Imperial decline in the 18th and early 19th centuries

Most manifestations of decline were only continuations and elaborations of earlier conditions. In the later Ottoman period, however, a new factor of decline was added: the weakness of the central government resulted in the loss of control of most of the provinces to the local ruling notables, called ayan or derebeyis (“lords of the valley”) in Anatolia and klephts or hayduks in Europe, who took more or less permanent control of large areas, creating a situation that in many ways resembled European feudalism much more than the traditional Ottoman timar system ever did. These notables were able to build up their power and maintain control not only because the sultan’s government lacked the military resources to suppress them but also because the local populations preferred the notables’ rule to that of the corrupt and incompetent Ottoman officials. In the Balkans and Anatolia local rulers solidified their positions by taking advantage of currents of local nationalism that were arising among the Balkan Christians. The notables formed private armies of mercenaries and slaves, which they sometimes used to provide important contributions to the Ottoman armies in return for recognition of their autonomy by the sultans. These rulers were able to exercise almost complete authority, collecting taxes for themselves and sending only nominal payments to the treasury, thus further increasing its problems. The central government maintained its position when it could by playing off the local rebels against each other, using the leverage of Ottoman support to its own advantage and securing considerable payments of cash and military contributions when needed. The treasury, therefore, did not suffer as much from these provincial revolts as might be imagined, but the revolts did disrupt the established food supplies of the empire and caused large-scale famines to starve the major cities on a regular basis. In response, the urban populace became a restless, misruled, and anarchic mass that broke loose at the slightest provocation, responding to unemployment, famine, and plague with riots and summary executions of the officials considered responsible. This violence brought attention to Ottoman difficulties but did not remedy them and in fact made things worse. The potential for reform lay only in the hands of the ruling class, but its reaction was quite different.

RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

Most Ottomans saw little need for the empire to change, because they benefited financially from the anarchy and the sultan’s lack of control. In addition, the ruling class was completely isolated from developments outside its own sphere; it assumed that the remedies to Ottoman decline lay entirely within Ottoman practice and experience. This resulted from the basic belief of Ottoman society in its own superiority over anything outsiders could possibly produce, a belief that had far more justification in the 16th century, when it arose, than in the 18th century. All the advances in industrial and commercial life, science and technology, and particularly political and military organization and techniques that had occurred in Europe since the Reformation were simply unknown to the Ottomans. The only direct Ottoman contacts with Europe were on the battlefield, where most Ottomans still assumed that their military reverses were caused not by the superiority of Western armies but rather by Ottoman failure to apply fully the techniques that had worked so well in the past. Thus, the 18th-century reforms largely paralleled those of the traditional Ottoman reformers of the 17th century, with only occasional efforts to add new military organizations and to make use of specific European weapons and techniques of undeniable superiority.

CONTACTS WITH THE WEST

For some Ottomans this isolation was at least partially broken down when some channels of contact opened with the West during the 18th century. A few Ottoman ambassadors went to Europe to participate in negotiations and sign treaties; more and more European merchants, travelers, and consuls came into the Ottoman Empire; a very few Ottoman men of science and philosophy began to correspond with their Western counterparts; and members of the Ottoman minorities entered into correspondence with their relatives in the West. But such contacts had very limited consequences: only a small number of Ottomans experienced them, and, even when they did learn something, the effect was quite superficial because the resulting information did not fit into the patterns of thought of even the most educated Ottomans. Those few who did understand something of what they heard usually were only voices in the wilderness, and their efforts to apply and disseminate the new knowledge had little overall effect. Such contacts led to nothing more than changes in the modes of living of a few upper-class Ottomans and to some military innovations. Beginning in the so-called Tulip Period(1717–30), some Ottomans under the influence of the grand vizier İbrahim Paşa began to dress like Europeans, and the palace began to imitate European court life and pleasures. SultanAhmed III (ruled 1703–30) built several lavish summer residences on the Bosporus and the Golden Horn (an inlet that forms part of the harbour of Istanbul), and members of his immediate entourage built similarly lavish houses, holding frequent garden parties in imitation of the pleasures of Versailles. The sultan and his ministers were no longer confined behind the walls of the Topkapı palace. This new era was celebrated by Nedim, the court poet, whose poetry demonstrates a considerable awareness of his environment and an appreciation of nature. Growing tulips became an obsession with rich and poor alike, signifying Westernization, and the flower gave its name to the period. In 1727 Turkish-language books were printed for the first time in the empire, by a Hungarian convert who took the name İbrahim Müteferrika, and while the press was closed at times owing to resentment on the part of the scribes—who feared being made obsolete—during the remainder of the century it provided a number of books on history and geography that further opened the minds of the literate.

MILITARY REFORMS

As a result of contact with European armies and the influence of European renegades in Ottoman service, a few attempts were made during the 18th century to adopt Western-style uniforms, weapons, and tactics. Because the members of the established military corps could not and would not surrender their old ways, entirely new corps were formed to handle the new weapons under the direction of European instructors. The new corps had no effect at all on the Janissaries and the other older corps that continued to form the bulk of the army, however; the older corps accurately perceived that the new ways threatened their privileges and security. The new corps thus were essentially special mercenary bodies built up under the direction of individual Ottomans, lasting only so long as their patrons remained in power.

The most successful and lasting Ottoman military reform during this time came in the navy, which was modernized by the grand admiral Gazi Hasan Paşa (served 1770–89) with the support and encouragement of the sultan Abdülhamid I (ruled 1774–89); this success came largely because the Ottoman naval establishment was devastated in 1770 at the Battle of Çeşme by a Russian fleet that had sailed from the Baltic Sea, and there was none of the inbred resistance that stifled significant reforms elsewhere. Important reforms introduced into the army under the grand vizier Halil Hamid Paşa (served 1782–85), with the help of Western technicians, were limited to new corps specially created for the purpose. The bulk of the Ottoman army remained unchanged and therefore was more equipped to suppress reform at home than to challenge modern Western armies.

Date: 2015-02-03; view: 1101