denominator in terms of attitudes and compromises. Their success depends a lot on the degree of involvement and commitment of the most powerful members of the group (Job, 1997: 172-173).

In Job's perspective, a higher level of cooperation is that of the pluralistic community of security, where there is a deeper, and qualitatively higher, level of multilateralism and institutionalism and where membership is more restrictive and very regulated. This happens because the pluralist community of security presupposes the mutual identification and identity development among participants, which is necessary to materialize and sustain the principle of diffuse reciprocity on a long-term basis. More importantly, the distinctive character of the security community is «the cognitive transition that occurs among States, and which, in principle, does not encourage or fear force as a means of interaction among themselves» (Job, 1997: 174-175). In M. Alagappa's view, also, the "community of security" is deeper than cooperative security, since it is more demanding in its premises and has a greater potential for preventing the emergence of new disputes: «In a community security system, national identity and national interest become fused with those of a larger community of states» (1998: 55). Therefore, there is no exception to the use of force among members of the community and it becomes illegitimate as an instrument of politics among the States that form it: in this perspective, security is collective by definition.

Date: 2015-12-17; view: 879