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AUSTRO-HUNGARY'S ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA

The British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey, for one, was shocked by Austria's demands, especially its insistence that Austrian officials would participate in Serbian judicial proceedings. The Serbian government's response was more conciliatory than most diplomats expected, but diplomatic efforts to avert war still failed. The Austrians' ultimatum to Serbia included the following demands:

 

The Royal Serb Government will publish the following declaration on the first page of its official journal of 26/13 July:

'The Royal Serb Government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, and regrets sincerely the horrible consequences of these criminal ambitions.

'The Royal Serb Government regrets that Serb officers and officials have taken part in the propaganda above-mentioned and thereby imperiled friendly and neighbourly relations.

The Royal Government . . . considers it a duty to warn officers, officials and indeed all the inhabitants of the kingdom [of Serbia], that it will in future use great severity against such persons who may be guilty of similar doings.

The Royal Serb Government will moreover pledge itself to the following:

1. to suppress every publication likely to inspire hatred and contempt against the Monarchy;

2. to begin immediately dissolving the society called Narodna Odbrana*, to seize all its means of propaganda î act in the same way against all the societies and associations in Serbia, which are busy with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

3. to eliminate without delay from public instruction everything that serves or might serve the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, both where teachers or books are concerned;

4. to remove from military service and from the administration all officers and officials who are guilty of having taken part in the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whose names and proof of whose guilt the I. and R. Government [Imperial and Royal, that is, the Austro-Hungarian empire] will communicate to the Royal Government;

5. to consent to the cooperation of I. and R. officials in Serbia in suppressing the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

6. to open a judicial inquest [enquete judiciaire] against all those who took part in the plot of 28 June, if they are to be found on Serbian territory, the I. and R. Government will delegate officials who will take an active part in these and associated inquiries;

The I. and R. Government expects the answer of the Royal government to reach it not later than Saturday, the 25th, at six in the afternoon. . . .

*Narodna Odbrana, or National Defense, was pro-Serbian and anti-, Austrian, but nonviolent. The Society of the Black Hand, to which Franz Ferdinand's assassin belonged, considered Narodna Odbrana too moderate.

Ralph Menning, The Art of the Possible: Documents on Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914 (New York: McCraw Hill, 1996), pp. 400, 402-403, 414-415 (source for all three document excerpts).



The Serbs recognized the provocation and mobilized their army three hours before sending a reply, which agreed to all but the most important Austrian demands. Austria responded with its own mobilization and declared war three days later, on July 28, 1914.

For a brief moment, it seemed possible to avoid a wider war. At first diplomats and politicians hoped to write the confrontation off as another crisis in the Balkans. Austria's steady escalation, coupled with Russia's traditional ties to Serbia, ultimately made that impossible. For Austria, the conflict was a matter of prestige and power politics – a chance to reassert the fraying empire's authority. For Russia, too, the emerging conflict was an opportunity to regain some of the tsar's authority by standing up for the rights of "brother Slavs." Initially, Russia planned to respond to Austria's threat with a partial mobilization, but when the orders came down on July 30, Russia mobilized fully – its troops were readied to fight both Austria and Germany.

The crisis spread, and the Germans were prepared. Sitting in the most precarious geographic position, Germany had the most detailed plans for fighting a war of necessity. Its military planners were among those who saw war as inevitable, an opportunity to settle the nation's future in continental Europe. As Russia began to mobilize, Kaiser William II (1888-1918) sent an ultimatum to St. Petersburg demanding that mobilization cease within twelve hours; the Russians refused. Meanwhile, the German ministers demanded to know France's intentions. Premier Rene Viviani (1914-1915) replied that France would act “in accordance with her interests” – which meant an immediate mobilization against Germany. Finally facing threat it had long anticipated, Germany mobilized on August 1 and declared war on Russia—two days later, on France. The next day, the German army invaded Belgium on its way to take Paris.

This invasion of neutral Belgium galvanize and parliamentary support for war in Great Britain. The British had secret pacts that obligated them France, but they also had an old, public agreement guarantee Belgium's neutrality. Moreover, Britain wanted to keep any Continental power from dominating the Low Countries, which lay directly across the English Channel, and to stop the threat of the growing navy. So on August 4, Britain entered the war against Germany. Other nations were quickly drawn into the struggle. On August 7 the Montenegrins joined with the Serbs in fighting Austria. Two weeks later the Japanese declared war on Germany, mainly to attack German possessions in the Far East. On August 1 Turkey allied with Germany, and in October began the bombardment of Russian ports on the Black Sea. Italy had been allied with Germany and Austria before the war, but at the outbreak of hostilities, the Italians cited a strict interpretation of their obligations and declared neutrality. They insisted that since Germany had invaded neutral Belgium, they owed Germany no protection.

The diplomatic maneuvers during the five weeks that followed the assassination at Sarajevo have been characterized as "a tragedy of miscalculation." Diplomats' hands were tied, however, by the strategic thinking and rigid timetables set by military leaders. Speed was of prime importance to generals. To them, once war seemed certain, time spent on diplomacy was time lost on the battlefield. Historians continue to debate whether Germany pressured Austria to attack Serbia in order to precipitate a continental war. A number of factors contributed to the outbreak of war when it came. Austria negotiated about its ultimatum for three weeks, and during the delay both Russia and Germany felt obliged to make shows of strength. Reasoned debate about the problem never occurred. During the crisis government officials had little contact with each other, and even less with the diplomats and ambassadors of other countries. Several heads of state, including the kaiser and the president of France, along with many of their ministers, spent most of July on vacation, they returned to find their generals holding orders for mobilization, waiting for signature. Austria's mismanagement of the crisis and Russia's inability to find a way to intervene without mobilizing its army contributed greatly to the spiraling confrontation. It is clear, however, that powerful German officials were arguing that war was inevitable. It seemed clear to them that Germany should fight before Russia recovered from its 1905 loss to Japan, and before the French army could benefit from its new three-year conscription law that would put more men in uniform. The same sense of urgency characterized the strategies of all combatant countries. The lure of a bold, successful strike against one's enemies, and the fear that too much was at stake to risk losing the advantage, created a rolling tide of military mobilization that carried Europe into battle.

 

 

Declaration of War, August, 1914. In Berlin, an officer reads the Kaiser's order to mobilize troops before a crowd of civilians and soldiers.

 

CHRONOLOGY WORLD WAR I BEGINS

Assassination of Archduke

Franz Ferdinand of Austria June 28,1914

Austria and Russian mobilize

for war July 28,1914

Germany declares war on Russia

and France August 1-3,1914

Britain enters war against

Germany August 4,1914

 


Date: 2015-04-20; view: 863


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